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ABSTRACT
SPECIES OF GOODNESS
FEBRUARY 1999
WILLIAM BENJAMIN BRADLEY
BA., LAWRENCE UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Fred Feldman
The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic value can be traced back to
Plato and Aristotle. I contend that the distinction has never been properly drawn. My
main task is to formulate the distinction in a way that avoids the problems of the
traditional formulations.
After defending the traditional Moorean conception of intrinsic value against
John Mackie’s arguments from relativity and “queemess,” and against recent attacks
by Elizabeth Anderson and Shelly Kagan, I attempt to define two important types of
extrinsic value in terms of intrinsic value. First, I define instrumental value. The main
problem with traditional definitions of instrumental value is that they fail to account
for the fact that preventing something intrinsically evil from occurring seems to be just
as worthwhile as bringing about something intrinsically good. I attempt to account for
this fact by introducing a “contextualist” analysis of instrumental value. Next, I
present and defend an analysis of contributory value. I compare contributory value
with conditional intrinsic value, and present an argument to show that the notion of
conditional intrinsic value faces problems that can be avoided by admitting the
VI
existence of contributory value. I then expand on the contextualist analysis of
instrumental value, and provide an analysis of extrinsic value that explains what is
common to instrumental and contributory value. I contend that my analysis can also
account for other types of extrinsic value — for example, signatory value — and I
defend my analysis against recent objections by Alastair Norcross involving the
extrinsic values of actions.
Finally, I argue that contributory value can help to solve a current problem in
environmental ethics. The problem is this: how can it be that the last member of a
species is more valuable than a similar member of a flourishing species (irrespective
of human interests)? I argue (following Leibniz and Brentano) that diversity of goods
increases the value of a whole; therefore, the last member of an endangered species
has contributory value in virtue of its contribution to the world’s biological diversity.
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PREFACE
When thinking about value, nearly all philosophers have noticed that there are
important distinctions between different types of value. For example, in Republic 357
Plato distinguishes three kinds of goods:
“Tell me, is there in your opinion a kind of good that we would
choose to have not because we desire its consequences, but because we
delight in it for its own sake — such as enjoyment and all the pleasures
which are harmless and leave no after effects other than the enjoyment in
having them?”
“In my opinion, at least,” I said, “there is a good of this kind.”
“And what about this? Is there a kind we like both for its own sake
and for what comes out of it, such as thinking and seeing and being
healthy? Surely we delight in such things on both accounts.”
“Yes,” I said.
“And do you see a third form of good, which includes gymnastic
exercise, medical treatment when sick as well as the practice of medicine,
and the rest of the activities from which money is made? We would say
that they are drudgery but beneficial to us; and we would not choose to
have them for themselves but for the sake of the wages and whatever else
comes out of them.”
“Yes, there is also this third,” I said, “but what of it?”
Aristotle seems to endorse a similar view in Nicomachean Ethics : “Clearly, then,
things can be called good in two senses: some as good in their own right, and others
as means to secure these” (Aristotle 1096b 13).
The types of value apparently introduced by Plato and Aristotle are today often
referred to as “intrinsic” and “extrinsic” value. The distinction between intrinsic and
extrinsic value is one of the most fundamental distinctions in ethical theory. Axiology
cannot be done without this distinction. One essential task of a substantive theory of
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value is to provide a statement of necessary and sufficient conditions for having
intrinsic value in the most basic way. 1 Differences between theories of value can
usually be seen as disagreements over what these necessary and sufficient conditions
are.
There is another essential part of axiology, however. This part consists of the
attempt to formulate rules determining the (non-basic) intrinsic, extrinsic, and overall
values of things. This part of axiology has been largely overlooked. The question of
how to determine the intrinsic value of something based on the values of its parts has
received some attention, most notably from G.E. Moore (1903). 2 However, the
question of how to determine something’s extrinsic value has been mostly ignored;
even when it has not been ignored, it has typically been given a simplistic one-
sentence answer. Most axiologists seem to think that rules determining extrinsic value
are easy to state and uncontroversial. One of the things I hope to show is that these
rules are neither easy to state nor uncontroversial; they deserve more attention than
they have received. They deserve attention not simply because they have never been
properly stated, but also in virtue of the fact, noted by William Tolhurst, that
difficulties in distinguishing intrinsic from extrinsic value have “led some who grant
that there are some things that are good to deny that anything is intrinsically good”
(Tolhurst 383).
One important preliminary issue concerns the meaning of the word ‘good.’ It
has often been noted that there are many senses of the word ‘good.’ Since we will be
focusing on the attempt to define extrinsic value or goodness, we must be clear on the
sense of ‘value’ or ‘good’ we have in mind. One sense of ‘good’ is the sense in which
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it is used in sentences like “This is a good knife; it is very sharp,” or “He’s a good
thief, he s never been caught.’ In this sense of ‘good," it does not make sense to say
‘x is good’ without having in mind a particular way in which x is good - x is a good
thief, knife, etc. To say that something is a good X is to say that it has all (or many) of
the qualities that we look for in something of type X. Peter Geach (1956), Philippa
Foot (1985) and Judith Thomson (1993) have famously argued that this is the only
sense of ‘good’ they understand and, hence, the only legitimate sense of the word. I
am not concerned with this sense of ‘good’; as far as I am concerned, it has nothing to
do with axiology.
There seems to be a clear difference between what we mean by ‘good’ when
we say that a knife is good and what we mean when we say that, for example, pleasure
is good. According to this second sense of ‘good,’ ‘good’ denotes a moral property (I
leave open for now the question of whether this property is natural or non-natural,
objective or subjective, etc.). Henceforth I will call this the “moral sense” of ‘good.’
When someone claims not to understand any meaning of ‘good’ other than the ‘good
X' conception, it is difficult to know what to say. There seem to be some perfectly
intelligible uses of ‘good’ for which the ‘good X’ conception does not allow. For
example, consider the following passage from Genesis: “God said ‘Let there be light,’
and there was light. God saw that light was good
,
and God divided light from
darkness.” It would be hard to understand the use of ‘good’ in this passage in the
‘good X’ sense; do Geach and Thomson therefore not understand this passage? It
seems to me that, although it is very difficult to define precisely this “moral sense” of
the word ‘good,’ there are countless instances of its use. Of course, I have only
scratched the surface of the issues raised by Geach, Thomson, and Foot. To do justice
to the issues they raise would require much more detail, which I am not prepared to
provide here. Henceforth I will simply presume that the reader has a rough
understanding of the “moral sense” of goodness.
A definition of extrinsic value should account for every case in which
something is good (bad) in the moral sense without being intrinsically good (bad).
The first important mistake that philosophers have made in defining extrinsic value is
in identifying it with a particular kind of extrinsic value - instrumental value, or the
value something has in virtue of what it brings about . 3 If we define extrinsic value as
instrumental value, then we won’t be able to account for the value of things that are
good in the moral sense but not intrinsically or instrumentally good. Several different
types of extrinsic, non-instrumental moral value have been suggested in the literature.
G.E. Moore, W.D. Ross, C.D. Broad, C.I. Lewis, William Frankena, Allan Gibbard,
and others claim there is such a thing as “contributory value.” Fred Feldman suggests
there might be a type of extrinsic value called “signatory value”; Judith Thomson
discusses “product value,” and C.I. Lewis mentions “inherent value.” When one gives
a definition of extrinsic value, one must either account for all these types of value or
show, for any type one cannot account for, why it is not a legitimate type of value.
Other problems creep in when we try to define each of these types of extrinsic
value. In particular, instrumental value has proven to be difficult to define. Typically,
something is said to be instrumentally good if and only if it causes something
intrinsically good to occur. Moore, Ross, Frankena, A.C. Ewing, Richard Brandt,
John Hospers, Christine Korsgaard, and several others have defined instrumental value
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in this way. However, it has been noted that something might be instrumental^ good
in virtue of preventing or eliminating an intrinsic evil; this has been pointed out by
Jeremy Bentham, J.S. Mill, Paul Taylor, Earl Conee, and Shelly Kagan. Definitions of
contributory value given by Moore, Ross, Broad, and Frankena also fail to pick out the
intended concept. Before we can evaluate definitions of extrinsic value with respect to
their ability to account for such types of value, we must understand what these types
of value are.
I will proceed as follows. Since the significance of my project depends on
whether there is such a property as goodness - that is, on whether moral realism is true
- I will first defend moral realism against one of the most famous attacks against it.
While my project would still be of some use if moral realism were not true, it would
have to be reconstrued. Since I will be assuming that it is possible to define every
interesting kind of extrinsic value in terms of intrinsic value, I will then discuss the
nature of intrinsic value and defend Moore's account against some recent objections.
In subsequent chapters I will discuss two important types of extrinsic value
(instrumental and contributory), criticize definitions that appear in the literature, and
provide my own definitions. I will then discuss some definitions of extrinsic value
generally, and present a “contextualisf ’ definition that accounts for many, if not all, of
the types of extrinsic value. In doing so, I will remain neutral concerning the question
of what things have intrinsic value. I think that a conception of extrinsic value ought
to be applicable to any reasonable axiology; if my view were not, I would consider
that to be a defect. Finally, I will apply my definition of extrinsic value to a current
problem in environmental ethics involving the value of endangered species. In order
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to apply the definition, I will have to introduce a substantive axiological view;
speaking roughly, the view is that diversity of goods enhances the value of a whole.
1
The notion of "basic” intrinsic value is discussed in Chapter Two below.
It is necessary to deal with this question in order to understand contributory
value; see Chapter Four below.
Mark Pastin complains of this fact: “This conception of intrinsic value...
[is] inadequate because... [it] presuppose[s] that the intrinsically valuable is contrasted
only with that which is valuable as a means” (Pastin 381).
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CHAPTER 1
REALISM ABOUT VALUE
1 . 1 Realism vs. Anti-Realism
The view that goodness is a real property of things has been held in different
forms by philosophers since Plato. In the Republic
,
Plato (through Socrates) asserts
that there is an idea, or form, in common to all good things. This is perhaps one of the
earliest statements of what we might call “realism”:
“We both assert that there are,” I said, “and distinguish in speech, many
fair things, many good things, and so on for each kind of thing.”
“Yes, so we do.”
“And we also assert that there is a fair itself, a good itself, and so on for
all the things that we then set down as many. Now, again, we refer them to
one idea of each as though the idea were one; and we address it as that
which really is.” (507b)
G.E. Moore makes a similar claim in Principia Ethica :
For ‘good conduct’ is a complex notion: all conduct is not good; for some
is certainly bad and some may be indifferent. And on the other hand, other
things, beside conduct, may be good; and if they are so, then, ‘good’
denotes some property, that is common to them and conduct” (Moore 1903,
p. 2; my emphasis).
There is a strong primafacie case for realism. In ordinary speech, we often call things
‘good’; we argue over whether some behavior, piece of legislation, or state of affairs is
good, and it is hard to see how such arguments could make sense if not interpreted as
disputes over whether the thing in question possesses the property of goodness.
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However, the view that there is no such property as goodness is just as old; in
Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle seems to embrace anti-realism when he claims that
“good is not a common characteristic corresponding to one Idea” (1096b). In this
century, such philosophers as Peter Geach (1956), Philippa Foot (1985), Judith
Thomson (1993 and 1997), and J.L. Mackie (1977) have famously argued that there is
no such thing as goodness. Their arguments are widely thought to have laid the notion
of intrinsic value to rest once and for all. For the sake of clarity, I will focus on
Mackie’s view.
We might well wonder what these philosophers mean when they say there is no
such property as goodness. On at least one common conception of what it is to be a
property — the “abundant” conception 1 — there is a property for every meaningful
predicate. Some philosophers (e.g., Ayer (1952), Geach and Thomson, among others)
have gone so far as to argue that the predicate ‘is good,’ used in the “moral sense” that
I am interested in here, is not meaningful - that is, sentences containing this predicate
do not express propositions; they are neither true nor false. This position is sometimes
called “non-cognitivism.” Being a non-cognitivist is one way to be an anti-realist.
However, some philosophers who claim to be anti-realists, such as Mackie, hold that
sentences containing the expression ‘is good’ are perfectly intelligible, and capable of
being true or false. So Mackie seems to be committed to the existence of a property of
goodness. How can Mackie be an anti-realist and yet admit that there is a property of
goodness?
Perhaps Mackie’s anti-realist position is that goodness is not a “sparse” or
“natural” property — it is not a property that carves the world “at the joints.” But I
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don t think this is what an anti-realist like Mackie wants to say. For one thing, as
David Lewis points out, “the distinction between natural properties and others admits
of degree. Some few properties are perfectly natural. Others ...are at least somewhat
natural in a derivative way” (1986, p. 61; Lewis’ emphasis). If Mackie is merely
denying that goodness is a perfectly natural property, then his position is rather
uninteresting. Many uncontroversial properties are not perfectly natural, since there
are probably only a very small number of perfectly natural properties. Redness, for
instance, is not a perfectly natural property; if goodness is at least as “real” as redness,
then it should be “real” enough for the moral realist. On the other hand, if Mackie is
saying that goodness is completely unnatural, his position seems quite implausible.
Even if there are some good things that seem to resemble each other very little, there
are certainly many good things that resemble each other quite a bit; this is enough to
show that goodness is at least not at the very bottom of the naturalness scale.
In order to understand what Mackie thinks is really at stake here, I propose that
we briefly examine his own view about the nature of goodness. Mackie seems to think
that the issue turns on “objectivity.” “There are no objective values” is the very first
statement of Chapter One of Mackie’s Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Mackie 15,
my emphasis), and it is this statement that he attempts to prove. Mackie considers his
own view to be a kind of “subjectivism.” Mackie states his particular version of
subjectivism as follows: “to be called good a thing must be such as to have some
satisfying relation to something like interests” (Mackie 62). Here is how I interpret
Mackie’s View of Goodness:
3
MVG: x is good relative to interest-set S = * x satisfies S.
Is MVG a form of moral anti-realism? In one sense, it is not; for it entails that
there really exists a (relational) property of goodness. But moral realism, as it is often
understood by contemporary ethicists, involves more than merely the claim that there
is a property of goodness. Richard Boyd states moral realism as follows:
By “moral realism” I intend the analogous doctrine about moral judgments,
moral statements, and moral theories. According to moral realism:
1. Moral statements are the sorts of statements which are ...true or
false...;
2. The truth or falsity...of moral statements is largely independent of
our moral opinions, theories, etc.;
3 . Ordinary canons of moral reasoning — together with ordinary canons
of scientific and everyday factual reasoning - constitute, under many
circumstances at least, a reliable method for obtaining and improving
(approximate) moral knowledge. (Boyd 1 82)
Part (1) of Boyd’s statement of realism entails that there is a property of goodness;
Mackie seems to agree with this. Part (2), however, seems to state that goodness is
objective”; this is where Mackie disagrees. The dispute is over what kind of property
goodness is; what makes a statement of value true or false? According to the realist,
whether something is good or bad does not depend on anyone’s subjective attitude
toward it. But MVG explicitly states that goodness is a relation between a thing and a
set of interests; thus, whether something is good or bad depends upon what attitude is
taken toward it. The motivation for this view seems to be that it is more compatible
than objectivism with a materialist worldview; this becomes evident when Mackie
begins presenting his arguments. So Mackie does not seem to be an anti-realist about
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goodness; he thinks there really is a (relational) property of goodness, but that it is a
“subjective” property - whether something has it or not depends on what subjective
attitudes are taken toward that thing. Thus Mackie is an anti-realist only about
“objective” goodness.
MVG seems to be, strictly speaking, incompatible with the Moorean notion of
intrinsic value. According to Moore, intrinsic value is the value something has in
virtue of its intrinsic properties alone (see Section 2.1.2). IfMVG, or something like
it, were true, then nothing would be good solely in virtue of its intrinsic properties;
whenever something had the property of goodness, it would be good at least in part
because of something external to it - namely, a set of interests. I will assume a
Moorean view of intrinsic value in defining extrinsic value; thus ifMVG were true,
my project would also have to be reconstrued. However, as I will explain below
(Section 2. 2. 2.2), we could still understand intrinsic value in a cjuasi-Moorean way; we
could say that something has intrinsic value when it satisfies a set of interests in virtue
of its intrinsic properties.
Perhaps the most important reason to worry about MVG is that if it is true, it
makes axiology a pretty uninteresting subject. If goodness is simply a satisfaction
relation between a thing and a set of interests, then a theory of goodness would simply
be a theory about that satisfaction relation. It does not seem important to provide such
a theory; such a relation does not exactly capture the imagination in the way that the
“Form of the Good” does. It is hard to imagine any great controversy over the nature
of this satisfaction relation. This is not an argument against MVG; perhaps axiology is
not interesting. But if axiology is not interesting, then neither is the problem I am
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interested in. Furthermore, ifMVG is true, it is hard to see how there could be any
real ethical disputes; for example, when one person argues that wiping out a species is
bad, and another argues that it is good, MVG would interpret their “dispute” as
follows: one would be saying that wiping out a species satisfies interest-set SI, while
the other would be saying that it does not satisfy interest-set S2. That is no dispute at
all. If there can be no such disputes, then my argument for species preservation in
Chapter 6 is of little interest. So my next task is to explain why nobody should be
convinced by Mackie’s arguments against realism.
1 .2 Mackie’s Arguments against Realism
Mackie presents two distinct arguments: an argument from relativity and an
argument (or, more accurately, a number of arguments) from “queemess.” I begin
with the arguments from queemess.
1.2.1 The Arguments from Queemess
The first argument from queemess begins with an ontological claim about what
values are supposed to be. Mackie says “If there were objective values, then they
would be entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from
anything else in the universe” (Mackie 38). But in what way are moral properties
different from everyday, garden-variety properties like shape and color? Mackie
explains:
6
The Form of the Good is such that knowledge of it provides the knower
with both a direction and an overriding motive; something’s being good
both tells the person who knows this to pursue it and makes him pursue it.
An objective good would be sought by anyone who was acquainted with it,
not because of any contingent fact that this person, or every person, is so
constituted that he desires this end, but just because the end has to-be-
pursuedness somehow built into it. (Mackie 40)
It is not clear whether Mackie intends this to be a stand-alone argument or
merely part of a longer, epistemological argument. To be fair, I will interpret him in
both ways and see if either interpretation results in a convincing argument. Since I am
interested here only in defending the existence of intrinsic goodness, I will interpret
Mackie narrowly as making an argument against the existence of goodness, though he
clearly believes his argument is equally effective against other moral concepts. Here is
my interpretation of Mackie ’s argument:
The Argumentfrom To-Be-Pursuedness
1 . If there is such a property as goodness, then there is a property that has “to-be-
pursuedness” built into it.
2. No property has “to-be-pursuedness” built into it.
3. Therefore, there is no such property as goodness.
In order to understand premise one of Mackie’ s argument, we must understand
what he means when he says that good things have “to-be-pursuedness” built into
them. As we have seen, to-be-pursuedness is supposed to serve two functions,
according to Mackie: it tells you to pursue something, and it makes you pursue it.
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Thus to-be-pursuedness seems to be some sort of complex, relational property. The
property can be explained as follows:
x has to-be-pursuedness iff:
1 . for any agent S, if S perceives x, then S is motivated to pursue x; and
2. for any agent S, S ought to pursue x.
When Mackie says that good things have to-be-pursuedness “built into” them, I
propose to understand him as meaning that good things have the property to-be-
pursuedness (or at least they would, if there were any such things).
But Mackie clearly does not think it is an accident that all good things have to-
be-pursuedness built into them. Rather, he seems to think that goodness itselfhas, or
is supposed to have, to-be-pursuedness built into it. When someone recognizes that
something is good, they recognize that they should pursue it and they infact pursue it;
that is part of what it means to say that they recognize that it is good. It is not clear,
however, how we should understand this claim. I propose to interpret Mackie as
claiming that goodness is (or is supposed by objectivists to be) a complex property,
with to-be-pursuedness as one of its constituents. Note, however, that if this is his
view, then he clearly does not understand goodness in the same way Moore does;
Moore famously claims that goodness is a simple, unanalyzable property - a property
with no constituents at all. So if this interpretation of Mackie is correct, he is already
begging important questions.4
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I now turn to premise two of Mackie’s argument. Why does he think that no
property has to-be-pursuedness built into it? Mackie never explains. However, there
would seem to be two possible reasons he could give. One is that there simply is no
such property as to-be-pursuedness. The other is that there is such a property, but it is
uninstantiated at this world. If there were such a property, it would be something like
a magnetic force that, when recognized, pulls us toward, or makes us pursue, the
object that possesses the property.
The Argument from To-Be-Pursuedness seems quite unconvincing. First, the
claim that goodness has to-be-pursuedness’ built into it is highly controversial. As I
noted above, to-be-pursuedness is a complex property with an ethical component (that
everyone should pursue it) and a motivational component (that everyone is motivated
to pursue it). Why does Mackie think that goodness has this property built into it?
The ethical component, it would seem, comes from utilitarianism - the view that we
ought to make the world as good as we possibly can (we ought to pursue goodness).
Thus utilitarianism seems to entail a conceptual link between goodness and moral
rightness. But of course, many philosophers have denied that we ought to maximize
goodness; surely not all of these philosophers are simply confused about the meaning
of the word ‘good’. Furthermore, many utilitarians would deny that the concept of
moral rightness is actually “built into” the concept of goodness as a constituent of it.
Rather, the utilitarian might claim that goodness and rightness are simple,
unanalyzable properties that are necessarily related in the way just described. So
premise one of Mackie’s argument seems to have a very narrow application; one
9
would accept it only if one were a utilitarian of a certain type. Mackie’s analysis of
goodness begs too many questions in normative ethics.
Others have made the same mistake Mackie makes. For example, Richard
Gamer (1990) presses Mackie’s point about to-be-pursuedness. He says:
If we recognize a moral fact, then we recognize it as a moral fact, which is
to say that we recognize it as directing us to be or act one way rather than
another - and we recognize this whether or not we are moved to obey the
directions. It is the peculiar combination of objectivity and prescriptivity,
rather than any intrinsic motivational power, that makes moral facts and
properties queer, and neither Brink nor anyone else can purge that from
them to protect them from the argument from queemess. (Gamer 143, his
emphasis)
Gamer seems to be restating the Argument from To-Be-Pursuedness, focusing on the
claim that goodness is “prescriptive.” Like Mackie, he assumes that all moral facts are
prescriptive. But it is entirely consistent to claim that there are moral facts, but deny
that all of them are prescriptive. The only moral facts that are prescriptive are those
that involve the concepts of moral rightness, wrongness, and obligatoriness. Facts
about goodness may not be prescriptive. So this attack on moral realism is an attack
only on a limited number of moral properties, and could not be a convincing attack
against the property I am interested in.
Even if one were a utilitarian of the sort described above, who believes that
part of what it is to be good is to be something that ought to be pursued, there is no
reason why she would need to accept premise one. This is because premise one
presupposes that goodness has a motivational component. The motivational
component comes from internalism - the view that goodness is an inherently
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motivating characteristic. But one could perfectly well deny that goodness is
necessarily motivating. In fact, it seems quite plausible to do so, since there seem to
be many people who recognize and understand the difference between good and bad.
right and wrong, yet knowingly choose to do what is bad or wrong. While many of us
at least try to do the right thing most of the time, some people simply do not seem to
be motivated by ethical considerations at all. Thus premise one of Mackie’s argument
holds no force against non-intemalist views of goodness.
On the other hand, suppose we accept the forms of utilitarianism and
intemalism required to make premise one true. Why should we accept premise two of
Mackie’s argument? Unless one has a preconceived notion of the way the world is,
and what kinds of properties it contains, one will not see any problem with admitting a
property of to-be-pursuedness into one’s ontological scheme. It is clear that Mackie
does presuppose an ontology; it is not clear exactly what that ontology is, or how he
defends it. Gamer suggests the following defense of premise two: “It is hard to
believe in objective prescriptivity because it is hard to make sense of a demand
without a demander, and hard to fmd a place for demands or demanders apart from
human interests and conventions” (Gamer 143). But why can’t we make sense of
demands without demanders? Few moral theorists believe in God these days. Yet
many of them believe we have moral obligations. Are such theorists forced to be
conventionalists about morality? I do not see why. Ifthere were ontological problems
with supposing that there is a property of moral goodness - and so far, I see no reason
to think there are such problems - it would merely show that these problems must be
weighed against the problems with conventionalism. It is not at all clear that problems
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with conventional accounts of morality are any less serious than any alleged
ontological problems with moral realism. But discussion of this would take me far
afield.
Mackie then presents another argument from queemess. This argument may
perhaps be understood as lending further support to premise two of the Argument from
To-Be-Pursuedness. The argument is given in the following passage:
Another way of bringing out this queemess is to ask, about anything that
is supposed to have some objective moral quality, how this is linked
with its natural features. What is the connection between the natural fact
that an action is a piece of deliberate cruelty... and the moral fact that it
is wrong? It cannot be an entailment, a logical or semantic necessity.
...The wrongness must somehow be ‘consequential’ or ‘supervenient’; it
is wrong because it is a piece of deliberate cruelty. But just what in the
world is signified by this ‘because’? (Mackie 41)
Here is how I interpret Mackie’ s argument:
The Argumentfrom Supervenience
1 . If there is such a property as goodness, then something is good because of its
natural properties - i.e., goodness supervenes on natural properties.
2. Goodness does not supervene on natural properties.
3. Therefore, there is no such property as goodness.
Premise one is intended to be obvious; normally when we attribute goodness to
something, there are certain natural features of the world we can point to in order to
explain why it is good. For example, certain states of affairs might be said to be good
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because they involve attributions of pleasure, a natural property. With respect to
premise two, I take it that when Mackie asks “just what in the world is signified by
this ‘because’,” his question is rhetorical; he thinks there is no relation in the world
that is signified by ‘because’.
But in denying that there is any such thing as a supervenience relation,
Mackie’ s argument surely goes too far. 6 Supervenience relations are fairly
uncontroversial in areas other than ethics. For example, it is widely held by
philosophers of mind that the mental properties a person has supervene on the physical
properties of his brain; and it seems fairly obvious that certain properties of food, such
as its taste, supervene on its physical or chemical properties. Certainly Mackie would
not wish to argue that there are no mental properties, or that there are no such things as
tastes.
Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, materialism itself is often
formulated as a supervenience thesis; materialists believe, roughly, that all facts
supervene on physical facts. David Lewis formulates materialism in this way:
“Among worlds where no natural properties alien to our world are instantiated, no two
differ without differing physically; any two such worlds that are exactly alike
physically are duplicates” (Lewis 1983, p. 364). This is a supervenience thesis. If
materialism is a supervenience thesis, then it would be incoherent for Mackie to argue
that moral realism is incompatible with materialism (and hence unacceptable) because
there is no such thing as supervenience. So Mackie’s task must be to show that there
is a special problem with utilizing the notion of supervenience in ethics ; so far he has
not done so. 7
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I conclude that the versions of Mackie’s ontological arguments against
goodness that I have just presented do not succeed. However, it is possible that
Mackie intended his ontological arguments to depend on his epistemological
arguments; so it is to these arguments I turn next. These arguments cannot plausibly
be interpreted as arguments against the existence of goodness, since one can always
maintain that although goodness exists, nobody ever has any good reason to ascribe it
to anything. Hence I interpret Mackie’s epistemological arguments as arguments that
there is no good reason to think that there is such a property as goodness.
Mackie states we cannot be aware of moral properties such as goodness; for if
we were aware of them, “it would have to be by some special faculty of moral
perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing
everything else” (Mackie 38). Thus I formulate Mackie’s first epistemological
queemess argument as follows:
The Argumentfrom Queer Faculties (Version One)
1 . If we have any reason to think there is such a property as goodness, then we must
be aware of goodness.
2. If we are aware of goodness, then we have a special faculty of moral intuition.
2. We have no such faculty.
3. Therefore, we have no reason to think there is such a property as goodness.
The reason Mackie thinks that awareness of goodness requires a special,
“queer” faculty is that goodness is a queer property. Mackie’s reasons for thinking
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goodness is a queer property have already been addressed; goodness is queer because
it has to-be-pursuedness built into it. Awareness of queer properties requires queer
faculties; so awareness of goodness must require a queer faculty. Uncontroversial
faculties such as sensation, introspection, and inference cannot make us aware of
goodness, according to Mackie (Mackie 39). The third premise is intended to be
supported by some sort of empiricist principle about knowledge - that all our
knowledge comes either from sense experience (including introspection) or from some
mental operations performed on concepts acquired through sense experience. Mackie
notes that some will dispute premise three, on the grounds that there are many
concepts about which we have knowledge that apparently cannot be explained by
empiricist principles - concepts such as essence, identity, necessity, possibility, power,
and causation, among others (Mackie 39). He seems to acknowledge that his defense
of premise three is incomplete in virtue of this response: “The only adequate reply to
it would be to show how, on empiricist foundations, we can construct an account of
the ideas and beliefs and knowledge that we have of all these matters. I cannot even
begin to do that here... I can only state my belief that satisfactory accounts of most of
these can be given in empirical terms” (Mackie 39).
This version of the Argument from Queer Faculties appears quite weak. First,
I have already given reasons to suspect that Mackie has not shown goodness to be a
queer property; if goodness is not a queer property, then premise two of this argument
stands unjustified. Second, in the absence of an empiricist account of the other
concepts mentioned above, premise three also stands unjustified; it is of interest only
as an autobiographical account of Mackie’s beliefs. Furthermore, if Mackie is so
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confident that concepts like essence, identity, necessity, power, and causation can be
understood empirically, why is he not equally confident that an empiricist account of
our knowledge of goodness can be given? If moral realism is compatible with the
weak version of materialism presented above - and in particular, if goodness
supervenes on observable properties - then such an account does not seem farfetched.
Finally, Mackie argues that the alleged supervenience of goodness on natural
properties presents an epistemological problem. This is a problem that he thinks
would arise even if we were to countenance a special faculty that discerns moral
properties:
It is not even sufficient to postulate a faculty which ‘sees’ the
wrongness: something must be postulated which can see at once the
natural features that constitute the cruelty, and the wrongness, and the
mysterious consequential link between the two. Alternatively, the
intuition required might be the perception that wrongness is a higher
order property belonging to certain natural properties; but what is this
belonging of properties to other properties, and how can we discern it?
(Mackie 4 1
)
Here is how I interpret Mackie’ s argument (substituting ‘goodness’ for
‘wrongness’):
The Argumentfrom Queer Faculties (Version Two)
1 . If we have any reason to think there is such a property as goodness, then either (a)
we have a single faculty that discerns natural features, goodness, and the link
between the two; or (b) we have a faculty that discerns the belonging of properties
to other properties.
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2. There is no single faculty that discerns natural features, goodness, and the link
between the two.
3. There is no faculty that discerns the belonging of properties to other properties.
4. Therefore, we have no reason to think there is such a property as goodness.
Mackie seems to defend premises two and three with an appeal to simplicity:
“How much simpler and more comprehensible the situation would be ifwe could
replace the moral quality with some sort of subjective response which could be
causally related to the detection of the natural features on which the supposed quality
is supposed to be consequential” (Mackie 41). What Mackie must have in mind is that
it is easier to account for moral knowledge if such knowledge consists merely of
knowledge of subjective attitudes toward certain natural properties. No special faculty
would be required.
This argument seems to have serious problems. First, premise three seems to
be obviously false. Everyone knows that some properties “belong to” other properties.
For example, the property redness has the property of being a color. It would seem we
know this a priori, by knowing what redness is and knowing what it is to be a color. If
certain natural properties have the property of being good, then whatever faculty tells
us that redness is a color also tells us that certain natural properties are good.
A further problem for Mackie’ s argument is that an exactly analogous
argument could be used to show that even if mental properties supervene on brain-
states, we could not possibly know it. After all, how could we have a faculty that
discerns the mental property, the brain-state, and the link between the two?
The same
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would go for any other case of supervenience. Surely Mackie goes too far in arguing
that, for any supervenient property, we have no reason to think that it exists. He would
seem to be limiting our knowledge to a very small set of properties. Thus, I reject
premise two.
I am not prepared to provide a full-fledged account of our knowledge of the
good; however, here is a sketch that might make things seem not very mysterious. We
have sensory faculties that discern natural properties; we have another faculty
(admitted by Mackie for the sake of argument) that discerns goodness. A priori
reasoning tells us that goodness supervenes on natural properties. We don’t observe
supervenience in the way that we observe colors (as Mackie seems to suggest); we
judge that the supervenience relation holds by thinking about the natural properties,
thinking about goodness, and realizing that there is a dependence (perhaps by realizing
that it is in virtue of those natural properties that something is good). Perhaps the
reason Mackie would object to this account is because he is an empiricist, and not
inclined to admit the existence of this sort of a priori reasoning.
Finally, we might wonder what Mackie means when he claims that things
would be “easier” if we could explain moral knowledge simply in terms of subjective
responses to natural phenomena. Mackie seems to be making an appeal to a principle
of theoretical simplicity - that other things being equal, we should prefer a simple
theory to a more complex one. I am prepared to admit such a principle; I might even
be prepared to admit that a theory like one that Mackie has in mind could be simpler
than a theory that involves a real property of goodness. Nevertheless, Mackie is far
too hasty in declaring this to be a reason to reject realism; for it is far from clear that a
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theory like the one he envisions can account for all the facts. In effect, what Mackie
argues is that an epistemological theory need not account for moral knowledge,
because a theory that doesn’t allow for moral knowledge would be simpler than a
theory that does. But if there really is moral knowledge, then a true epistemological
theory must account for this fact. A theory that entails there isn’t any moral
knowledge would not be satisfactory - even though it might be simpler.
1 .2.2 The Argument from Relativity
Mackie ’s other main line of attack against realism is a familiar one; it is based
on the fact that different people, and different cultures, have different beliefs about
morality.
The argument from relativity has as its premiss the well-known variation
in moral codes from one society to another and from one period to
another, and also the differences in moral beliefs between different
groups and classes within a complex community. (Mackie 36)
Thus, I interpret Mackie ’s Argument from Relativity as follows:
1 . Different cultures have different moral codes, and different individuals have
different moral beliefs.
2. If 1 , then realism is not true.
3. Therefore, realism is not true.
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Premise one is uncontroversial (though the extent to which the moral codes of
different cultures are different is debatable). Premise two, however, is highly
debatable; it stands in need of a lot ofjustification. It has been pointed out many times
that the mere fact that people disagree about something does not show that nobody is
right. Mackie is well aware of this.
But it is not the mere occurrence of disagreements that tells against the
objectivity of values. Disagreement on questions in history or biology or
cosmology does not show that there are no objective issues in these fields
for investigators to disagree about. (Mackie 36)
Why, then, do moral disagreements cast doubt on realism even though
scientific disagreements do not cast doubt on the objectivity of science? According to
Mackie, the reason seems to be that there is an important difference between the way
we come to have our scientific beliefs and the way we come to have our moral beliefs.
(S)cientific disagreement results from speculative inferences or explanatory
hypotheses based on inadequate evidence, and it is hardly plausible to
interpret moral disagreement in the same way. Disagreement about moral
codes seems to reflect people’s adherence to and participation in different
ways of life. The causal connection seems to be mainly that way round: it
is that people approve of monogamy because the participate in a
monogamous way of life rather than that they participate in a monogamous
way of life because they approve of monogamy. (Mackie 36)
Thus Mackie’ s version of the argument from relativity is based on a causal
claim about how we come to have our moral beliefs.
8 The fact that people disagree on
moral matters can most reasonably be explained by the view that people
come to have
their moral beliefs as a result of societal conditioning.
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(T)he argument from relativity has some force simply because the actual
variations in the moral codes are more readily explained by the hypothesis
that they reflect ways of life than by the hypothesis that they reflect
perceptions, most of them seriously inadequate and badly distorted, of
objective values. (Mackie 37)
It seems that according to Mackie, realism entails that we form judgments about
whether things are right or wrong, good or bad, by perceiving that they are so - not by
learning it. Since there is widespread disagreement about moral questions, realism
entails that at least some of these perceptions must be mistaken.
But Mackie recognizes a further objection the realist may make at this point.
When one culture approves of an action, and another disapproves of it, the realist may
claim that this is because of contingent differences in the circumstances of the
members of the two cultures. The same general ethical principle may condone a
behavior in one culture but forbid it in another.
9
It is easy to show that such general principles, married with differing
concrete circumstances, different existing social patterns or different
preferences, will beget different specific moral rules; and there is some
plausibility in the claim that the specific rules thus generated will vary
from community to community or from group to group in close agreement
with the actual variations in accepted codes. (Mackie 37)
Thus the realist may deny that most moral judgments are based on “seriously
inadequate and badly distorted” perceptions of value. Two apparently incompatible
judgments may both be based on clear perceptions of objective value; the apparent
incompatibility can be explained by appealing to the different circumstances of
judgment. Of course, there will still be some disagreements that cannot be explained
in this way. However, the plausibility of the Argument from
Relativity depends upon
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there being very little general agreement on ethical issues, in which case many
judgments would have to be wrong; a small amount of disagreement could not be
sufficient to establish his conclusion.
But Mackie thinks this response is inadequate. According to Mackie, general
principles do not play a part in ordinary moral reasoning:
That is, people judge that some things are good or right, and others are bad
or wrong, not because - or at any rate not only because - they exemplify
some general principle for which widespread implicit acceptance could be
claimed, but because something about those things arouses certain
responses immediately in them, though they would arouse radically and
irresolvably different responses in others. (Mackie 37-38)
It seems to me that Mackie’s response misses the point. In claiming that a
single ethical principle can explain apparently incompatible moral judgments, the
realist is not claiming that such a principle plays any part whatsoever in the psychology
or the motivation of the people making the judgments. The realist can agree
completely with what Mackie says. What the realist claims is that a single principle
couldjustify apparently incompatible judgments - that the principle, combined with
certain relevant facts about the two situations, entails one judgment in one situation
and a different judgment in another.
Furthermore, I think Mackie overstates the difference between the realist and
anti-realist positions concerning the formation of moral judgments. The realist need
not deny that social conditioning plays a causal role in the formation of moral
judgments. It certainly seems plausible to suppose that, to some extent at least, we are
taught the difference between right and wrong. While growing up, we are taught
to
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distinguish good from bad through the use of exemplars; certain things are taken to be
paradigmatic instances of goodness, and we generalize based on those instances. The
difference between the realist s account of the formation of moral judgments and
Mackie’s account concerns the extent to which societal influences determine one’s
beliefs; Mackie seems to think that societal influences are the only factor in the
formation of these judgments. This makes Mackie’s view seem implausible in certain
cases; for example, consider the case of the person who rejects her society’s moral
code. The realist can say that in such a case, a person may perceive a fault in her
society’s morality; since Mackie does not believe in moral perception, this option is
not open to him. Mackie must hold that the “moral reformer” has simply fallen under
the sway of some other societal influence. Perhaps Mackie’s view is right; but he
certainly has not given any reason to prefer it. Thus it seems to me that Mackie’s
relativity argument fares no better than his queemess arguments.
I think that Mackie has not provided any compelling reason to reject realism. I
do not pretend to have put this issue to rest. There have been many other attacks on
intrinsic value; besides Geach, Foot, and Thomson, Monroe Beardsley (1965) and
John Dewey (1939) have advanced arguments against intrinsic value that some have
found convincing. I do not find any of these arguments convincing;
10 however, I must
leave refutation of these arguments for another occasion. I now turn to the concept of
intrinsic value.
1
Here I follow the terminology of David Lewis (1986, p. 59).
2 Or almost every predicate; perhaps self-contradictory predicates do not
denote properties even in the abundant sense.
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3
See Lewis (1986, p. 60).
4 We might instead interpret Mackie as claiming that the property of goodness
itself has the property to-be-pursuedness. If this is his claim, then he must hold one of
two views. Either (i) when we pursue something good, it is really the property of
goodness itself, not the thing that is good, that we are pursuing and ought to pursue; or
(ii) when something is good, the to-be-pursuedness of the property of goodness itself
always attaches to the thing that is good. However, in other passages Mackie seems to
imply that there is no such thing as the “belonging of properties to other properties”
(Mackie 41); thus I think it would be wrong to interpret Mackie in this way.
5
This is noted by David Brink (1989, p. 422).
6
Brink gives essentially the same response to Mackie (1989, pp. 425-426).
Some philosophers have remained uneasy about the claim that moral
properties supervene on natural properties. Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons
(1992) have argued that while Mackie did not provide reasons for thinking that there is
a special problem with supervenience in ethics, such reasons can be given. The
problem, they say, is that supervenience relations must be explained, and there is no
way to explain how moral properties supervene on physical properties in a way that is
satisfactory to a materialist. The notion that supervenience relations need to be
“explained” in the sense required by Horgan and Timmons is questioned by Nick
Zangwill (1997). The issues raised are very complex, and I do not wish to discuss
them here.
o
It should be noted that not everyone interprets Mackie in this way; for
example, see Brink (1989, pp. 423-425).
9
For further discussion of this claim, see James Rachels (1996).
10
Against Geach, see Hare (1957); against Beardsley, see Conee (1980); and
against Dewey, see Frankena (1963).
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CHAPTER 2
INTRINSIC VALUE
2. 1 What is Intrinsic Value?
When explaining the notion of intrinsic value, philosophers often say that
something is intrinsically good if it is good “in itself’ or “in and of itself.”
Intrinsically good things, it is often said, are “ends in themselves”; they are good even
if they don’t have any good effects; they are good “for their own sakes.” Pleasure, for
instance, is often mentioned as something that is intrinsically good; we think it is good
to feel pleasure even if the pleasure will not bring about anything else that is good.
Money, on the other hand, is obviously not intrinsically good; if it is good at all, it is
good because of what it can get you. Unfortunately, this does not help very much in
understanding the nature of intrinsic value. What does it mean to say that something is
“good in itself,” “good as an end,” or “good for its own sake”? These expressions are
quite mysterious themselves. There have been many attempts to characterize the
notion of intrinsic value.
1
I will focus on the views of Kant and Moore.
2.1.1 The Kantian View
Kant begins the Groundingfor the Metaphysics ofMorals with the following
passage: “There is no possibility of thinking of anything at all in the world,
or even
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out of it, which can be regarded as good without qualification, except a good will”
(Kant 7, his emphasis). Kant goes on to write:
A good will is good not because of what it effects or accomplishes, nor
because of its fitness to attain some proposed end; it is good only
through its willing, i.e., it is good in itself. ...Even if, by some
especially unfortunate fate or by the niggardly provision of stepmotherly
nature, this will should be wholly lacking in the power to accomplish its
purpose.
. .yet would it, like a jewel, still shine by its own light as
something which has its full value in itself (Kant 7-8, my emphasis)
It would seem that Kant is talking here about intrinsic value, since he says that a good
will is good “in itself.” Thus Kant seems to think that to say that something is
intrinsically good, or good in itself, is to say that it is “good without qualification.” So
I propose the following as a preliminary formulation of Kant’s view:
K1 : x is intrinsically good if and only if x is good without qualification.
Fred Feldman explains this view as follows: “In general, and for anything, when you
say that it has this sort of goodness you don’t have to add any qualifier. Your remark
will be complete and unambiguous as it stands” (Feldman 1998a, p. 8).
K1 is not a very promising account of intrinsic goodness. The problem is that
no statement of the form ‘x is good’ is unambiguous as it stands, because ‘good’ has
many interpretations. It can mean ‘intrinsically good,’ ‘overall good,’ ‘extrinsically
good,’ and so on. So it seems impossible for anything to be good without qualification
in this sense. Furthermore, as Feldman points out, even when something is
intrinsically good, it is sometimes very misleading simply to say that it is good,
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without using the qualifier ‘intrinsically’. “For example, suppose a certain episode of
pleasure causes a dear friend to have a fatal heart attack.
. . .If you (a hedonist) were to
say ‘that episode of pleasure was good, a “good thing,” just dandy’ you might be
misunderstood” (Feldman 1998a, p. 9).
It might be thought that such an example begs the question against Kant. After
all, Kant doesn’t think that pleasure is intrinsically good; the only thing he thinks is
intrinsically good is a good will. “Of course this episode of pleasure turns out not to
be intrinsically good according to Kl,” Kant might say. “That’s not a counterexample
to Kl, it merely shows that hedonism is not true; and we could argue against many
other axiologies in the same way.” Perhaps (though it seems unlikely) any time
someone says something like “Mary’s good will is good,” what they say is not open to
any misunderstanding. Even if this were true, I would not want to endorse Kl . It is
important not to presuppose any substantive axiological theory when trying to
illuminate the concept of intrinsic value. I would not endorse any criterion of intrinsic
value that eliminated plausible axiological theories (hedonism, for instance) on the
grounds that they are incoherent. If the hedonist is wrong to say that the doomed
man’s experience of pleasure is intrinsically good, he is making an axiological
mistake, not a conceptual one.
Here is a slightly different interpretation of Kl . Sometimes we say that
something is an “unqualified success.” When we say this, we mean something like
that it is a success from every possible viewpoint, or from every perspective; it is a
success in every way. For example, we might say that building the Tellico Dam was
an unqualified success, because it was good for the economy, provided many people
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with work, eliminated many hideous snail darters, and so on; it was economically
good, environmentally good, morally good, etc. Perhaps when Kant says that intrinsic
goodness is goodness “without qualification,” he means that when something is
intrinsically good, it is good from every perspective, or in every way.
This interpretation is no better. Nothing is good from every perspective; even a
good will is not good from the perspective of someone who hates goodness or loves
evil (Satan, perhaps). And I think it is pretty clear that something could be
intrinsically good without being good in every way. Something could be intrinsically
good, yet instrumentally bad (and overall bad, signatorily bad, contributorily bad,
economically bad, etc.).
In order to arrive at a better interpretation of Kant, let’s look at some other
things he says about the good will:
While such a will may not indeed be the sole and complete good, it
must, nevertheless, be the highest good and the condition of all the rest,
even of the desire for happiness. In this case there is nothing
inconsistent with the wisdom of nature that the cultivation of reason,
which is requisite for the first and unconditioned purpose, may in many
ways restrict, at least in this life, the attainment of the second purpose,
viz., happiness, which is always conditioned. (Kant 9, my emphasis)
This suggests that when we say that something is intrinsically good, we are
saying that it is good unconditionally. Kant sheds more light on his views in the
following passage:
Persons are, therefore, not merely subjective ends, whose existence as an
effect of our actions has a value for us; but such beings are objective
ends, i.e., exist as ends in themselves. Such an end is one for which
there can be substituted no other end to which such beings should serve
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merely as means, for otherwise nothing at all of absolute value would be
found anywhere. But if all value were conditioned and hence
contingent, then no supreme practical principle could be found for
reason at all. (Kant 36, my emphasis)
This passage reveals that when Kant says that something is good
“unconditionally,” he also thinks it has absolute value, and that it is good not merely
contingently, but necessarily. We are now in a position to state three other possible
Kantian criteria of intrinsic goodness.
K2: x is intrinsically good if and only if x is good unconditionally.
K3: x is intrinsically good if and only if x is good absolutely.
K4: x is intrinsically good if and only ifx is good necessarily.
I think it is possible to understand K2-K4 in such a way that they are
essentially equivalent. When we say that x is good unconditionally, we are saying that
x is good under all conditions : on the condition that today is Tuesday, on the
condition that x has bad consequences, and so on; thus, we are saying that x is good,
not merely relative to this or that circumstance, but in any circumstance; that is, that x
is good absolutely. “A thing is unconditionally good if it is good under any and all
conditions, if it is good no matter what the context” (Korsgaard 178, my emphasis).
And to say that x is good absolutely - not merely relative to this or that circumstance -
is just to say that x is good not merely in this or that possible world, but in every
possible world; that is, x is good necessarily.
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Kant’s view of intrinsic value has been very influential. Christine Korsgaard,
for example, claims that Kant’s view has an “important advantage” over G.E. Moore’s
view (Korsgaard 184). (I will discuss Moore’s view below.) “The primary advantage
of the Kantian theory of goodness is that it gives an account of the ‘objectivity’ of
goodness that does not involve assigning some sort of property to all good things”
(Korsgaard 195). Whatever advantages Korsgaard thinks Kant’s view may have,
Kant’s view is simply unacceptable as a view about intrinsic value. The first problem
is that in each of K2-K4, the term ‘good’ appears on the right-hand side of the
biconditional. As I noted above, ‘good’ is subject to many interpretations; so how are
we to understand ‘good’ in these accounts of intrinsic value? It is hard to see any way
to understand ‘good’ that would make these accounts plausible. 2 Suppose we
understand ‘good’ to mean ‘overall good’. Then according to K2-K4, nothing could
ever be intrinsically good. It is simply impossible to think of something that is overall
good in every possible world, in any possible circumstance. All we have to do is
imagine a world in which that thing has terrible consequences. According to Kant, a
good will is necessarily good. But just imagine a world where that good will has
disastrous consequences for itself and everything else in the world; imagine, for
instance, that the existence of that good will causes thousands of people to suffer
excruciating pain throughout their lives, or causes the destruction of many other good
wills. Clearly in such a world that will would not be overall good.
3
But it may be objected: “Sure, in that world the good will would have terrible
consequences; but it would still have at least one good aspect that could not be taken
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away - it would still be good in itself!” This may well be true. However, it is not a
defense of K2-K4. Instead, it is a defense of the following principle:
NEC: If x is intrinsically good, then x is intrinsically good necessarily.
NEC is not a definition of intrinsic goodness. Instead, it is a principle about
intrinsic goodness. To say that ‘x is intrinsically good’ means ‘x is intrinsically good
necessarily’ would obviously be circular. NEC is, however, an interesting principle to
which we will return shortly.
Kant’s definition of intrinsic goodness, then, is a failure. Perhaps Kant was not
really trying to define intrinsic value; but no matter what he was trying to do, the
concept he picked out has no possible application. Nothing could ever have the
property of being unconditionally good. So I turn now to Moore’s view of intrinsic
value.
2.1.2 The Moorean View(s)
In Principia Ethica and “The Conception of Intrinsic Value,” Moore gives (at
least) two different accounts of intrinsic value. I will maintain that these two accounts
nevertheless are intended to pick out the same concept, and that it is a useful concept
of intrinsic value. I will also show that the principle of the necessity of intrinsic value
(NEC), which is also held by Moore, is compatible with these accounts given certain
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assumptions concerning the bearers of value (assumptions that Moore himself might
not have made).
In Principia Ethica Moore introduces a criterion for determining what kind of
value something has: “it is absolutely essential to consider each distinguishable
quality, in isolation, in order to decide what value it possesses” (Moore 1903, p. 93;
his emphasis). It is clear that Moore intends this “isolation test” to be a test of intrinsic
value.
The method which must be employed in order to decide the question
‘What things have intrinsic value, and in what degrees?’ has already
been explained in Chap. III. (§§ 55, 57). In order to arrive at a correct
decision on the first part of this question, it is necessary to consider what
things are such that, if they existed by themselves, in absolute isolation,
we should yet judge their existence to be good; and, in order to decide
upon the relative degrees of value of different things, we must similarly
consider what comparative value seems to attach to the isolated
existence of each. (Moore 1903, p. 187; his emphasis)
I will interpret Moore as holding the following biconditional:
ISO: x has intrinsic value to degree n if and only if x, considered in isolation, has
value to degree n.
ISO encapsulates a definition of the notion of intrinsicness. ISO follows from
a popular sort of definition of intrinsicness:
INT : x has F intrinsically =df x would have F even if x existed all by itself, in
isolation.
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While INT is inadequate as it stands, and I doubt that anyone holds INT in this form,
many philosophers hold views that are quite similar. For example, Peter Vallentyne
holds (roughly) that to find the intrinsic properties of some thing x, you must
“remove” from the world, as much as possible, everything wholly distinct from x
(Vallentyne 1997). This seems to be essentially an “isolation test.”
In “The Conception of Intrinsic Value,” Moore claims that something’s
intrinsic value is the value that depends entirely on its intrinsic properties: “We can.
in fact, set up the following definition. To say that a kind ofvalue is ‘intrinsic ' means
merely that the question whether a thing possesses it, and in what degree it possesses
it, depends solely on the intrinsic nature ofthe thing in question” (Moore 1951, p. 260;
his emphasis).4 The “intrinsic nature” of a thing can be understood to be the set of its
intrinsic properties. Let’s call this the “supervenience principle,” and formulate it in
this way:
SUP: The intrinsic value of x supervenes on x’s intrinsic properties.
SUP may be compatible with ISO. 5 Ifwe assume something like INT (that
something’s intrinsic properties are the properties it would have if it were completely
isolated), then SUP can be understood to say that the intrinsic value of x supervenes
on (is wholly determined by) the properties x would have if x existed in isolation.
That is, in order to determine something’s intrinsic value, we must determine what
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value it would have if it had only the properties it would have if it were isolated. That
is just what ISO says.
Moore provides yet another characterization of intrinsic value when explaining
SUP:
When I say, with regard to any particular kind of value, that the question
whether and in what degree anything possesses it depends solely on the
intrinsic nature of the thing in question
,
I mean to say two different
things at the same time. I mean to say (1) that it is impossible for what
is strictly one and the same thing to possess that kind of value at one
time, or in one set of circumstances, and not to possess it in another
(2) The second part of what is meant is that if a given thing possesses
any kind of intrinsic value in a certain degree, then not only must that
same thing possess it, under all circumstances, in the same degree, but
also anything exactly like it, must, under all circumstances, possess it in
exactly the same degree. (Moore 1951, pp. 260-261; his emphasis)
Here Moore seems quite clearly to endorse Kant’s necessity principle:
NEC: If x has intrinsic value, then x has intrinsic value necessarily.
This is quite puzzling, in virtue of the fact that it seems obvious that many
things do not have their intrinsic properties (hence intrinsic natures) of necessity.
Take me, for example. Hair and skin cells fall off me, and are replaced by others.
Sometimes I am sitting down, sometimes I am standing up; my body has a different
shape at these different times. Intuitively, these changes are intrinsic changes in my
body. Thus there are many intrinsic properties that I have at some times but not
others. Similarly, there are many intrinsic properties that I actually have but might not
have had; I actually have two arms, but I might have had three. But if intrinsic value
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depends on intrinsic properties (i.e., if SUP is true), then if my intrinsic properties can
change, there is no reason why my intrinsic value could not change as well; or if I
might have had different intrinsic properties, I might have had a different intrinsic
value. Thus NEC and SUP seem incompatible.
I do not know of a very satisfying solution to this problem. There are at least
two possible solutions, but each seems to have problems of its own, at least as an
interpretation of Moore. One possibility is that Moore thinks that the bearers of value
are abstract states of affairs. (I discuss the nature of states of affairs at greater length
in Section 2.3.1 below.) It seems plausible to suppose that states of affairs have all of
their intrinsic properties of necessity. If so, then it would be consistent to maintain
both NEC and SUP. However, this solution runs into the following problem. In the
passage quoted above, Moore claims that if something has intrinsic value to a certain
degree, then anything exactly like it must also possess intrinsic value to the same
degree. But there are no two states of affairs that are exactly alike. If there were two
states of affairs that were exactly alike, they would be the same state of affairs.
Consider the state of affairs that someone is happy. What would it be for there to be
another state of affairs that was exactly like that one?
The other solution would be to make heavy weather over the word ‘strictly’ in
Moore’s claim that “it is impossible for what is strictly one and the same thing to
possess that kind of value at one time, or in one set of circumstances, and not to
possess it in another.” Perhaps Moore recognizes two distinct kinds of identity - one
“strict” and one “loose.” According to the strict sense, if I have certain intrinsic
properties now, and do not have them later, then strictly speaking
,
I am not the same
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person (or thing) that I was then (though I might be the same person in a looser sense).
This might be a better interpretation of Moore. However, it does have very strange
consequences. For one thing, it implies that nothing ever really changes. Whenever
something stops having one of its intrinsic properties, it stops existing altogether.
Thus I do not know how to interpret these remarks by Moore. Henceforth I will
ignore NEC when discussing Moore’s account of intrinsic value.
I propose, then, to understand Moore’s official account of intrinsic value to be
SUP. ISO is compatible with SUP ifwe assume INT. However, INT is probably not
true, at least as it stands.
6
Nevertheless, ISO seems to point us in roughly the same
direction as SUP; perhaps it is best to think of ISO as giving us a less accurate, but
more intuitive guide to the nature of intrinsic value. 7 I turn now to arguments against
SUP and ISO.
2.2. Objections to Moore’s Account
2.2.1 Anderson’s Objection
One recent attack comes from Elizabeth Anderson. In the following lengthy
passage, she seems to be offering an argument against ISO:
According to Moore, something is intrinsically valuable if and only if
one judges that a world in which it exists in isolation is good (1903, p.
187). To make such judgments, Moore and his followers removed
themselves from active engagements in the larger world, withdrew to
private spaces in the company of intimate friends, and introspectively
contemplated the isolated objects of their imaginations. It is not
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surprising that many goods were not salient to people in such a
privileged, exclusive aristocratic setting, insulated from experiences of
work and practical activity with strangers. The demand that intrinsic
goods be valued in isolation from their social context, through
undisturbed contemplation, mirrors the norms of appreciation for objects
in a museum. Thus, Moore’s test effectively restricted intrinsic goods to
the states and proper objects of an aesthetic attitude of admiring,
passionate contemplation and private communion. (Anderson 1993 p
120 )
Clearly, Anderson is no friend of ISO. Using ISO to determine what is
intrinsically good, according to Anderson, involves withdrawing from society and
becoming a sort of hermit, locked away in an ivory tower. And how could a hermit
possibly know what is intrinsically good? Hermits miss out on valuable experiences
that the rest of us know to be good, such as “experiences of work and practical activity
with strangers.” A hermit like Moore excludes from his list of intrinsic goods such
things as “meaningful work, athletic achievement, justice, and freedom . . . These
exclusions do not agree with many people’s reflective judgments” (Anderson 1993, p.
120).
8
When we look beyond Anderson’s personal attacks on Moore’s social life, we
seem to get an argument like this:
1 . If ISO is true, then meaningful work, athletic achievement, justice, and
freedom are not intrinsically good.
2. Meaningful work, athletic achievement, justice, and freedom are intrinsically
good.
3. Therefore, ISO is not true.
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We might begin by looking skeptically at premise two. Anderson’s only defense of
premise two is to claim that it is true according to “many people’s reflective judgments’’
(Anderson 1993, p. 120). Who are these people? Does anyone really think that athletic
achievements have intrinsic value? I certainly don’t; however, for the sake of argument, I am
willing to grant that such things have intrinsic value.
What is Anderson s justification for premise one of this argument? In order to
show that such things as meaningful work are not intrinsically good according to ISO,
Anderson claims that, by following ISO, Moore and his followers were inevitably led
to deny the intrinsic value of such things. Using ISO leads one to the view that only
things with some aesthetic appeal have intrinsic value, and since meaningful work
does not have this appeal, ISO entails that it is not intrinsically good.
It seems to me that premise one is false. ISO does not imply anything of
substance about what particular things are intrinsically good. 9 ISO is entirely
compatible with the view that meaningful work, athletic achievement, and such things
are intrinsically good. If such things are good in isolation, then ISO implies they are
intrinsically good. When Moore considered the question of whether meaningful work
is good in isolation, he concluded that it is not; but others (Anderson, perhaps) would
conclude that it is. Perhaps Anderson would be right to assert that Moore misused
ISO, and that he focused too much on things that had aesthetic appeal. That would be
a criticism of Moore’s ethical intuitions, not of ISO. Perhaps she would also be right
to say that nothing has intrinsic value when isolated from a “social context.” But
again, this would simply be to claim that the bearers of intrinsic value are more
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complicated things; perhaps they are states of affairs that somehow involve societies.
This is also consistent with ISO. If ISO is true, then to say that these complicated
states of affairs involving societies have intrinsic value is to say that they would have
intrinsic value m isolation. To claim, however, that something could have intrinsic
value when part of a social context, but not when isolated, would be a mistake. It
would be to claim that something can have intrinsic value in virtue of its relational
properties, such as being part of a society.
2.2.2 Kagan’s Objections
Another kind of criticism of Moore’s account of intrinsic value is raised by
Shelly Kagan. In “Rethinking Intrinsic Value,” Kagan argues that Moore’s conception
is too restrictive; it leads us to reject certain reasonable axiologies simply on
definitional grounds. According to Kagan, we ought to forget about Moore’s
conception and reserve the name ‘intrinsic value’ for another conception. Kagan’s
paper is rich with examples, and he raises many interesting issues. In the following
sections I will defend the traditional conception against some of Kagan’s attacks.
2.2.2. 1 Mooreanism vs. Platonism
First, however, it is important to get clear on what the debate is about.
According to Kagan, the term ‘intrinsic value’ is a “philosophical term of art”; it is up
to philosophers to determine what property is picked out by the term. Thus I will
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phrase the debate as a dispute over what property is (or should be?) picked out by the
term ‘intrinsic value.’ The term ‘intrinsic value’ was not commonly used until
Moore’s Principia Ethica, where he stated ISO; later, in “The Conception of Intrinsic
Value,” he stated SUP. 10 I have already noted that these two accounts might amount to
roughly the same thing. Since Kagan focuses on SUP, let the following be known
henceforth as “Moore’s Property”:
MP. The property of having value that depends solely on intrinsic properties.
We can understand Moore’s Conception of Intrinsic Value (MCIV) as the view that
‘intrinsic value’ picks out MP (this is essentially what is stated by SUP).
There is another way people have described intrinsic value. As I noted at the
beginning of this chapter, sometimes people say that while an instrumentally good
thing is good “as a means” or “for the sake of something else,” an intrinsically good
thing is good “as an end” or “for its own sake.” Plato introduced this distinction in
Republic 357 (though it seems unlikely that he was the first person ever to make it).
Let’s understand Plato’s Conception of Intrinsic Value (PCIV) to be the view that
‘intrinsic value’ picks out the following property (“Plato’s Property”):
PP: The property of having value as an end.
Plato did not call this property ‘intrinsic value,’ of course; but it seems like a very
important property, and one that might be co-extensional with Moore’s.
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Now, one might think that since the term ‘intrinsic value’ is a “philosophical
term of art,” we should use the term in the way that it was used by the philosopher who
popularized it - viz., Moore. However, people have been discussing PP much longer
than MP. Perhaps MP is not worth studying; and perhaps we might still want to go on
using the expression ‘intrinsic value’ to refer to a property that is fundamentally
important in ethics. So the debate, according to Kagan, is over the following two
questions: (1) Are MP and PP co-extensional? That is, is all value as an end value in
virtue of intrinsic properties? (2) If not, which property rightfully deserves to be called
‘intrinsic value’? That is, should we accept MCIV or PCIV?
Kagan argues for two main points, both of which he takes to be contrary to
received wisdom about intrinsic value: (1) that MP and PP are not co-extensional, so
MCIV and PCIV cannot both be true; and (2) that MP is really not worth studying, so
PP deserves the title ‘intrinsic value’ (i.e., PCIV is true and MCIV is false). First,
Kagan argues that Moore’s concept places undue restrictions on what sorts of things
can have intrinsic value. He presents several examples designed to show that there are
some things that could reasonably (if not truly) be said to have intrinsic value, but for
which MCIV leaves no conceptual space; thus MCIV leads us to reject some
axiologies on definitional grounds instead of axiological grounds. I will argue that if
we understand PP to be a property that is not co-extensional with value in virtue of
intrinsic properties - and in particular, ifwe understand it to be a property with the
features required for Kagan’s arguments to work - then intrinsic value is not value as
an end, and PCIV is not true.
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2.2.2.2 The Argument from Subjectivism
The first argument Kagan presents is based on subjectivism. Subjectivists, he
says, do think that some things have value as ends; however, according to subjectivism
nothing has value in virtue of its intrinsic properties alone. This is because
subjectivists hold that “absolutely nothing would have any value as an end, in the
absence of some creature who values it” (Kagan 1998b, p. 4). If nothing has value
unless it is valued, then nothing has value unless it has a certain extrinsic property;
thus nothing has value solely in virtue of its intrinsic properties. Thus MCIV seems
incompatible with subjectivism. But we do not want our conception of intrinsic value
to rule out a theory like subjectivism; for even if we don’t happen to believe in
subjectivism, we don’t want to rule it out simply by defining our terms in a certain
way. This suggests the following argument:
1 . Any correct conception of intrinsic value must be consistent with subjectivism.
2. MCIV is not consistent with subjectivism.
3. Therefore, MCIV is not a correct conception of intrinsic value.
It may be true that, strictly speaking, subjectivism is incompatible with
MCIV. 1
1
In “The Conception of Intrinsic Value,” Moore takes great pains to say that
they are incompatible: “It is this conviction - the conviction that goodness and beauty
are intrinsic kinds of value, which is, I think, the strongest ground of [the] objection to
any subjective view” (Moore 1951, p. 255; his emphasis). However, even a
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subjectivist can divide goods into intrinsic and extrinsic goods in a Moorean way.
While an objectivist might be interested in the question “In virtue of what kinds of
properties does something have the property of intrinsic goodness?”, the subjectivist
would be interested in the question “In virtue of what kinds of properties do we (or
should we, or would we, or could we) value something intrinsically?” Either way, the
answer could come back: “In virtue of its intrinsic properties.” Of course, it still
would not be true for the subjectivist that things have intrinsic value solely in virtue of
their intrinsic properties; but it is hard to see what turns on this. In any case where an
objectivist thinks something has value solely in virtue of its intrinsic properties, the
subjectivist can say that its value comes from its intrinsic properties plus one
additional extrinsic property - that of being valued. The debate between the Moorean
and anti-Moorean would then resurface for subjectivism; the question would be which
of the following two (relational) properties is picked out by the expression ‘intrinsic
value’:
MP’ : The property of being valued solely in virtue of intrinsic properties.
PP’: The property of being valued as an end.
The subjectivist version ofMCIV would be the view that the expression ‘intrinsic
value’ picks out MP’.
But Kagan thinks that a subjectivist who accepts the modified MCIV places
undue restrictions on what can have intrinsic value. After all, isn’t it possible to value
something as an end, or for its own sake, but not because of its intrinsic properties? I
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think that one appropriate response to this question is to say that it really doesn’t
matter whether it is possible or not. If we were already convinced that intrinsic value
is value (or being valued) as an end - if we were convinced of PCIV - then we might
be concerned to make sure that all valuing as an end is valuing in virtue of intrinsic
properties. But so far, we have no reason to accept PCIV. If it turns out that we can
value something as an end, but not in virtue of its intrinsic properties, then so much the
worse for PCIV, or so I would say. (The argument for this comes below.)
Let me put this another way. If Kagan does indeed show that MP’ and PP’ are
not co-extensional, then we might indeed conclude, as Kagan does, that we should
reject MCIV
. But we might just as well reject PCIV. Kagan asks why we should care
about Moore’s conception of intrinsic value; but we might as well ask Kagan why we
should care about Plato’s conception.
Even if we were concerned to make sure that MCIV is compatible with PCIV,
and would reject MCIV if it were not compatible with PCIV, Kagan has so far given
us no reason to think that we can value things as an end, or for their own sake, but not
in virtue of their intrinsic properties. His reasons seem to turn on his more specific
examples. Nothing about subjectivism itselfshould lead us to think that MCIV and
PCIV are not compatible.
2. 2.2.3 The Argument from Uniqueness
So I now turn to some of Kagan’s more specific examples. Kagan says that
many people “are attracted to a view according to which the intrinsic value of an
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object depends in part of how rare that object is, or... on its being completely unique”
(Kagan 1998b, p. 5). For example, a beautiful piece of artwork might be more
intrinsically valuable if it were the only one of its kind; or the last member of a species
might be more valuable than some common creature. 12 But uniqueness is not an
intrinsic property of anything; hence, MCIV is incompatible with this claim. Here is
how I understand his argument:
1 . It’s possible that uniqueness might increase a thing’s intrinsic value.
2. If(l). then MCIV is false.
3. Therefore, MCIV is false.
Let me say first that I am not attracted to this view about uniqueness at all.
Suppose we were to discover another Mona Lisa - call it ML2 - painted at about the
same time as the Mona Lisa we know about - call it ML1 . On this view, we would
have some reason to destroy ML2 - so that the original Mona Lisa, ML1, would be
intrinsically better (or vice versa). In deciding whether or not to destroy ML2, we
would have to weigh the gain in intrinsic value that would result from the uniqueness
against the loss in intrinsic value from losing a beautiful painting. It seems to me that
no such weighing would take place. There are no conflicting values to weigh here.
Now we have two Mona Lisas - great! (Maybe not so great for the owner of the
original; but that’s not relevant to the intrinsic value of ML1, only perhaps to its
monetary value.) Thus I find premise one unconvincing. When we realize that we are
concerned with a kind of moral value here — the kind of value that affects how we
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ought to behave morally - and not monetary value, or collectible value, or some other
type of value, it becomes very implausible to me to say that the intrinsic value ofML1
depends on the existence of ML2. 13
I think the non-instrumental value of uniqueness, if there is any, can be better
explained by the concept of contributory value u It seems likely to me that someone
who holds that unique objects are more valuable might hold something like Brentano’s
principle of the value of variety:
PVV: When the intrinsic values of the goods are equal, it is better to combine dissimilar
goods than similar ones. 15
To illustrate, let W1 be the actual world, and let W2 be the world described above with
ML1 and ML2. If we are inclined to say that the Mona Lisa in W1 has more value
than ML1 in W2 in virtue of being unique, Brentano’s principle PVV could explain
this intuition. Destroying the Mona Lisa in W 1 would reduce the amount of aesthetic
variety in Wl, thereby reducing the value ofW1 by more than the Mona Lisa’s
intrinsic value. But destroying ML1 in W2 would not, because W2 would still have
ML2. Thus, besides its intrinsic value, the unique Mona Lisa has contributory value;
unlike ML1, it contributes more than its intrinsic value to the value of the world. The
proposed way of accounting for this value is entirely consistent with MCIV. 16
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2.2.2A The Argument from Instrumental Value
I turn now to Kagan’s last example: the example ofAbraham Lincoln’s pen.
Kagan claims that the pen used by Lincoln to sign the Emancipation Proclamation had
instrumental value, and the fact that it had this instrumental value could make the pen
intrinsically valuable. Destruction of the pen, Kagan says, might reasonably be
thought to “diminish the value of the world as such” (Kagan 1998b, p. 7). This might
be so, he says, even if we ignore the continuing instrumental value of the pen. To
suppose that the pen has intrinsic value in virtue of its causal history would be
incompatible with MCIV. Here is how I understand Kagan’s argument:
1 . It’s possible that Lincoln’s pen might have intrinsic value in virtue of its causal
history.
2. Ifm. then MCIV is false.
3. Therefore, MCIV is false.
I think there are serious problems with the claim that something can have
intrinsic value in virtue of its causal history. Thus, I reject premise one of this
argument. Here is why. Consider the following three scenarios revolving around
Lincoln’s signing of the Emancipation Proclamation.
Scenario #1
:
Lincoln signs the proclamation, then keeps the pen, which is preserved
by collectors. (I’m supposing this is what actually happened.)
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Scenario #2: Lincoln signs the proclamation, then throws the pen into the fire,
destroying the pen.
Scenario #3
:
Lincoln signs the proclamation in a rather unusual way. He uses a
separate pen to sign each letter of his name - fourteen pens in all. All fourteen
pens are preserved by collectors.
Suppose that something can have intrinsic value in virtue of its causal history,
so that the pen in Scenario #1 has intrinsic value. Then we should think that Lincoln’s
throwing the pen into the fire in Scenario #2 was a bad thing to do; it made the world
worse, since it destroyed something with intrinsic value. It made the world worse than
it would have been otherwise. But this seems absurd. Who cares what he did with the
pen? The pen served its purpose. Would we really think it was a shame if he had
thrown away the pen? Perhaps collectors, or museum curators, might think it was a
shame; it might be instrumentally bad for them, but it wouldn’t rate the world a minus
as such. We certainly would not think less of Lincoln’s moral character if we
learned what he had done; from a moral point of view, his act seems inconsequential.
Let me provide an analogy. On the TV show “Mission: Impossible,” when the
agents receive their instructions, the last thing the message says is “this tape will self-
destruct in five seconds.” Five seconds later, the tape self-destructs. The message is
vitally important to the mission. Without the message, the agents would not know
what to do. Terrible consequences would result. Clearly, then, the message has great
instrumental value. Very few things could have more instrumental value than that
message. So if anything could have intrinsic value in virtue of its instrumental value,
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surely that message would have intrinsic value. Yet nobody thinks it is a real shame
when the message self-destructs. 17 Who cares? If the message had any intrinsic value,
wouldn’t some effort be made to preserve it (while maintaining its secrecy, of course)?
Returning to Lincoln’s pen: if the pen in Scenario #1 has intrinsic value, then
wouldn t all fourteen pens in Scenario #3 have intrinsic value as well? If so, then it
would seem that Lincoln’s odd behavior in Scenario #3 was perfectly appropriate -
perhaps even morally obligatory. For if each pen used to sign the proclamation rates
the world a plus, then the more pens used, the better the world is. A consequentialist
would say Lincoln should have maximized the number of pens he used to sign the
proclamation. This doesn’t make any sense; it just didn’t matter how many pens he
used. The important thing was that the slaves were freed. This suggests that if we say
that something can have intrinsic value in virtue of its instrumental value, we may be
unable to say that when something has intrinsic value, it rates the world a plus; and we
may be unable to make sense of the claim that intrinsic value is the sort of thing that
can be maximized. If PCIV has these consequences, I suggest that we forget about
that conception of intrinsic value and focus on a better one.
Of course, this problem arises only if we assume that in Scenario #3, the
instrumental value of each pen is equal to the intrinsic value of its causal
j g
consequences. That is, the objection presupposes the following principle about
instrumental value:
PI : the instrumental value of x = the intrinsic value of x’s total consequence.
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We might suppose, mstead, that something’s instrumental value depends not only on
its causal consequences, but also on how many other things are required to bring about
that consequence. Thus, each pen would get only l/M* of the credit for the
consequences; so the fourteen pens, taken together, are worth exactly as much as the
single pen in Scenario #1.
I think this supposition would have undesirable results. 19 Why, after all, should
we suppose that each pen gets anything close to 1/1
4
th
of the credit for the
consequences? The causal chain leading up to the freedom of the slaves is long and
complex. There would have been many links to the chain, each of which might have
been necessary to achieve the result. The pen or pens used to sign the proclamation
are just a tiny part of the chain. If something’s instrumental value depends on how
many other links there are in the causal chain leading up to the good consequences,
then it would seem that, simply in virtue of the enormous number of links in the causal
chain, hardly anything would have very much instrumental value in virtue of bringing
about the freedom of the slaves. It seems much better to suppose that something’s
instrumental value equals the intrinsic value of its consequences,20 no matter how
many other things are required to bring about those consequences.
The considerations just raised suggest an answer to a question Kagan raises:
Remember, first of all, that to pick out the value that an object has by
virtue of its intrinsic properties alone is to identify a type of value on the
basis of a certain type of metaphysical fact, namely, that the relevant
properties are all “one-place” properties. But why should we think that
this picks out a kind of value of particular interest from the perspective
of value theory? (Kagan 1998b, p. 10; his emphasis)
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The reason one-place, or non-relational, properties are particularly important from the
perspective of value theory is that assigning intrinsic value based on such properties
avoids problems such as the one I just pointed out. If standing in some contingent
relation to something with intrinsic value can endow something with intrinsic value,
then to make a world better, we just put more and more things in it that stand in such
relations. In the case of causal relations, if we just make a longer or more complicated
causal chain leading up to the intrinsically good thing - for example, by using more
pens to sign the proclamation - we will be making the world better. This seems
wrong, and that is why one-place properties are important. 21
I think other problems will arise when we attempt to supplement Kagan’s view
with some principles that would tell us how much intrinsic value something has. Such
principles would be required by a complete axiology. Since Kagan does not explicitly
endorse any such principles, however, my criticism of various possible principles
should not be taken as a criticism of anything Kagan has said. Let’s suppose that PI is
approximately true. If we are going to say that intrinsic value can depend on
instrumental value, as Kagan suggests, it would seem that how much intrinsic value
something has should depend on how much instrumental value it has. Lincoln’s pen
should turn out to be intrinsically better than some ordinary pen with only a small
amount of instrumental value. But what is the dependence here? How do we
determine something’s intrinsic value based on its instrumental value? Kagan does not
attempt an answer to this question. Furthermore, I do not see how it could be done in
any plausible way. Suppose that we come up with a formula that will tell us how
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intrinsically good something is based on its instrumental value. Then, presumably, we
will be committed at least to something like the following very weak principle:
P2: The intrinsic value x derives from its consequences depends on x’s
instrumental value. (So when x’s consequences have more intrinsic value,
x has more intrinsic value.)
Combining PI and P2 quickly gets us into trouble. Think about Lincoln’s pen again.
Let the intrinsic value of the freedom of the slaves = n. Then by PI, it would seem the
pen has an instrumental value of n. But wait! Once the slaves are freed, the pen itself
acquires intrinsic value. The pen has brought it about that it itself has intrinsic value.
How much intrinsic value it has depends on how much intrinsic value it brought about
(by P2). Let s suppose that, as a result of causing something with intrinsic value of n
(the freedom of the slaves), the pen gets an intrinsic value of m. Now (and here is
where the trouble really begins) we have to reconsider the instrumental value of the
pen. The pen has brought about the freedom of the slaves, with a value of n; but it also
brought about its own intrinsic value, which is m. So by PI, the instrumental value of
the pen = n+m. But now, by P2, since the instrumental value of the pen has increased,
we have to reconsider the intrinsic value of the pen! It seems, then, that we will never
be able to figure out either the intrinsic value or the instrumental value of the pen.
22
Of course, we could simply drop either PI or P2 to avoid this problem; but that may
get us into other problems. Ifwe drop PI, we will need to rethink some plausible
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views about instrumental value; ifwe drop P2, it is hard to see why Lincoln’s pen
would be any better intrinsically than an ordinary, somewhat useful pen.
The moral is this: in order for Kagan’s argument to work, PCIV must be
compatible with the claim that Lincoln’s pen has intrinsic value. If PCIV is
compatible with this claim, then the property it associates with the term ‘intrinsic
value, PP, is not suited to play the role that intrinsic value is supposed to play — as
something that rates the world a plus, and that can be maximized.
2.2.2. 5 States of Affairs and the Spirit of Mooreanism
Finally, I would like to address Kagan’s last line of argument. He correctly
points out that many people deny that material objects, such as people and pens, have
intrinsic value; instead, certain states of affairs (or perhaps facts) have intrinsic value.
I think there are some good reasons to think this is true. If states of affairs are the
bearers of intrinsic value, then we may accept all of the intuitions about intrinsic value
discussed by Kagan; however, we can deny that MCIV is incompatible with these
intuitions. In the case of the pen, for instance, we can claim that the state of affairs
consisting of there being a pen that was used by Lincoln to sign the Emancipation
Proclamation has intrinsic value. Or, we might instead claim that the state of affairs
consisting of this particular pen being used by Lincoln to sign the proclamation has
intrinsic value. We can explain its intrinsic value simply by appealing to its intrinsic
properties - that it involves this pen, Lincoln, and the Emancipation Proclamation
being related in a certain way. I think any value theory that assigned intrinsic value to
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such states of affairs would be rather implausible; but it would be entirely consistent
with MCIV.
However, Kagan argues that such a theory might be consistent with “the letter,
but not the spirit” of MCIV. This is because the theory would not limit the properties
ascribed by intrinsically valuable states of affairs to intrinsic properties. Being used by
Lincoln to sign the proclamation is not an intrinsic property of the pen. To preserve
the spirit of MCIV, says Kagan, we ought to formulate MCIV in such a way that the
only states of affairs that have intrinsic value are the ones that ascribe only intrinsic
properties to something. Here is his reasoning for this claim:
I take it, after all, that most friends of the tradition would insist that
uniqueness cannot be relevant to intrinsic value... They would insist,
similarly, that usefulness cannot be relevant to intrinsic value... And
they would insist as well that instrumental value cannot be relevant to
intrinsic value... But to insist upon these things — within the framework
in which only facts have intrinsic value - they must insist that the
ascribed properties relevant to a fact’s intrinsic value must themselves be
intrinsic properties. (Kagan 1998b, p. 14)
Let me try to fill in this account with some examples that seem to fit within the
dominant tradition. Beauty seems to be an intrinsic property of things. A value theory
that said that beauty was intrinsically good, then, would say that certain states of
affairs - such as the state of affairs consisting of the Mona Lisa being beautiful - are
intrinsically good in virtue of ascribing intrinsic properties to things. Similar things
might be said about pleasure. If pleasure were a feeling, as many have supposed,23
then it seems plausible to suppose that whether someone is feeling pleasure or not is
simply a matter of his intrinsic properties. So a hedonist would say that states of
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affairs are intrinsically good when they ascribe an intrinsic property - feeling pleasure
- to a person or other sentient being. Many philosophers have at least seriously
entertained the idea that things like beauty and pleasure have intrinsic value.24
However, it must be pointed out that many philosophers within the dominant
tradition have thought that states of affairs ascribing non-intrinsic properties have
intrinsic value. Take knowledge, for instance. Many philosophers have thought that
knowledge is intrinsically good (including Ross and Moore,25 who are part of the
dominant tradition if anyone is). What these philosophers probably mean is that states
of affairs that ascribe knowledge to someone - e.g., the state of affairs that consists of
my knowing that Clinton is the president - are intrinsically good. But knowing that
Clinton is president is not an intrinsic property. I currently know that Clinton is the
president; but there could be someone who is intrinsically just like me who does not
know that Clinton is the president - because in that person’s country, Clinton is not the
president.
Furthermore, if pleasure is not a feeling but a propositional attitude - as some
philosophers now believe26 - it seems likely that states of affairs that attribute pleasure
to someone in fact attribute an extrinsic property to that person. For example:
suppose John takes pleasure in his wife Kim’s accomplishments. We might say that
John is taking pleasure in a singular proposition about Kim: that Kim has achieved
some goal. A hedonist might want to say that the following state of affairs has
intrinsic value:
S 1 : John takes pleasure in the fact that Kim achieves a goal.
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But there could be someone intrinsically exactly like John who does not take pleasure
in Kim s achievement; that person might take pleasure in his own wife’s achievement
instead. So taking pleasure in Kim’s achievement is an extrinsic property of John; yet
a hedonist would most likely want to assign intrinsic value to a state of affairs like SI
that ascribes that property to John.
I think similar things might be said about justice. It seems unlikely that a value
theory that gives justice some weight in assignments of intrinsic value could assign
intrinsic value only to states of affairs that ascribe intrinsic properties. So we have at
least three sorts of things — knowledge, propositional pleasure, and justice — that many
friends of the dominant tradition want to say have intrinsic value, yet could not have
intrinsic value according to Kagan’s interpretation of the spirit of MCIV. I think it
would be quite uncharitable to accuse all such philosophers of holding incompatible
positions. It would be much more charitable to suppose that the spirit of MCIV is
contained in its letter - that MCIV places no restrictions on what sorts of ascribed
properties can enter into intrinsically good states of affairs.
Why, then, do most friends of the tradition who believe that states of affairs are
the bearers of value deny that uniqueness and usefulness are relevant to intrinsic
value? I do not know. Kagan has convinced me that the reason should not be that it is
incoherent to claim that such things are relevant. Rather, it should be a simple
axiological intuition. A state of affairs consisting of something being unique does not
seem to be intrinsically valuable, and that is that; no conceptual confusion need be
involved here. The same goes for usefulness; ifwe have a world full ofpotentially
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useful things that never bring about anything good, and another that is just the same
but without the potentially useful things, there seems to be no reason to prefer one over
the other. The worlds are equally worthless.
In short, I agree with Kagan’s critique of the stronger view he sees as being
part of the spirit of the traditional Moorean view. Nobody should hold such a view.
But I doubt that anyone ever has. I conclude that neither Anderson nor Kagan has
given us good reason to reject Moore’s conception of intrinsic value. Next I will
discuss some other important topics: the bearers of intrinsic value, and the notion of
“basic” intrinsic value.
2.3 The Bearers of Value
The arguments of the preceding section make it clear that when we talk about
value, it is important to make clear our metaphysical assumptions concerning what
kind (or kinds) of thing can properly be said to be intrinsically valuable. This is not a
question in substantive axiology. In fact, I think that our answer to this question
should allow for the possibility of the truth of any plausible theory of value. There
seem to be four main contenders for the bearers of value: states of affairs, facts (or
“obtainings”), properties, and concrete particulars. No other candidates have received
sufficient attention to warrant discussion here.
27
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2.3.1 States of Affairs vs. Facts
I hold that the bearers of intrinsic value are states of affairs (or
propositions”).28 States of affairs can be expressed by ‘that’-clauses: that John is
hungry, that there are no unicorns, etc. States of affairs have the following
characteristics: they are “abstract”; every state of affairs exists necessarily, or at every
possible world; 29 some of them are true, and others are false (i.e., some “obtain,” and
others do not); many states of affairs may be true at one world but false at another;
true states of affairs are called “facts”.
There are many different sorts of state of affairs. There are some that obtain at
some times but not others — for example, that John is hungry may obtain at noon,
before John eats lunch, but not at 1 :00 PM, after he has eaten. There are other states
of affairs whose truth-value at a world never changes - if true at a world, they are
always true at that world. Call such states of affairs “eternal” states of affairs. One
example of an eternal state of affairs would be that John is hungry at noon on October
12, 1996. Either sort of state of affairs might have intrinsic value; however, eternal
states of affairs are more important for my purposes, for I believe that eternal states of
affairs are the only states of affairs that have basic intrinsic value.
States of affairs are individuated “finely.” If John is wearing red suspenders
and drives a Ford Escort, and he feels pleasure, the state of affairs that John feels
pleasure is distinct from the state of affairs that the man with red suspenders feels
pleasure and the state of affairs that the man driving a Ford Escortfeels pleasure.
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These states of affairs are distinct even if a single concrete event (if there are such
things) makes all three states of affairs true.
Some have argued that it is not a state of affairs that has intrinsic value, but
that the state of affairs obtains. 30 This is an argument with an impressive pedigree.
Ross seems to be presenting an argument like this in the following passage:
However much one were convinced that conscientiousness, for example,
is good, and that A might become conscientious, no one would say ‘A’s
conscientiousness is good’ if he were convinced that A is not in fact
conscientious. ...We might say ‘perfectly conscientious action is good’,
even if (as Kant suggests) we are not convinced that there has ever been
such an action. But that is only a short-hand way of saying that without
being sure that such an action ever has existed, we can be sure that ifany
existed it would be good. (Ross 96-97
;
his emphasis)
Chisholm seems to make a similar argument:
Perhaps we ought to say that the only bearers of intrinsic value are
actual states of affairs - just those states of affairs that occur, obtain, or
exist. Everyone being happy is not a state of affairs that obtains and
therefore we are not likely to say of it that it is good. We would be more
likely to say of it that it would be good if it were to obtain. (Chisholm
1968, p. 23; his emphasis)
Chisholm and Sosa make the same point:
Ordinarily, one would not say of any unexemplified state of affairs (say,
that of everyone being happy) that it is good, or bad, or better than some
other state of affairs. One might say, instead, that the state of affairs is
on which would be good, or bad, or better than some state of affairs if
only it were exemplified. (Chisholm and Sosa 244; their emphasis)
The reason it is thought to be problematic to suppose that states of affairs are the
bearers of value is that every state of affairs exists at every possible world. For
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example, the state of affairs that everyone is happy exists at the actual world; but its
mere existence at this world does not improve the value of this world. If that state of
affairs were to obtain, however, the value of this world would improve greatly. Thus,
it is not the state of affairs itself that has intrinsic value, but that the state of affairs
obtains
.
31
There are two important problems I see with this line of reasoning. The first is
that it is not clear what “obtainings” are; on my view, they are simply true states of
affairs. States of affairs are expressed by ‘that’-clauses; so ‘that S obtains’ itself
expresses a state of affairs. Perhaps, then, the objection is that it is only certain types
of state of affairs that have intrinsic value: viz., states of affairs expressed by clauses
of the form ‘that it is true that S’ or ‘that S obtains.’ But this does not help at all.
Consider the state of affairs that it is true that everyone is happy. This state of affairs
exists at every possible world, including the actual world; yet it is false at the actual
world, so it does not make the actual world any better.
There is an important assumption that lies behind this line of attack. The
assumption is that if a state of affairs exists at a world, and is intrinsically good, then it
must contribute its value to the value of the world; in order to calculate the intrinsic
value of a world, we simply add up the (basic) intrinsic values of the states of affairs
that exist there. This is an unwarranted assumption. It seems much more reasonable
to suppose that in order to fmd the intrinsic value of a world, we add the basic intrinsic
values of the states of affairs that are true at that world. On this assumption, the state
of affairs that everyone is happy contributes its intrinsic value only to those worlds in
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which it is true; thus, while it exists at the actual world, it does not make this world
any better.
It is true that we do not ordinarily speak of states of affairs being intrinsically
good when we know that they do not obtain. It sounds odd to assert the following
sentence:
SI: It is intrinsically good that John is feeling pleasure
when we know that John is in pain. I think it is probably best to provide a pragmatic
solution to this problem. When we assert SI, there is a strong implication that it is
true that John is feeling pleasure. I don’t think we should make too much of this
implication. SI might be literally true, yet misleading when John is not feeling
pleasure.
Others have claimed that only facts (true states of affairs) have intrinsic value;
for example, Noah Lemos claims that “it is useful to distinguish facts and states of
affairs and to speak of facts as bearers of value” (N. Lemos 1994, p. 23). Perhaps
when people argue that obtainings have intrinsic value, they are thinking of obtainings
asfacts. The appropriate response to this view is the same. A state of affairs has its
intrinsic value whether or not it is a fact; however, it only contributes its intrinsic
value to the value of a world if it is a fact at that world. Truth (being a fact) is not an
intrinsic property of a state of affairs; it is a relation between a state of affairs and a
world. Thus, by SUP, whether a state of affairs is true or false cannot affect its
intrinsic value.
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It is easy to be led into incoherence by holding a Moorean view about intrinsic
value and holding that facts, but notfalse states ofaffairs, are the bearers of value.
Consider the following passages from Lemos’ Intrinsic Value: “(T)here is an
understandable temptation to say that some states of affairs are bearers of value. This
is simply because facts are states of affairs that obtain” (Lemos 1994, p. 23). “(I)t
would not be, strictly speaking, the state of affairs everyone s being wise and happy
that would be intrinsically good, but the fact that everyone was so” (Lemos 1994, pp.
24-25, his italics). If a fact is a state of affairs that obtains, then it is a state of affairs.
But if a fact is a state of affairs, then if the fact that everyone is wise and happy is
intrinsically good, then the state of affairs that everyone is wise and happy must also
be intrinsically good. The fact and the state of affairs are one and the same thing! If
one wants to hold that facts have intrinsic value, but states of affairs do not, then one
must not also hold (as Lemos does) that facts are states of affairs. Instead, one must
hold that facts occupy a different ontological category. 32
Holding that states of affairs are the bearers of value forces us to rethink the
view that something’s intrinsic value is the value it would have if it were isolated. The
problem is that it is impossible to isolate a state of affairs in the necessary way. 33
There may be a possible world where my calculator is the only physical object; but
there is no possible world at which the state of affairs that my calculator exists is the
only true state of affairs. That state of affairs entails countless other states of affairs:
that something exists, that my calculator exists or 2+2=4, etc. This could lead to
serious problems ifwe allow that one state of affairs with intrinsic value could entail
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another state of affairs with intrinsic value. For example, suppose that knowledge and
pleasure are intrinsically good; consider the state of affairs
S2: John knows that Kim is pleased.
Since knowledge is intrinsically good, S2 should be intrinsically good. To find its
intrinsic value according to ISO, we look at a world where S2 is completely isolated
and find the value of that world. But no matter how we try to isolate S2, we will not
be able to remove from the world all the other states of affairs with intrinsic value; for
the state of affairs that Kim is pleased will be true at any world where S2 is true, and
we are supposing that hedonism is true. So a world where S2 is as isolated as it can be
will be a world with greater intrinsic value than S2. Thus I think that we should drop
ISO as our official conception of intrinsic value, and use SUP instead.
I have not yet given any good reasons to think that states of affairs are the
bearers of value; but so far, I find no reason to reject them. I now turn to two other
proposals for the bearers of value: properties and concrete particulars. In discussing
these proposals, I will demonstrate some of the benefits we can gain by holding that
states of affairs are the bearers of value.
2.3.2 States of Affairs vs. Properties
Some have claimed that rather than states of affairs or concrete particulars, it is
properties that have intrinsic value. Panayot Butchvarov claims that “a person’s life
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can be said to be good on the grounds that it is happy only if happiness itself can be
said to be good, and in general a concrete entity can be said to be good only on the
grounds that it has some other property or properties that themselves have the property
of being good” (Butchvarov 1989, p. 14). So for example, a hedonist might say that
the state of affairs that Johnfeels pleasure is good in virtue of the fact that it involves
pleasure. But if that is true, then pleasure itself is good.
I think there are problems both for Butchvarov’ s argument and for the view he
defends. First of all, his argument is fallacious; for as Noah Lemos notes, “In general,
from the fact that X has G because X has F, it does not follow that the property of
being F has the property of being G” (Lemos 1994, p. 23). In fact, when X has G
because X has F, it will rarely be the case that the property of being F has the property
of being G. I am human because (let’s suppose) I have human parents; but the
property of having human parents does not itself have the property of being human!
Since this appears to be Butchvarov’ s main argument for holding that properties,
rather than states of affairs, are the bearers of value, he can hope for no better than a
standoff.
But the view that properties are the bearers of value runs into serious problems
when it comes to determining the value of a world - problems that the states of affairs
view does not have. Suppose hedonism is true. Then according to Butchvarov’s view,
what really has intrinsic value is the property of being pleased. But it seems
reasonable to suppose that the property of being pleased exists at every possible world.
If that is so, then every world would be equal in value.
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Perhaps Butchvarov would hold, instead, that the property of being pleased
exists only at worlds where it is instantiated. This would not help much; for there are
countless worlds where the property of being pleased is instantiated. Some of these
worlds contain a lot of pleasure, some very little; but they all come out equal on
Butchvarov’ s approach. A hedonist wants to say that worlds are better when they
contain more pleasure (amounts of pain being equal). But Butchvarov’ s view allows
for only two amounts of pleasure - either a world contains the property or it doesn’t.
That does not give us enough to work with. On the other hand, if we hold that states
of affairs are the bearers of value, then we can make plenty of distinctions. The state
of affairs that Johnfeels pleasure to degree +12for ten minutes can be said to be
intrinsically better than the state of affairs that John feels pleasure to degree +7for
three minutes, because they are distinct states ofaffairs. The difference between their
values cannot be explained by a difference in the property of pleasure itself, because
there is only one property of pleasure involved in both states of affairs.
2.3.3 States of Affairs vs. Concrete Particulars
According to Elizabeth Anderson, states of affairs do not have intrinsic value;
they have only extrinsic value. Concrete particulars - things like people, animals,
artworks, and other things - are the bearers of intrinsic value. 34 This view is at the
very heart of Anderson’s own theory of rationality, which she calls the “expressive
theory.” Her argument is rather complicated. In this section I will attempt to explain
her argument and defend the states of affairs view against her attacks.
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Before we can understand Anderson’s argument against states of affairs as the
bearers of intrinsic value, we must examine her conception of intrinsic value, because
her attack depends crucially on this conception. Anderson does not accept the
Moorean conception of intrinsic value. Instead, Anderson defines intrinsic value in
terms of what can be rationally valued. Here is what she says:
First, there are the people, animals, communities, and things toward which
we direct our actions. These are the things it makes sense for a person to
care immediately about, independent of its making sense for her to care
about any other particular thing. Call these intrinsic goods. Intrinsic goods
are the immediate objects of our intrinsic valuations. ...These are the
things we rationally value in themselves. Extrinsic goods, by contrast, are
goods which it makes sense for a person to value only because it makes
sense for her to value some other particular thing. The value of an extrinsic
good depends upon the value of something else, in that one’s rational
valuation of it is mediated by one’s rational valuation of something else.
(Anderson 1993, p. 19)
This suggests the following conception of intrinsic value:
x has intrinsic value if and only if x is the immediate object of an intrinsic
valuation,
as well as the following definition of ‘immediate object of intrinsic valuation’:
x is the immediate object of an intrinsic valuation if and only if it is rational to
value x immediately,
and the following definition of ‘rationally valuing x immediately’:
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It is rational to value x immediately if and only if it is rational to value x
independent of whether it is rational to value anything other than x.
We can thus state the following as Anderson’s official definition of intrinsic value
(ADIV):
ADIV: x has intrinsic value it is rational to value x independent of whether it is
rational to value anything other than x.
ADIV plays an important role in Anderson’s argument that states of affairs
cannot have intrinsic value. I turn now to the argument, which is contained in the
following passage:
It makes sense for a person to value most [states of affairs] only because it
makes sense for a person to care about the people, animals, communities,
and things concerned with them. This follows from the fact that our basic
evaluative attitudes - love, respect, consideration, affection, honor, and so
forth — are non-propositional. They are attitudes we take up immediately
toward persons, animals, and things, not toward facts. Because to be
intrinsically valuable is to be the immediate object of such a rational
attitude, states of affairs are not intrinsically valuable if they are not
immediate objects of such attitudes. (Anderson 1993, p. 20)
Here is how I formulate Anderson’s argument:
1. Our basic rational evaluative attitudes are non-propositional.
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2. To be intrinsically valuable is to be the immediate object of a basic rational
evaluative attitude. (ADIV)
^ IL1&2, then states of affairs are not intrinsically valuable.
4. Therefore, states of affairs are not intrinsically valuable.
There is much that requires clarification here. Let us start with premise one.
Premise one relies on several distinctions between kinds of attitudes: basic vs. non-
basic, rational vs. non-rational, evaluative vs. non-evaluative, and propositional vs.
non-propositional
. I will attempt to determine how Anderson understands each of
these distinctions.
Two of the distinctions are fairly easy to understand. First, there are evaluative
and non-evaluative attitudes. An evaluative attitude is an attitude such that, when one
has that attitude toward something, one values that thing in some way. So, for
example, belief is a non-evaluative attitude; one can believe a proposition without
valuing it. Love, however, is an evaluative attitude; to love something is to value it in
a certain way. Next, there are propositional and non-propositional attitudes.
Propositional attitudes are attitudes that take propositions as their objects. Belief is a
propositional attitude, while love, according to Anderson, is non-propositional; we
love people and things, not propositions, and we believe propositions, not people. 35
(Sometimes we say that we believe people; what we really mean is that we believe
what they say - i.e., we believe certain propositions.)
What does it mean to say that an attitude is rational? Anderson suggests an
answer in the following passage:
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Many of our motivational states, such as appetites, whims, habits,
compulsions, and addictions, can express a concern for the realization of
states of affairs without any regard for ourselves, other people, or other
thmgs. When we care about states of affairs in these ways, the fact of our
carmg does not depend upon our caring about anything else. However,
these motivations also do not generally depend or change upon reflection
on their objects or on our own attitudes and reasons for action. This is why
these motivational states are neither rational nor irrational. (Anderson
1993, pp. 20-21)
Here we get an idea of what makes an attitude rational. An attitude is rational if and
only if in general, reflection upon the object of the attitude can change the attitude
taken toward that object. Take compulsion, for example. Suppose someone is
compelled to wash his hands every five minutes. He is concerned to bring about the
state of affairs consisting of his hands being washed. He is not really concerned about
his hands, much less himself. He might even realize that it is not good for his hands to
be washed every five minutes. If there is a true compulsion, then no matter how much
he reflects upon the state of affairs of his hands being washed, it will not change his
compulsion. Thus compulsion is not a rational attitude, and the objects of compulsion
- states of affairs - do not have intrinsic value.
Finally, we have the distinction between basic and non-basic evaluative
attitudes. While Anderson does not explicitly define what makes an attitude “basic,” I
think the following passage sheds some light on what she has in mind:
Evaluative attitudes take up states of affairs as their mediated objects
through the desires, hopes, wishes, and other propositional attitudes that
express them. Jack’s love for Margaret can be expressed in the hope that
he will be able to see her soon. His favorable attitude toward her is what
makes sense of his favorable attitude toward the state of affairs in which he
sees her soon. Margaret is the immediate object of his love. The states of
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affairs he desires, hopes, or aims at are the mediated object of his love.
ey are mediated by norms for desire, hope, and intention that express his
evaluative attitudes. (Anderson 1993, p. 20)
Here is how I interpret Anderson. When we have a basic evaluative attitude
toward something, our valuing it need not be explained by other evaluative attitudes
toward other things. It makes sense to have that attitude, whether or not one has any
favorable attitude toward anything else. When we have a non-basic evaluative attitude
toward something, on the other hand, there is a basic attitude that we have toward
something else that makes sense of, or explains, the non-basic attitude. In the example
Anderson gives, Jack’s hopes and desires are non-basic attitudes. It only makes sense
for Jack to hope for certain states of affairs about Margaret to obtain if Jack loves
Margaret. But it makes sense for Jack to love Margaret whether or not he has any
favorable attitudes toward other things. Thus Jack’s love for Margaret is basic.
Now we are finally in a position to understand premise one. What Anderson is
asserting is that the evaluative attitudes that are basic and rational — i.e., that (i) are
unexplainable in terms of other attitudes and (ii) generally can change upon reflection
upon their objects - all have people, animals, communities, or things as their objects.
Any evaluative attitude that has a state of affairs as its object either is arational (cannot
change upon reflection) or depends upon (must be explained in terms of) attitudes
toward people, animals, communities, or things.
Since this premise is so important, we should examine more thoroughly
Anderson’s reasons for believing it to be true. Anderson argues that, for example,
welfare states cannot have intrinsic value because “if it doesn’t make sense to value
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the person ... then it doesn’t make sense to care about promoting her welfare”
(Anderson 1993, p. 26). Against those who argue that knowledge is intrinsically good,
she says that “it makes sense to care about knowing something only if the object of
knowledge is interesting or important or the knowledge itself is useful” (Anderson
1993, p. 27). Nor can we simply say that instead of intrinsically valuing people and
things, we value states of affairs consisting of their existence; for “states of affairs
which consist in the existence of something are valuable only if it makes sense to care
about the thing that exists” (Anderson 1993, p. 26).
It is difficult to evaluate Anderson’s first premise, even when we understand
what she means by ‘basic,’ ‘rational,’ etc. Are all of our basic, rational, evaluative
attitudes non-propositional? My feeble mind is incapable of answering such a
question. Fortunately, Anderson gives examples of basic, rational, evaluative
attitudes, love, respect, honor, affection, and consideration. So let’s just assume that
according to Anderson’s definitions of ‘basic,’ ‘rational,’ and ‘evaluative,’ these
attitudes turn out to be basic rational evaluative attitudes. Furthermore, let’s suppose
that appetites, whims, and habits are not basic rational evaluative attitudes according to
Anderson’s definitions. The question now arises: are love, honor, and the other
attitudes non-propositional?
It certainly seems that love and honor can have people as their objects.
However, it seems that they can also have propositions as their objects. For example,
sometimes we honor people’s wishes. When we honor someone’s wishes, what we
seem to be honoring is a certain state of affairs: that someone wished something.
Often people say, “I just love it when you do that”; this seems to be a case of loving a
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certain state of affairs: your doing that?6 The same might be said of consideration;
we are sometimes asked to be considerate of facts. For example, if I am making a lot
of noise late at night, I might be asked to be considerate of the fact that people are
asleep. I might even be asked to respect that fact.
Anderson would probably argue that although we may love, respect, and honor
facts, we only love, respect and honor them because we love, respect, and honor
people (or things, or communities). It only makes sense to be considerate of the fact
that people are asleep if it makes sense to be considerate of those people themselves.
Thus, perhaps when love, respect, and honor are taken towards states of affairs, they
are taken only mediately. It makes no sense to love, honor, or respect a state of affairs
without loving, honoring, or respecting something else as well.
However, it seems reasonable to claim that it is normally the case that when we
love or respect someone, there is some propositional attitude that explains this love or
respect. When a student respects a teacher, for example, he does not simply respect
her. If, when asked why he respects her, he could not come up with one single reason,
we might have reason to doubt he does in fact respect her, or we might doubt whether
his respect is rational. More likely, he would say that he respects her intelligence, or
her fairness, or her teaching ability. That is to say, he would say that he has a
favorable evaluative attitude about thefact that she is intelligent, or fair, or a good
teacher. I do not see how these attitudes could, in turn, be explained by a positive
attitude he has toward the teacher herself, though they might perhaps be explained by
favorable attitudes toward other states of affairs.
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This is an extremely important point. For when Anderson claims that it is
rational to value a person’s welfare only when it is rational to value that person, or that
it is rational to value something’s existence only when it is rational to value that thing
itself, the appropriate response is simply that it is rational to value a person or a thing
only when it is rational to value certain facts (states of affairs) about that person or
thing. (In fact, it may be that to value a person or thing simply is to value certain facts
about that person or thing.) If this is true, then Anderson has not provided us with a
reason to reject the intrinsic values of states of affairs. We need to say that certain
states of affairs have intrinsic value in order to explain the values of people and things.
Thus, returning to ADIV : if x has intrinsic value only if it is rational to value x
independent of whether it is rational to value anything other than x, then it seems that
people and things cannot have intrinsic value; for it does not make sense to value
people and things alone. In any case where it makes sense to value a person or a thing,
it also makes sense to value a state of affairs.
Anderson herself admits that we have to admit certain states of affairs as being
intrinsically valuable. She says:
Perhaps some things are interesting because we have discovered interesting
facts about them. Interest does seem to be an evaluative attitude that can
take a state of affairs as its immediate and independent object. This is an
exception to the general rule that states of affairs have no intrinsic value.
(Anderson 1993, p. 27)
I think there will turn out to be many other cases where we value something, yet there
is nothing other than a state of affairs that can reasonably be said to be valued. Take
justice, for example. Suppose that we have a favorable evaluative attitude toward the
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state of affairs consisting of a criminal receiving his punishment. Such an attitude
would seem to be entirely rational. But in a case like this, there is no person, thing,
animal, or community that we could be said to value in virtue of which we value the
state of affairs consisting of this criminal being punished. Certainly it is not the
criminal that we value. It’s possible that we might value society, and think the
criminal’s getting punished would benefit society in some way, but we need not think
so in order to see value in the punishment. So ifjustice has intrinsic value, then there
are some more exceptions to the claim that states of affairs have no intrinsic value.
What a messy axiology we would be stuck with if, besides states of affairs, we also
had to say that things like people and animals have intrinsic value. Certainly things
would be much nicer ifwe could say that all the things with intrinsic value at least
belong to one ontological category. At the very least, we should not admit that people
and things have intrinsic value without having a good reason to introduce this
additional messiness. So far I see no such reason . 37
I conclude that there are some good reasons to hold that states of affairs are the
bearers of intrinsic value, and that no good reasons have been advanced to show that
they are not. Probably the best way to argue that states of affairs are not the bearers of
intrinsic value would be to argue that there are no states of affairs. If states of affairs
don’t exist, then obviously they can’t bear intrinsic value. However, discussion of the
existence of states of affairs would take us far afield. Henceforth I will assume that
states of affairs are the bearers of intrinsic value.
74
2.4 Basic Intrinsic Value
The final topic of this chapter is a problem that arises when we attempt to
determine the mtrmsic values of more complicated things like worlds, lives, and total
consequences. This is a very important problem, because my definitions of extrinsic
value concepts will depend on the ability to calculate the intrinsic values of such
things.
The problem appears to have been noted first by Gilbert Harman (1967). The
problem is this: if we try to determine the intrinsic value of a world (or life, or
consequence) by summing the intrinsic values of the states of affairs true at the world,
we come up with some strange results. Suppose that hedonism is true, and suppose
that only one person, John, ever feels any pleasure at world wl; he feels pleasure to
degree +9 for three minutes. Now imagine that we want to find the intrinsic value of
wl, so we begin summing the intrinsic values of states of affairs true at wl
. One such
state of affairs will be the following:
S 1 : John feels pleasure to degree +9 for three minutes.
Let’s say that SI gets an intrinsic value of +27 (9 x 3). We might suppose that we
were finished, because S 1 is the only state of affairs with intrinsic value that is true at
wl . But consider the following states of affairs that are also true at wl
:
S2: John feels pleasure to degree +9 for three minutes and 2+2=4.
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S3 : John feels pleasure to degree +9 for three minutes and snow is white.
S2 and S3 also seem t0 be intrinsically good. If we determine the intrinsic values of
conjunctive states of affairs S2 and S3 by summing the intrinsic values of their
conjuncts, their intrinsic values would also be +27. Now we have an intrinsic value
for wl of at least 27+27+27, or +81. There are a number of other states of affairs true
at wl that also seem to be intrinsically good, such as the following:
S4: Someone feels pleasure to degree +9 for three minutes.
S5: Someone named ‘John’ feels pleasure to degree +9 for three minutes.
56. John feels pleasure to degree +9 for more than two minutes.
57. John feels pleasure to a degree greater than +8 for three minutes.
Thus it seems that when we add the intrinsic values of all the states of affairs true at
wl, we get a number that is much too high, given that there is only one episode of
pleasure that occurs at wl.
Harman’s solution to this problem is to introduce the notion of basic intrinsic
value. The idea is that while there are many states of affairs at wl that are
intrinsically good, ifwe state our version of hedonism correctly there will be a very
small number of states of affairs that are basically intrinsically good. For example, we
might wish to say that only states of affairs that are about a particular person (de re)
qualify as basic. This would eliminate S4 and S5. We might also say that
conjunctions are out; this would eliminate S2 and S3. And we might say that in order
76
for a state of affairs to be basically intrinsically good, there must be a determinate
degree of pleasure attributed, for a determinate amount of time; this would eliminate
S6 and S7.39
It is difficult to define the notion of basic intrinsic value. Roughly speaking,
we might say that states with non-basic intrinsic value “derive” their values from
states with basic intrinsic value. All of S2-S7 seem to be intrinsically good “in virtue
of’ the intrinsic value of SI. However, SI does not entail all of S2-S7. I will not try
to provide a precise definition of basic intrinsic value here; I will simply hope that the
reader gets an intuitive grasp of the idea.
Once we carefully specify which states of affairs have intrinsic value in the
most basic way, we can hold that the intrinsic value of a world is equal to the sum of
the basic intrinsic values of the states of affairs true at that world. In general, we can
hold the following Summative Principle:
SP: The intrinsic value of a complex whole is equal to the sum of the basic
intrinsic values of its parts.40
Of course, it is highly controversial that we can determine the intrinsic values
of complex things by summing the basic intrinsic values of their parts. Moore (1903)
famously argued that we cannot assume that the value of a sum equals the values of its
parts, because of the existence of what he called “organic unities.” Issues involving
organic unities are complicated; I postpone discussion of these issues until Chapter 4.
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I now turn to defining the various types of extrinsic value; until further notice I will
assume SP for the sake of simplicity.
1
See Feldman ( 1 998a) for a summary of some of the various criteria of
intrinsic value that have been offered.
2
Feldman makes this point in (Feldman 1998a).
3 A similar criticism of Kant’s view is given by William Tolhurst (1983 n
384); also see Feldman (1998a). P
4
Note that Moore claims that this is a definition. This would seem to conflict
with his assertion in Principia Ethica that intrinsic goodness is a simple, undefmable
property.
5
However, problems may arise ifwe suppose that states of affairs are the
bearers of value; see Section 2.3.1 (below).
When something exists in isolation, it has the property of being isolated.
Being isolated is not an intrinsic property.
I think that ISO might break down when we try to apply it to states of
affairs; it is very difficult to isolate a state of affairs. I will discuss this further below.
g
It seems odd that Anderson thinks that being a hermit would lead Moore to
deny thatfreedom has intrinsic value. I would think that one of the main advantages
of being a hermit would be the additional freedom one would have, since hermits have
no societal or familial obligations.
9
Perhaps the reason Anderson thinks the isolation test has substantive
consequences is that she thinks of it as a substantive theory of intrinsic value; she says
she will “consider whether Moore’s theory can explain deeply entrenched features of
our actual practices and experiences” (Anderson 1993, p. 1 19, my emphasis). My
view is that the isolation test, by itself, is not supposed to “explain” anything in the
sense Anderson seems to think it is supposed to. The isolation test is not supposed to
be anything more than a guideline to keep in mind when developing an axiology.
Certainly it is not supposed to “explain deeply entrenched features of our actual
practices and experiences”; even a substantive axiology is not supposed to do that!
Instead, this would seem to be a job for sociologists or anthropologists. It would be a
mistake for philosophers to try to tackle this job.
1
0
See Moore ( 1 95 1
,
p. 260).
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some verslons °f subjectivism are compatible with. could understand subjectivism as the claim that to say that something hasva ue just means that it is valued; and hence, that to say that something has intrinsic
value just means that it is valued intrinsically - i.e„ in virtue of its intrinsic propertiesThis version of subjectivism would be compatible with MC. However it is not the
sort of subjectivism Kagan has in mind.
Elliot (1992) endorses this view about endangered species. I will
Chapter 6 that Elliot’s conception of intrinsic value is incoherent.
argue in
I would say a similar thing about Kagan’s examples involving capabilities-
a fast racecar might be said to have intrinsic value in some sense of ‘intrinsic value’ -
in the sense that some people would value it even if it never raced. But this does not
seem to be the same sense of ‘intrinsic value’ we are talking about when we do moral
philosophy. It is a kmd of “collectible value” or “sentimental value.” (I am indebted
to Fred Feldman for discussion of this issue.)
14
For more on contributory value, see Chapter 4.
1
5
See Chisholm ( 1 986, pp. 70-7 1 ).
16
For more on the contributory value of unique things, see Chapter 6.
17
In his response to my comments, Kagan claimed that, in fact, he would care
about preserving the message if the mission were important enough.
18
It also assumes that there is no intrinsic value in rarity, since the lone pen
would have more rarity value than any of the fourteen pens. I have already addressed
the question of rarity above.
19
Kagan does not make this supposition.
20
This is not exactly right, for it ignores the possibility of preventive value; I
discuss this in Chapter 3.
2
1
Fred Feldman gives the following argument in support of this point:
Suppose hedonism is true. Suppose in wl we have just one episode of pleasure, and
it has an ivalue of +10. Suppose this episode comes about as a result of a very short
causal chain; a person performs a free act, and immediately someone feels this 10
hedon pleasure. In w2 there is also just one episode of pleasure and it also has an
ivalue of +10. Yet in w2 the episode comes about as a result of a tremendously long
sequence of causes and effects. Let this chain last a thousand years, and have 10
million links. If Kagan’s view were true, IV(w2) > IV(wl). Yet this is completely
implausible. Therefore, Kagan’s view is not true” (personal correspondence).
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22 Tom Hurka points out (in conversation) that, depending on what formula is
used to derive something’s intrinsic value from its instrumental value, the intrinsic
value may approach a limit rather than increasing to infinity. Even if this is true, I find
it implausible to think that intrinsic value is determined in this way.
23
Moore seems to have held this view about pleasure: “The idea of the
drinking causes afeeling ofpleasure in my mind” (1903, p. 69; my emphasis). I do
not know of any well-known philosopher who holds this view nowadays.
24
In fact, Moore (1903, chapter VI) seems to hold that both beauty and
pleasure are intrinsically good.
25
See Ross (1930, pp. 138-141) and Moore (1903, chapter VI).
26
For example, see Feldman (1998b, chapter 5).
27 •
Views I do not discuss include the view that the bearers of value are
“concrete events,” and the view that they are “concrete realizations” of states of affairs
(Audi 253). Perhaps these are the same view. Neither has been defended at any
length; see note 32 below.
2g „
The conception of states of affairs that I employ is roughly the one
endorsed by Chisholm (1976, p. 1 14).
29
Perhaps singular propositions exist only at worlds where their constituents
exist. This should not have any great impact on the issues here.
30
This point was brought to my attention by an anonymous referee for
Philosophical Studies.
3
1
Noah Lemos buys into this argument as well (Lemos 1994, pp. 24-25).
Perhaps one could hold that facts are like states of affairs, only “concrete”
and not “abstract.” Something like this view seems to be held by Zimmerman (1998),
who says that “states” - particular, concrete things, but not physical objects - are the
bearers of value. This would strike me as unnecessary, in light of the fact that we do
not yet have a reason to reject states of affairs as the bearers of value. It would also
seem superfluous to have both states of affairs and concrete “states” in our ontology.
At the very least, we ought to know more about what concrete states are supposed to
be, and why we need them, before we hold that they are the bearers of intrinsic value.
In my opinion, the concrete states view has not been explained or defended
sufficiently to warrant significant attention here.
33
I thank Ted Sider for bringing this difficulty to my attention.
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34 Noah Lemos presents arguments against the view that people have intrinsic
value (1994, p. 28). I find his arguments inconclusive and probably question-begging;
therefore I will not discuss them here.
35
This assertion is highly contentious. I discuss it further below.
36
I am indebted to Fred Feldman for this example.
37
For further criticism of Anderson, see Sturgeon (1996), who argues that
even if states of affairs do not have intrinsic value, they still might be said to be
“ultimately promotable” (Sturgeon 516). See Anderson (1996) for her response to
Sturgeon.
38
Warren Quinn (1974) denies that there is such a thing as basic intrinsic
value; instead, he proposes that we recognize certain propositions as “basic” in the
assignment of intrinsic value (Quinn 128). I will not address the relative merits of
Harman’s and Quinn’s approaches here.
39
For more on how to formulate hedonism properly, see Feldman (1998b),
chapter 7.
40
I intentionally leave the notions of “whole” and “part” unexplained here,
since it is not clear how to apply these notions to states of affairs. I will discuss this
topic in more detail in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 3
INSTRUMENTAL VALUE
3.1 Some Naive Views of Instrumental Value
Often when one asks whether something is good, what he is asking is “What is
it good for?” For example, if someone wanted to know what makes eating food so
good, we might say that eating food is good because it produces pleasant, tasty
sensations in us, or because it causes us to be healthy. When we say that something is
good for reasons like this, we say that it has instrumental value; it has value because of
its causal relationships. Instrumental value is quite an important type of value, simply
in virtue of the fact that most of our everyday attributions of value seem to be
attributions of instrumental value. Money, vaccines, computers, and motorcycles (or
states of affairs involving these things), among other things, all seem to be good (if
good at all) merely because of what they cause. On the face of it, the notion of
instrumental value seems quite easy to understand. Thus it is a quite surprising fact
that this notion has been almost universally misconstrued by ethical philosophers.
To demonstrate this, I begin with a recent definition offered by Robert Audi:
Consider the existence of instrumental goods - something virtually anyone
will grant, since it simply implies that some things are efficient in bringing
about others. ...Suppose for the sake of argument that (1) there is only
instrumental (hence extrinsic) good, that is, good which is instrumental in
some broad way, so that a good thing is, as such, a means to something
else. (Audi 250)
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Audi seems to be suggesting a definition of instrumental value like the following:
AIV: x is instrumentally good -df x is efficient in bringing about something.
AIV is plainly false. Many things are quite efficient in bringing about other
things, yet are not instrumentally good. A deadly poison may be quite efficient in
bringing about death to millions of people; we do not therefore call it instrumentally
good.
The value of what something brings about seems to be relevant to its
instrumental goodness in some way. One way in which the value of a thing’s
consequences is thought to affect its instrumental value is suggested in the following
definitions offered by William Frankena, Ramon Lemos, and Charles Baylis:
One may also say that something is good on the ground that it is a
means, necessary, sufficient, or both, to a good end, as when one says,
‘It is a good idea to go to the dentist twice a year.’ Then it is
extrinsically or instrumentally good, or good as a means. (Frankena 65) 1
In order that something have positive instrumental value it is sufficient
that it be a means to the existence or occurrence of something good. (R.
Lemos 43)
Anything is instrumentally good in so far as it is a causal factor in the
production of something which is good. (Baylis 488)
These passages clearly suggest the following definition of instrumental value (the
“naive view”):
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NV : s is instrumentally good -df There exists an x such that (i) s causes x to
occur and (ii) x is good.
NV reflects the vagueness of the definitions offered by Frankena, Lemos, and
Baylis. The vagueness arises in the use of the term ‘good’ in the definiens ofNV.
What sort of goodness do these philosophers have in mind? Do they mean intrinsic
goodness, overall goodness, or perhaps some other sort of goodness?
In the end, it does not matter what they mean by ‘good.’ NV would fail no
matter how ‘good’ is construed. (I will demonstrate this below.) However, it seems
plausible to understand them to mean ‘intrinsically good.’ This would be in keeping
with a tradition that is evident in the following passages by historically important
philosophers such as G.E. Moore, W.D. Ross, and A.C. Ewing, as well as
contemporary ethicists Christine Korsgaard, John Hospers, Richard Brandt, Louis
Pojman, Robert Olson, and Richard Gamer and Bernard Rosen:
It is, I think, clear that it is the predicative rather than the attributive senses
of ‘good’ that are most important for philosophy. And of the predicative
senses, the first or instrumental is clearly a complex notion including (a)
the notion of a causal relation between something and something else, and
(b) the notion of the intrinsic goodness of the effect. (Ross 73)
“Good as a means” may also mean “productive of something intrinsically
good.” (Ewing 1947, p. 1 13; his emphasis)
Whenever we judge that a thing is ‘good as a means,’ we are making a
judgment with regard to its causal relations: we judge both that it will have
a particular kind of effect, and that that effect will be good in itself. (Moore
1903, p. 22)
The first kind of good is called instrumental good because the goodness or
worthwhileness of these things lies in their being instruments toward the
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attainment of the other things which are considered good not merely as
instruments. (Hospers 104-105, emphasis his)
That which is valuable as a means to the achievement of an intrinsic good
is often called and instrumental good. (Olson 367)
Contributive value and inherent value, however, both share with
instrumental value the fact of deriving their goodness from the contribution
they make to the existence of a supposedly intrinsically good end.
(Korsgaard 172)
(I)f a thing leads (no matter how well or poorly) to something intrinsically
good, it is beneficially good. (Gamer and Rosen 1 16)2
Instrumental goods are worthy of desire because they are effective means
in reaching our intrinsic goods. (Pojman 1993, p. 85)
To say that something “is a good thing” is nearly if not quite the same as to
say that it “is a desirable thing.” ...Presumably, something is
instrumentally desirable only because the expected results, immediate or
remote, are intrinsically desirable. (Brandt 301-303)
Thus the following revision seems in order:
NV’: s is instrumentally good =# There exists an x such that (i) s causes x to
occur and (ii) x is intrinsically good.
NV’ suffers from a serious defect. If something is a causal factor in the
production of something intrinsically good, it may also be a causal factor in the
production of something intrinsically very bad. Consider the following example. One
day, a comet is headed for earth. The comet lands on the town of Amherst,
Massachusetts, destroying the entire town and resulting in many tragic and untimely
deaths. Before it lands, however, it is seen by an amateur astronomer in Athens, Ohio,
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who (not knowing what tragic events are about to unfold) gets some pleasure from her
discovery. Let’s suppose the pleasure experienced by the astronomer is intrinsically
good. Since the landing of the comet caused something intrinsically good, NV’
implies that the landing of the comet was instrumentally good. This result is quite
counterintuitive; it seems that the comet’s landing was instrumentally bad, not good.
This point applies no matter how we interpret ‘good’ in NV. To make the
point clear: suppose we interpret ‘good’ in NV as ‘overall good.’ Now consider the
above example. The landing of the comet caused both a bit of intrinsically good
pleasure in the amateur astronomer and a great deal of intrinsically bad suffering in the
residents of Amherst. It seems reasonable to suppose that the pleasure felt by the
astronomer was not just intrinsically good, but overall good. The pleasure did not
have any bad consequences. NV entails that the landing of the comet was
instrumentally good, since it caused something overall good - the pleasure of the
astronomer - to occur. But the deaths of the residents of Amherst were certainly
overall very bad; so it seems we ought to say that the landing of the comet was
instrumentally bad.
3.2 Total Causal Consequences
The problem with NV and NV’ is that they fail to make use of the notion of
something’s total causal consequence .
3 To explain this notion, we should first make
some preliminary decisions. Let’s assume that the bearers of intrinsic and extrinsic
value are states of affairs, or propositions. Assume also that possible worlds are
86
conjunctions of states of affairs, and that for every world w and state of affairs s, either
s or not-s is true at w. The total causal consequence of a state of affairs s at w can be
defined as the conjunction of all states of affairs at w that are caused by s. Next we
need to calculate the intrinsic value of the total causal consequence of s at w. There
are different views as to how we should calculate the intrinsic value of a conjunctive
state of affairs. Personally, I am partial to the standard view that the intrinsic value of
a conjunctive state of affairs is equal to the sum of the basic intrinsic values of its
conjuncts. Others, however, might reject this view as too simplistic; perhaps there
could be a conjunctive state of affairs whose intrinsic value is greater than the sum of
the basic intrinsic values of its conjuncts — an “organic unity.” Henceforth I will
assume the standard view; those who believe in organic unities may make the
appropriate revisions in my definitions. The following formula gives us the
instrumental value of s:
BIV: For any state of affairs s and world w, the instrumental value of s at w = the
intrinsic value of the total causal consequence of s at w. (Thus s is
instrumentally good at w iff the intrinsic value of s’s total causal
consequence at w > 0, and s is instrumentally bad iff the intrinsic value of
s’s total causal consequence at w < 0.)
It should be obvious that the instrumental value of a state of affairs must be relativized
to a world, since a single state of affairs will have different effects at different worlds.
87
BIV solves the problems I noted for NV and NV’. I suspect that something
like BIV is what lies behind the remarks on instrumental value made by Moore, Ross,
Ewing, Brandt, Korsgaard et al. But even BIV is not acceptable; for as Conee has
noted, “it is clear that we sometimes take things to have instrumental merit because of
what they prevent as well as what they accomplish” (Conee 1980, p. 1 1 1). Conee is
certainly not the first to note the value of prevention, however. Aristotle seems to
have noticed this long ago in Nicomachean Ethics : “(O)nly those goods that are
pursued or esteemed in their own right are called good in virtue of one Form; those
that are merely in some sense productive or conservative of these, or preventative of
their contraries, are called good because of them and in a different sense” (Aristotle
1096b, my emphasis). Other historically important figures that have noticed the
existence of preventive value include Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. “By
utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit,
advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness ...or ...to prevent the happening ofmischief
pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered” (Bentham 2, my
emphasis). “All desirable things ... are desirable either for pleasure inherent in
themselves or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention ofpain” (Mill
10-11, my emphasis). Certain remarks made by G.E. Moore suggest that he, too,
acknowledged preventive value: “The truth of what we believe is, therefore, very
important as preventing the pains of disappointment and still more serious
consequences” (Moore 1903, p. 195). More recently, Shelly Kagan has suggested the
existence of “eliminative” value, which seems much like preventive value: “Many
things with moral value possess only instrumental value. They are valuable only
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insofar as they can contribute to producing other goods (or eliminating various bads)
(Kagan 1998a, p. 28; his emphasis).4
3.3 The Conee/Tavlor View
Thus I turn now to Conee’s attempt to define instrumental value in a way that
accounts for preventions. Conee’s view is a “disjunctive” view; it seems to be
endorsed by Paul Taylor in the following passage:
Whether something that has utility also has instrumental value or
disvalue depends on whether the given end itself has value or disvalue.
...There are two ways in which an end can have value and two ways in
which it can have disvalue. It has value if it consists in the creation,
furtherance, preservation, strengthening, or increase of something which
is intrinsically or extrinsically valuable, or if it consists in the
destruction, hindrance, avoidance, weakening, or decrease of something
which is intrinsically or extrinsically disvaluable. (Taylor 28, my
emphasis)
Conee states the view in the following way (Conee’s view of instrumental value):
CIV: s is instrumentally good -df s causally contributes to bringing about
something overall good or preventing something overall bad. (Conee
1980, p. Ill)
Conee thinks CIV gives us a concept of interest. But CIV suffers from some
of the same defects as NV, since the first disjunct of the definiens of CIV is relevantly
similar to the definiens ofNV. A further problem with CIV is that it defines
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instrumental value in terms of overall value. If we understand something’s overall
value, as Conee seems to, 5 to be the sum of its intrinsic and instrumental values, then
CIV is rather uninformative. We can’t understand CIV unless we already understand
what instrumental value is. If we iron out these problems, we get something like the
following:
CIV’: For any state of affairs s and world w, s is instrumentally good at w =df s’s
total causal consequence at w is intrinsically good or s causally contributes
to preventing something intrinsically bad from occurring at w.
CIV’ still suffers from serious defects; for contributing to preventing
something intrinsically bad does not seem sufficient to make something instrumentally
good. Consider the comet example again; suppose that the comet will land on one of
three places, depending (implausibly) on which way the wind happens to be blowing.
If the wind is blowing north, then the comet will land on Amherst, Massachusetts;
many people will die, so the comet’s crashing will cause states of affairs with intrinsic
value of (say) -10,000. If the wind is blowing south, then the comet will land on
Springfield, Massachusetts; again, the intrinsic value of the states of affairs caused
will be -10,000. If the wind is blowing east, the comet will land harmlessly in the
ocean; the intrinsic value of the states of affairs caused will be zero. Suppose the wind
blows north and the comet lands on Amherst. It seems reasonable to suppose that the
wind’s blowing north prevented the comet from landing on Springfield; thus, the
wind’s blowing north prevents many intrinsically bad states of affairs. If CIV’ were
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true, it would be instrumentally good for the wind to blow north. But this is obviously
not instrumentally good.
Perhaps we might try to revise CIV’, as follows:
CIV”: For any state of affairs s and world w, s is instrumentally good at w =df s’s
total causal consequence at w is intrinsically good or s causally contributes
to preventing something intrinsically worse than s’s total causal
consequence at w from occurring at w.
This revision appears to handle the counterexample I gave to CIV’. Given the
three possibilities (i) the comet lands on Amherst, (ii) the comet lands on Appleton,
and (iii) the comet lands in the ocean, if (i) were to obtain, it would not prevent
anything intrinsically worse than the total causal consequence of (i). So according to
CIV”, (i) turns out not to have instrumental value, in accord with our intuitions.
But CIV” still suffers from a fatal defect. Suppose that the comet lands on
Amherst in 1 996, but had it not landed on Amherst, it would have landed harmlessly
in the ocean. Furthermore, suppose that had the comet landed in the ocean, the
citizens of Amherst would have gone on to live prosperous and happy lives for many
years. The town would have thrived and grown for centuries until 2496 when,
tragically, another comet would have come along and destroyed it. As it would have
happened, due to a few additional deaths caused by the growth of the town, the
intrinsic value of the states of affairs caused by the comet of 2496 would have been -
1 1,000. According to CIV”, since the comet’s landing on Amherst in 1996 had a total
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causal consequence with intrinsic value of -10,000 but (it seems reasonable to
suppose) prevents a state of affairs with intrinsic value of -1 1,000, it would be
instrumentally good for the comet to hit Amherst in 1996. As I’ve described the
situation, this would clearly not be instrumentally good; it prevents many people from
living very happy lives.
3.4 Total Preventions and Contextualism
I conclude that the “disjunctive” approach advocated by Conee cannot succeed.
However, I think that Conee suggests the right approach to instrumental value in the
following passage: “Intuitively, the idea is that it is equally creditable to move the
world upward some amount on the overall value scale from what would have been,
whether or not the change introduces something better than neutral” (Conee 1980, p.
116). In order to have our conception of instrumental value capture this intuition, we
need to be able to make comparisons between what it causes to occur and what it
prevents from occurring. Therefore, just as we needed the notion of a total causal
consequence to avoid the problems with NV and NV’, we also need the notion of a
“total prevention” to compare with the notion of total causal consequence. Thus I
propose the following as a rough formulation of what I think is the correct analysis of
instrumental value:
BIV2: s is instrumentally good =#. s’s total causal consequence is intrinsically
better than what s prevents.
6
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Whenever s’s total consequence is intrinsically better than what s prevents, s will
move the world up on the overall value scale; thus BIV2 will entail that something is
instrumentally good if and only if it makes the world better, provided that s has no
intrinsic value. This is in accord with Conee’s intuition.
But certain complexities arise when we introduce the notion of a total
prevention. When we calculate the intrinsic value of a world, or a life, we need to
look only at the intrinsic values of states of affairs that are true in that world, or
involving that life. We don’t need to know what happens at other worlds. This is
because intrinsic value depends solely on intrinsic properties; thus, a state of affairs
has its intrinsic value absolutely. But in order to have the concept of instrumental
value capture Conee’s intuitive idea, the instrumental value of a state of affairs at a
world will depend not only on the intrinsic values of states of affairs true at that world,
but at other relevant worlds as well. For we want to know if what the state of affairs
leads to is overall better than what would have happened if it hadn’t obtained.
Without considerations of other possible worlds, it’s impossible to factor in the
instrumental values of preventions. So we need to know which other world or worlds
to consider when calculating something’s instrumental value.
Unfortunately, there’s no mechanical way to determine what world to consider,
because what would have happened if some state of affairs hadn’t obtained depends on
what factors we keep fixed from world to world. For example: a grenade falls in the
middle of a group of people. Heroic Henry heroically jumps on it, sacrificing himself
to save the group. There’s a clear sense in which his jumping on it was an
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instrumentally good thing because of the suffering it prevented - even if the saved
lives end up having no intrinsic value from then on. But maybe there was another
person in the group — call her Sensible Sally -- who was willing to jump on the
grenade, but waited to see if Henry would do it first. If Henry hadn’t jumped on the
grenade, Sally would have. The intrinsic value of the world had Sally jumped on the
grenade would have been the same as if Henry had jumped on it. Then Henry’s
jumping on the grenade fails to move the world up on the overall value scale, and so
according to Conee’s intuitive notion, it’s not even instrumentally good. Is Henry’s
jumping on the grenade instrumentally good or not? Is there any absolute answer to
this question?
I think that there is not; rather, the answer will depend upon what world would
have obtained had Henry not jumped on the grenade; and this, in turn, depends (at
least in part) upon the context of utterance. When we say that Henry’s jumpmg on
the grenade was instrumentally good, we’re supposing that the following
counterfactual statement is true: ‘if Henry hadn’t jumped on the grenade, many would
have died.’ Thus we must be comparing its effects to the effects in a world where
everyone else acts just as they do in the actual world — so nobody jumps on the
grenade. It’s instrumentally good if it prevents that world from being actual; it makes
the world better than that world. When we say that Henry’s jumping on the grenade
wasn’t instrumentally good, we’re supposing that the following counterfactual
statement is true: ‘if Henry hadn’t jumped on the grenade, Sally would have.' Thus
we are comparing its effects to the ones at the world where Sally jumped on the
grenade - a world no worse than the actual world. Given one context, one answer
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may be right, given another context, the other Answer may be right; And there seems to
be no reAson to think thAt one of these contexts is the “correct” one.
This view presupposes a view About counterfActUAls. The view is stAted by
DAvid Lewis in the following passAge:
ANALYSIS 2. A counterfactuAl ‘If it were thAt A, then it would be thAt C’
is (non-vAcuously) true if And only if some (Accessible) world where both
A And C Are true is more similAr to our acUiaI world, overAll, then is Any
world where A is true but C is false. (Lewis 1979, p. 56)
BecAuse this AnAlysis gives the truth of counterfactuAls in terms of similArities between
worlds, it Allows for a certAin Amount of context-sensitivity. “CounterfActuAls Are both
vAgue And VArious. Different resolutions of the VAgueness of overAll similArity Are
AppropriAte in different contexts” (Lewis 1979, p. 56). 8 Returning to the grenAde
exAmple: in one context, similArity of behAvior might be more importAnt. In such a
context, the counterfActuAl ‘if Henry hAd not jumped on the grenAde, mAny would hAve
died’ would be true. Thus, it could truly be SAid to be a good thing thAt Henry jumped
on the grenAde. In Another context, similArity of psychologica 1 dispositions might be
more importAnt. In thAt context, the counterfActuAl ‘if Henry hAd not jumped on the
grenAde, SAlly would hAve’ would be true, And it would not be right to SAy thAt it was a
good thing that Henry jumped on the grenade.
If what would have happened is dependent on the context, then so is the
instrumental value of a state of affairs; it will vary not only from world to world, but
also from context to context. So the instrumental value function will be a function, not
simply from pairs of states of affairs and worlds to numbers, but from triples of states
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of affairs, worlds and contexts to numbers (or alternatively: from states of affairs to
triples of worlds, contexts, and numbers). Defining instrumental value in this way,
taking contextual factors into account, seems to me to be a promising approach.
Appealing to a shift of context would enable us to explain away apparently
troublesome “disagreements” (such as one that could arise in the grenade example
above) over whether something is instrumentally good or not.
At this point some may be skeptical. Some people, upon hearing this example,
are inclined to think that it is good that Henry jumps on the grenade — even ifwe
suppose that if Henry hadn’t jumped on it, Sally would have. When we find out about
Sally’s dispositions, we are not inclined to revise our opinions about the goodness of
Henry’s action.
I think that when we look at the example more carefully, we should be inclined
to reject this intuition. After all, the question ofwho jumps on the grenade is not
important in this example. There is no particular importance to Henry’s jumping on
the grenade rather than Sally; the world is made no better by Henry’s action than it
would have been if Sally had acted first. What is really important, what really has
value, is a more general state of affairs - viz., that someone or other jumps on the
grenade. This is the state of affairs that makes the world better; for if that state of
affairs had not obtained, nobody would have jumped on the grenade, and that would
have been very bad.
Even if one is not convinced about the grenade example, there are other
examples that might be more convincing. Consider the following case:
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Remember the case of Caesar in Korea: had he been in command, would
he have used the atom bomb? Or would he have used catapults? It is right
to say either, though not to say both together. Each is true under a
resolution of vagueness appropriate to some contexts. (Lewis 1979, p. 48)
Now consider whether it is a good thing that Caesar was not in Korea. If we are in a
context in which it is true that Caesar would have used the atom bomb, we might think
that it is a good thing that Caesar was not in Korea; using the bomb, we may suppose,
would have had terrible consequences for civilians in Korea. On the other hand, ifwe
are in a context in which it is true that Caesar would have used catapults, then we
might not think it is a good thing that Caesar was not in Korea; perhaps Caesar’s
catapult attack would have confused and bewildered the enemy troops, or somehow
had good consequences. There seems to be no absolute, context-independent fact of
the matter about whether it is good that Caesar was not in command in Korea. 9
Here is how I think instrumental value should be calculated. Suppose s is a
state of affairs that occurs in world w. Let W be a function that determines what
world would have obtained, given a context c, had s not occurred -- i.e., the closest
world to w, given c, where s doesn’t occur; we can represent this as W<~s,w,c>. To
determine the instrumental value of s at w given c, or EV<s,w,c>, first we determine
all the states of affairs other than s that obtain in w but not in W<~s,w,c> — call their
conjunction ‘the total causal consequence of <s,w,c>‘ — and calculate the intrinsic
value of the total causal consequence of <s,w,c>. The intrinsic value of the total
causal consequence of <s,w,c> is equal to the sum of the basic intrinsic values of its
conjuncts. Then we determine the conjunction of all the states of affairs that obtain in
W<~s,w,c> but not in w - call this ‘what <s,w,c> prevents’ - and let the intrinsic
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value of what <s,w,c> prevents be the sum of the basic intrinsic values of its
conjuncts. 10 Here, then, is the formula that determines the instrumental value of
<s,w,c>:
BIV3: For any state of affairs s, world w, and context c, the instrumental value of
<s,w,c> = the intrinsic value of the total causal consequence of <s,w,c> -
the intrinsic value of what <s,w,c> prevents. (Thus <s,w,c> is
instrumentally good (bad) iff the intrinsic value of the total causal
consequence of <s,w,c> is greater (less) than the intrinsic value of what
<s,w,c> prevents.)
I think BIV3 comes close to capturing Conee’s intuition (though it is
formulated in terms of intrinsic value, not overall value). It seems to yield the right
results in the grenade example above. Let H = the state of affairs consisting in
Henry’s jumping on the grenade, and S = the state of affairs consisting in Sally’s
jumping on the grenade; H obtains at @, but S doesn’t. Let Cl = the context in which
the counterfactual ‘ifH hadn’t obtained, S would have obtained’ is true. Let C2 = the
context in which the counterfactual ‘ifH hadn’t obtained, many would have died’ is
true. Suppose that those whose lives were saved go on to have lives with zero intrinsic
value; that their deaths would have had intrinsic value of -200; that Henry’s death has
intrinsic value of -50, and that Sally’s death would also have had intrinsic value of -50.
If we apply BIV3 to this situation, we fmd that the instrumental value of <H,@,C1>
=
zero; for the intrinsic value of the total causal consequence of <H,@,C1> = the
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intrinsic value of what <H,@,C1> prevents = -50. We also find that the instrumental
value of <H,@,C2> = +1 50; for the intrinsic value of the total consequence of
<H,@,C2> = -50, while the intrinsic value of what <H,@,C2> prevents = -200. Thus,
given context C2, H is instrumentally good, but given context Cl, it isn’t. This is
exactly the result for which I hoped.
3.5 The Infinity Problem
There is a problem for BIV3 involving the calculation of the instrumental
values of certain states of affairs. The problem arises when there is a world with an
infinite future.
11
This problem was first pointed out as a problem for utilitarianism,
but it applies equally to BIV3. The problem is that when a world has an infinite
future, the intrinsic value of the total consequence of a state of affairs will sometimes
be infinite, and so will the intrinsic value of what it prevents. In any such situation,
BIV3 implies that the state of affairs is instrumentally worthless - even in situations
where it is clear that the total consequence is better. For instance: suppose that as a
result of S, the intrinsic value of the world each day is +100, while had S not occurred,
the intrinsic value of the world each day would have been +1; and suppose that
whether S occurs or not, the world extends infinitely into the future. The intrinsic
value of S’s total consequence is equal to what S prevents; their intrinsic values are
both infinite. It seems clear that the world is made better by S’s occurrence; but BIV3
entails that S has an instrumental value of zero.
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Peter Vallentyne (1993) has suggested a solution to this problem. We say that
one outcome, 01, is better than another, 02, provided that there is some time, t, such
that at any time after t, the value of 01 through t is greater than the value of 02
through t. This would account for the example I gave above, though of course it
cannot tell us how much better S makes the world, so it will not give us a number as
S’s instrumental value. However, there is another sort of case that may pose a
problem for Vallentyne’ s solution. 12 Consider the following two possible worlds:
• • *t-3, t-2, t.j, to, t|, t2, tj, t4
Wl: ...-3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4....
W2: ...-3, -2, -1, 0, 0, 1, 2, 3....
(Note that this diagram covertly presupposes that it is possible to locate a single time
in two different possible worlds. I do not know how this is to be done, or if it can be
done; I am not prepared to give trans-world identity conditions for times.) Consider
some event El that occurs at to in Wl and another event E2 that occurs at to in W2.
Vallentyne’s solution entails that since Wl is always “one step ahead” ofW2 after to,
the outcome of El is better than that of E2. But it is clear that both Wl and W2 have
zero value, since at each world we can pair each positive number with its negation.
How, then, could El be instrumentally better than E2?
It seems to me that the “infinity problem” poses a serious problem, both for my
view of instrumental value and for utilitarianism. A proper solution would likely
involve some complicated mathematics and an account of the trans-world identity
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conditions for times. Since I am not a mathematician, and this is not a dissertation on
the modal properties of times, I propose henceforth to ignore worlds with infinite
futures and to focus on finite worlds.
1
Note that Frankena also makes the mistake of equating instrumental value
with extrinsic value.
2 Gamer and Rosen use the term “beneficially good” in the way that most
philosophers use the term “instrumentally good.”
3
I make a distinction between something’s total consequence and something’s
total causal consequence. Something’s total causal consequence includes any state of
affairs caused by it; something’s total consequence may include other states of affairs
as well. The notion of a total causal consequence is relevant when defining
instrumental value, while to define extrinsic value we need the more general notion of
total consequence; this notion is introduced in Chapter 4.
4
It is interesting to note that the existence of preventive value refutes any
attempt to prove the existence of something with intrinsic value based on the existence
of something with instmmental value (see Audi 250-251 for such an attempt); for if
something can be instrumentally good in virtue of preventing evil, we can imagine a
world with no intrinsic goods where something prevents some evil from existing, and
so has instrumental value.
5 Conee claims that “the right concept to use is what we call being ‘good on
the whole’ or ‘overall good.’ ...In the case of that notion, plainly it ‘does not matter’
whether the impact is positive because of intrinsic or instrumental factors” (Conee
1980, p. 105).
6
Here I am indebted to an anonymous referee for Philosophical Studies.
7
I follow Stalnaker (1975) in understanding a context to include “the
common knowledge, or presumed common knowledge and common assumption of the
participants in the discourse” (Stalnaker 141).
8
Also see Stalnaker (1975, p. 144).
9 Note that this is not an epistemological problem. The problem is not that we
don’t know enough about Caesar, or about the Korean conflict, to know what would
have happened had Caesar been in command. The problem is that there is nofact of
the matter about whether the atom bomb world or the catapult world is more similar to
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the actual world. They resemble the actual world in different respects; some would be
relevant in one context, while others would be relevant in another.
10
Note that the sense of ‘prevents’ utilized here is a very broad notion —
probably much broader than the ordinary use of the word. In the narrower, ordinary
sense, to prevent something is to cause it not to occur; but one state of affairs may
prevent another from occurring in the broader sense introduced here without causing it
not to occur.
1
1
The problem seems to have been noted first by Mark Nelson (1991).
1 2 rpl •
This case was brought to my attention by Fred Feldman.
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CHAPTER 4
CONTRIBUTORY VALUE AND ORGANIC UNITIES
Several famous arguments and principles seem to imply the existence of a type
of extrinsic value that has been called “contributory value” and of a type of entity that
Moore called an “organic unity.” Among them are Leibniz’ response to the problem
of evil, Descartes’ response to the problem of imperfect faculties, and Brentano’s
principles of bonum variations and of the value of retribution. Yet contributory value
is not a well-known species of value. This is unfortunate, because recognizing
contributory value can help us to solve problems in applied ethics, including (as I will
argue in Chapter 6) a problem involving endangered species.
In order to give the reader an intuitive grasp of what is meant by “contributory
value” and to explain its usefulness I will first briefly explain the relevance of this
notion to Leibniz’ argument and Brentano’s principles. I will further demonstrate the
importance of contributory value by showing how awareness of its existence could
have been helpful to J.S. Mill and G.E. Moore. I will then show that the notion of
contributory value has been often misunderstood, and that attempts by philosophers
such as Moore, W.D. Ross, C.D. Broad and William Frankena to capture the notion in
a definition have proven inadequate. Next I will attempt to provide the correct
analysis of contributory value by making more precise a definition given by C.I.
Lewis, and I will test the definition of contributory value by applying it to Brentano’s
principles. Then I will discuss a view introduced by Thomas Hurka that attempts to
account for organic unities using conditional intrinsic value instead of contributory
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value. Hurka argues that conditional intrinsic value has certain advantages over the
“holistic” view that I advocate; I will defend the holistic view against Hurka’
s
arguments and present an argument against conditional intrinsic value. Finally, I will
discuss some technical problems for contributory value involving addition and
subtraction.
4.1 The Value of Evil. Punishment. Variety. Money, and Living Arms
In “On the Ultimate Origination of Things” Leibniz presents a solution to the
problem of evil based on the concept of what might be called “necessary evil.”
Leibniz discusses two reasons that God might have found it necessary to allow evil in
the world. The first is that evil is necessary as a means to a greater good: “And in
general it may be said that afflictions are for the time evil but in the end good, since
they are short ways to greater perfection” (Leibniz 1898a, 349). The idea here is that
painful experiences may be necessary in order to cultivate certain virtues in people;
these painful experiences could be said to have instrumental value.
But there is another important way in which Leibniz thinks evil may be
necessary: as a part of a greater good.
1
The following passage seems to be an attempt
by Leibniz to illustrate and justify this view:
If you look at a very beautiful picture, having covered up the whole of it
except a very small part, what will it present to your sight, however
thoroughly you examine it (nay, so much the more, the more closely you
inspect it), but a confused mass of colours laid on without selection and
without art? Yet if you remove the covering and look at the whole picture
from the right point of view, you will see that what appeared to have been
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carelessly daubed on the canvas was really done by the painter with very
great art. (Leibniz 1898a, p. 347)
Here is how I interpret Leibniz. Consider a beautiful painting. The painting
may be composed of many lines, shapes, and colors. If we consider one of the lines
that makes up the painting, we may fmd that it has absolutely no aesthetic value taken
on its own. Yet it may be that if that line were removed from the painting, then the
painting as a whole would be less beautiful; the aesthetic value of the painting would
be greatly diminished. It seems that we would want to say that the line has some sort
of value. The value of the line is not intrinsic; taken in itself, the line is quite ugly.
Thus the value of the line must be some sort of extrinsic value. Its value does not
seem to be instrumental; the line and the painting do not stand in a relationship of
cause and effect, as we might say that a paintbrush and a painting do. Rather, the line
derives its value from being a part of a valuable whole. This type of extrinsic value
has been called “contributory value.”
The painting example is, I think, supposed to be taken as an analogy; it seems
unlikely that things with merely aesthetic value could really have intrinsic value. The
painting as a whole represents the universe; the ugly line represents an intrinsically
evil part of the universe. The universe is better with that intrinsic evil than it would be
without it — even if the evil doesn’t cause anything good to occur, and even if all the
intrinsically good parts of the world that actually obtain could obtain without that evil.
Thus, although something might be intrinsically evil and instrumentally neutral, there
is a sense in which it could still be extrinsically good: it could have contributory
value.
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But Leibniz has not yet explained why it is plausible to suppose that the world
is analogous to the painting in this way. How could afflictions make the world a better
place? Leibniz suggests a way in the following passage:
For it is to be observed that, as in a thoroughly well-constituted
commonwealth care is taken, as far as may be, for the good of
individuals, so the universe will not be sufficiently perfect unless the
interests of individuals are attended to, while the universal harmony is
preserved. And for this no better standard could be set up than the very
law of justice which declares that each should participate in the
perfection of the universe and in a happiness of his own in proportion to
his own virtue and to the degree in which his will has regard to the
common good... (Leibniz 1898a, pp. 348-349).
Leibniz seems to be saying that one reason suffering may be good is that it promotes
justice; when someone is wicked, his suffering makes the world more just and
therefore better.
2
Thus Leibniz seems to be appealing to a principle later endorsed by
Franz Brentano: the principle of the value of retribution
In Brentano and Intrinsic Value
,
Roderick Chisholm explains the principle of
retribution as follows: “Wickedness accompanied by sorrow is better than the same
wickedness accompanied by pleasure... IfA is a wicked deed and if B is the suffering
involved in the sinner’s remorse or in his retribution, then the two evils, A and B, may
be preferable to A without B” (Chisholm 1986, p. 72). It seems plausible to suppose
that the feelings of remorse felt by the evildoer are intrinsically evil. Yet it also seems
plausible to suppose that those feelings might make the world better even if they don t
have any instrumental value - even if, for instance, they don’t cause the evildoer to
refrain from performing evil acts in the future. The positive value of those feelings
could be understood to be their contributory value.
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Another principle discussed by Brentano is the principle of bonum variationis
,
which Chisholm explains as follows: “other things being equal, it is better to combine
two dissimilar goods than to combine two similar goods” (Chisholm 1986, pp. 70-
7 1 ). The example Chisholm uses to illustrate this principle goes as follows:
Suppose, for example, that A is a beautiful painting, that B is a painting
exactly like A, and that C is a beautiful piece of music. The aesthetic
contemplation ofA may have the same [intrinsic] value as that of B and
also the same [intrinsic] value as that of C. But the whole that is the
aesthetic contemplation of A followed by that of C is intrinsically better
than that whole that is the aesthetic contemplation of A followed by that
of B. Hence one could say that the value of a bonum variationis is
greater than the sum of the values of its constituent parts. (Chisholm
1986, pp. 71)
Consider the value of C in the above example. Besides its intrinsic value, it also
seems to have another kind of value: the value it contributes to the whole consisting
ofA and C. This value is its contributory value.
I think that the notion of contributory value can help us to understand some
puzzling passages in J.S. Mill’s Utilitarianism. The following passage is where things
begin to get puzzling:
The principle of utility does not mean that any given pleasure, as music, for
instance, or any given exemption from pain, as for example health, is to be
looked upon as means to a collective something termed happiness, and to
be desired on that account. They are desired and desirable in and for
themselves; besides being means, they are a part of the end. (Mill 46)
Mill goes on to discuss the value of money:
(M)oney is, in many cases, desired in and for itself; the desire to possess it
is often stronger than the desire to use it, and goes on increasing when all
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the desires which point to ends beyond it, to be compassed by it, are falling
off. It may, then be said truly that money is desired not for the sake of an
end, but as part of the end. (Mill 46)
If we interpret ‘desirable’ as ‘good’ here, then it would seem that Mill thinks that
things like music, health, and money are intrinsically good - he says they are
“desirable in and for themselves.” He certainly cannot be interpreted as claiming that
these things are good only instrumentally, since he explicitly denies this several times.
But how could money, or even the state of affairs of someone’s having money, be
intrinsically good? If that state of affairs were intrinsically good, then it would have to
be good even if it were not a part of “happiness.” Mill does not seem to want to make
this claim.
I think the concept of contributory value could have been useful to Mill here.
Mill seems to want to say that the relationship between having money (or enjoying
music, being healthy, etc.) and being happy is a part-whole relationship, and that
having money is good (desirable) because it is a part of that whole:
What was once desired as an instrument for the attainment of happiness has
come to be desired for its own sake. In being desired for its own sake it is,
however, desired as a part of happiness. ...The desire of it is not a different
thing from the desire of happiness any more than the love of music or the
desire of health. They are included in happiness. They are some of the
elements of which the desire of happiness is made up. Happiness is not an
abstract idea but a concrete whole; and these are some of its parts. (Mill
47, his emphasis)
But if such things as money, health, and music are good only because they are part of
an intrinsically valuable whole — viz., happiness -- then it follows that they are not
intrinsically good after all. It may be that we cannot desire happiness without desiring
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its parts; but if the parts do not have value on their own -- if they don’t have a value
that they would have even if not part of a whole - then they have no intrinsic value.
Rather, the value they have should be understood to be a form of extrinsic value:
contributory value.
G.E. Moore seems to deny the existence of contributory value explicitly in the
following passage from Principia Ethica :
Now it is quite possible that even a living arm, apart from its body,
would have no intrinsic value whatever; although the whole of which it
is a part has great intrinsic value owing to its presence. Thus we may
easily come to say that, as a part of the body, it has great value, whereas
by itself it would have none; and thus that its whole ‘meaning’ lies in its
relation to the body. But in fact the value in question obviously does not
belong to it at all. To have value merely as a part is equivalent to having
no value at all, but merely being a part of that which has it. (Moore
1903, p. 35; emphasis his)
If Moore means to say that when something has value merely as a part it has no
intrinsic value, then Moore is certainly correct. But we do often say that things such
as living arms have some sort of value in virtue of their part-whole relations, as Moore
seems to recognize. It would be nice to be able to make sense of such claims, rather
than dismissing them as Moore seems to do. Recognizing contributory value would
enable us to do so. In fact, Moore later is led to introduce a sense of ‘good’ that Ross
dubs the ‘contributive sense’ (see below).
It would seem, then, that in order to understand Leibniz’ view of the value of
evil, Brentano’s view of the values of variety and retribution, Mill’s view of the value
of money, and the view of the value of living arms apparently (perhaps only
temporarily) rejected by Moore, we must understand the notion of contributory value.
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Several twentieth-century philosophers have attempted to define the notion of
contributory value. Among these philosophers are Moore, W.D. Ross, C.D. Broad,
William Frankena, Allan Gibbard, Paul Taylor, Ramon Lemos, Bernard Rosen, and
Richard Gamer. Their attempts demonstrate that the notion of contributory value is
subject to much confusion. I now turn to presenting and criticizing each of their
views.
4.2 Some Traditional Definitions
4.2.1 Broad’s View
C.D. Broad attempts to define contributory value in the following passage from
Ethics’.
Sometimes when a thing is called ‘good’ all that is meant is the
following, (a) All or most wholes in which this thing, or a thing of this
kind, is an element have considerable positive value, (b) In each case, if
the thing is removed from such a whole, the residue has much less value
or is actually bad. When these conditions are fulfilled we say that this
thing, or things of this kind, are contributively good. (Broad 258).
As I interpret Broad, he intends that condition (a) and condition (b) each be a
necessary condition for something’s having positive contributory value, and that they
be jointly sufficient. But as I will show, condition (a) is not a necessary condition for
something’s having contributory value, nor are (a) and (b) jointly sufficient.
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Before I criticize Broad’s definition, I must discuss an obscurity in his
proposal. Broad writes of something having value in virtue of being an “element,” or
part, of a whole. Broad explains what he means by a “whole” as follows: “Any whole
W consists of certain elements A, B, C, ...etc., intimately related in a certain order by a
certain relation R. Thus, W = R(A, B, C,...)” (Broad 254). There are different ways
we might construe Broad’s talk of “parts” and “wholes.” Sometimes when we say that
one thing is part of another, we have in mind a mereological relationship between
physical objects. I think Broad’s view would fail if we interpret his talk of parts and
wholes in this way. However, since I hold that the bearers of value are states of
affairs, I will interpret the part-whole relationship as a relationship involving states of
affairs (wholes) and their constituents (parts). Note that a state of affairs may be a part
of another state of affairs; for instance, state of affairs P could be said to be a part of
P&Q.4 Though I interpret Broad as making a claim about the contributory value of
states of affairs, I believe by criticisms would apply to any plausible interpretation of
Broad.
Now consider Broad’s condition (a). I think it is extremely implausible that a
necessary condition on something’s having contributory value is that “all or most
wholes” of which that thing is a part have “considerable positive value.” Consider
some arbitrary state of affairs E. E is an element of many wholes — for instance, E
and 2+2=4. No matter what state of affairs E is, E will not have contributory value. E
is an element of infinitely many wholes; and it is likely that there are infinitely many
wholes of which E is an element that have negative value as well as infinitely many
with positive value. The good wholes of which E is a part can be placed in a one-to-
lll
one correspondence with the bad wholes of which E is a part. If this is so, then E
cannot satisfy condition (a); for exactly half the wholes of which it is an element will
have positive value. Thus according to Broad’s view, nothing at all could have
contributory value.
Furthermore, even if satisfying (a) were necessary for something to have
contributory value, satisfying conditions (a) and (b) would not be sufficient for it to
have contributory value. Suppose E is the state of affairs that everyone is happy. If
any state of affairs could satisfy condition (a), E could. But if we remove E from a
whole of which it is a part, what remains will be much less valuable. If, for example,
we remove E from the state of affairs that everyone is happy and 2+2=4, what remains
is the state of affairs that 2+2=4, which has no value at all. Thus E satisfies condition
(b) as well, and so according to Broad, it has contributory value. Yet it seems likely
that the reason the state of affairs that everyone is happy satisfies conditions (a) and
(b) is because it has great positive intrinsic value — not because it has contributory
value.
4.2.2 A Naive View
I conclude that Broad’s analysis of contributory value is not successful. I now
move to some more recent attempts to explain this concept. One attempt is made by
Richard Gamer and Bernard Rosen: “something may be part of another thing that is
either intrinsically, instrumentally, or beneficially good, in which case the part has
contributive value” (Gamer and Rosen 1 16). Paul Taylor seems to endorse a similar
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conception of contributory value: “something has contributive value if it is a part of a
whole which has intrinsic, inherent, or instrumental value” (Taylor 30). The only
difference between these proposals lies in their different assumptions concerning the
types of extrinsic value. I think the following definition more or less captures what is
common to the two views (the “naive view” of contributory value):
NCV: x has positive contributory value =#. there exists a y such that (i) y is either
intrinsically or extrinsically good and (ii) x is part of y.
NCV seems defective. Consider Leibniz’ painting again. Suppose there is a
stray line in the painting that makes the painting worse; the line actually detracts from
the more beautiful aspects of the painting. While the painting is very beautiful, it
would have been even better without that line. According to NCV, the defective line
has positive contributory value, for it is a part of the painting, which is good. (A
beautiful painting would be an example of something that has what C.I. Lewis called
“inherent” goodness;
5
inherent goodness is supposed to be a form of extrinsic
goodness.
6
) However, it seems pretty clear to me
that if the defective line has any
contributory value, its value must be negative. While it is a part of the painting, it
makes the painting worse, not better.
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4.2.3 Frankena’s View
Not all writers on contributory value make this mistake. William Frankena
suggests a different account of contributory value:
Then we can also say of certain sorts of experience that they are good
because they contribute to the good life, or because if they are included
in one’s life they make it intrinsically better. One might call such
contributively good experiences means to the good life, but it is better to
think of them as parts of it. (Frankena 66, his emphasis).
It seems to me that we don’t want to define contributory value, as Frankena does, in a
way that entails that the only way something can have contributory value is by being
part of an intrinsically good life. Contributing to the good life might be one way in
which something might have contributory value; but perhaps something could have
contributory value by being a part of a painting, or a world, or some other complex
entity.
If we strip away Frankena’s talk of good lives, we get a proposal that is more
plausible than the naive view and much more commonly held. G.E. Moore states the
proposal in the following passage, where he distinguishes contributory value (2) from
intrinsic value (1) and instrumental value (3):
When we say that a thing is ‘good’ we may mean either (1) that it is
intrinsically good or (2) that it adds to the value of many intrinsically
good wholes or (3) that it is useful or has good effects; and similarly
when we say that a thing is bad we may mean any one of the three
corresponding things. (Moore 1912, p. 107)
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W.D. Ross seems to endorse Moore’s definition; he quotes the above passage and
adds: “The second of these three meanings is properly distinguished both from the
meaning ‘intrinsically good’ and from the meaning ‘instrumentally good’, and might
be called ‘contributively good’.” (Ross 72). 7
Ramon Lemos seems to endorse the view in the following passages:
To have contributory value is to contribute in some way to the value of
some whole of which that which has contributory value is a part. To say
that some part of a given whole contributes to the value of the whole is
to say that the value of the whole is determined, at least in part, by the
nature of the part in question, taken in conjunction with the nature of the
whole of which it is a part. (R. Lemos 41)
In order that a part of a whole have contributory value it is sufficient that
it contribute to the positive value of the whole if its contributory value is
positive, to the negative value of the whole if its contributory value is
negative. (R. Lemos 43)
Paul Taylor seems to agree when he says “the degree to which something has
contributive value is in direct proportion to what it contributes to a good whole”
(Taylor 30). Gamer and Rosen also seem to endorse this view: “Thus not every part
of an intrinsically valuable thing has contributive value, but only those which
‘contribute’ to its intrinsic value” (Gamer and Rosen 116). On this proposal, it is not
enough that something be a part of a good whole; it must also make a positive impact
on that whole in order to have positive contributory value.
Here is how I will formulate this view (Frankena’s view of contributory value):
FCV: the contributory value of x = the contribution x makes to the value of a
whole of which it is a part. (Thus something is contributorily good if and
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only if its contributory value is greater than zero, and contributory bad if
and only if its contributory value is less than zero.)
The first problem to note with FCV is that one thing may be a part of more
than one whole. If x is a part of y and a part of z, then when we are determining the
contributory value of x, do we consider its contribution to y or to z? One thing we
could do would be to relativize the contributory value of something to a particular
whole of which it is a part. This would result in an analysis like this:
If x is a part of y, then the contributory value of x relative to y = the contribution x
makes to the value of y.
However, often we may want to know not just what something contributes to this or
that whole, but what it contributes overall -- taking everything into consideration. I
think it will most often be useful to talk about the contribution that something makes
to the world as a whole. Henceforth when I talk about something’s contributory value,
I will mean its overall contributory value. Here, then, is a revised interpretation of
Frankena’s view:
FCV’: the contributory value of x = the contribution x makes to the value of the
world.
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Unfortunately, FCV does not help much in understanding what contributory
value is; for in order to understand FCV’, we must understand what is meant by a
“contribution.” It seems to me that when we want to know what something
contributes to a whole of which it is a part, we need to compare the value of the whole
to the value of the whole with that part missing. Suppose that x is a part of y. Let y-x
be what Broad calls the “residue” when x is removed from y. A rough definition of
the concept of a residue is the following: if y is a set of states of affairs with x as one
of its members, then y-x is the set of all states of affairs other than x that are members
g
of y. But what are the values of y and y-x that should be compared? My own
interests lie in defining all forms of extrinsic value in terms of intrinsic value; hence I
think we ought to compare their intrinsic values. I think the following definition
provides the most promising interpretation of the remarks made by Frankena, Moore,
Ross, Lemos, Taylor, Rosen, and Gamer:
FCV”: the contributory value of x at world w = the intrinsic value ofw - the
intrinsic value of (w-x).
A narrower version ofFCV” seems to be endorsed by Allan Gibbard: “The
contributory value of the consequences of an act is the [intrinsic] value of its future
minus the [intrinsic] value of the unavoidable part of its future: V(f) - V(u)” (Gibbard
169, bracketed insertions are my editorial additions). The consequences of an act are
the “avoidable” part of its future, according to Gibbard (pp. 160-161). It seems
reasonable to think of the unavoidable part of the future of an act as what is left of the
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future (the “residue”) when we eliminate its avoidable part. If so, then Gibbard’s
definition of the contributory value of the consequences of an act is simply a version
of FCV” restricted to consequences.9
FCV” accounts both for the positive contributory value of the necessary line in
the painting and for the negative contributory value of the defective line. Thus, FCV”
is an improvement over NCV. However, FCV” still suffers from a serious defect.
Consider some state of affairs S that has intrinsic value of +10 but, by hypothesis, has
no contributory value. There seems to be no contradiction in holding that such a state
of affairs exists. 10 When we apply FCV” to S, we ought to find that S has a
contributory value of zero. However, that is not what we find. Instead, we find that
S’s contributory value is +10. No matter what the intrinsic value of the world is, if we
take that value and subtract the intrinsic value of the world without S, we end up with
the intrinsic value of S.
The problem is that a state of affairs with intrinsic value typically contributes
its intrinsic value to any set of which it is a member. When a set S has as a member a
state of affairs T with intrinsic value, the value of S will be determined, at least in part,
by the intrinsic value of T; so according to FCV”, T will have contributory value. I
take it that we don’t want our definition of contributory value to imply that every state
of affairs with intrinsic value has contributory value; thus I reject FCV”.
It might be thought that Frankena et al. have not been sloppy in defining
contributory value; rather, according to the concept they have in mind, every state of
affairs does contribute its intrinsic value to the wholes of which it is a part, and so its
intrinsic value ought to be included as part of its contributory value. It may indeed be
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true that FCV” captures such a conception; nevertheless, I think this conception of
contributory value has some strange consequences. Suppose S is a state of affairs with
intrinsic value of +10, that S is not a part of any organic unities, and that S has no non-
contnbutory extrinsic value. Suppose that, in order to calculate the overall value of a
state of affairs, we add its intrinsic and extrinsic values. According to FCV”, S has
contributory value of +10, since it contributes its intrinsic value to the intrinsic value
of the world; so +10 is also S’s extrinsic value. Thus S’s overall value is +20. In fact,
for any state of affairs that (a) has no non-contributory extrinsic value and (b) is not a
part of an organic unity, its overall value will be exactly double its intrinsic value.
This smacks of double counting.
4,3 Interpretation and Application of Lewis’ View
In short, the problem with FCV” is that it counts something as having
contributory value so long as it enhances or diminishes the value of some whole —
even if it does so simply in virtue of its own nature. If P makes the whole {P,Q}
better simply because P is good in itself, that should not be enough for P to have
contributory value; after all, contributory value is supposed to be a type of extrinsic
value. C.I. Lewis did not make this mistake; he defines contributory value as follows:
Let us call the value assignable to any transitory experience not — or not
merely — by reason of the quality it immediately presents but on account of
its contribution to some larger whole of experience, or to life altogether,
the contributory value of it (Lewis 1955, p. 68; his emphasis)
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As Lewis seems to recognize, when determining something’s contributory value, we
must discount its intrinsic value. Thus, I think the following definition comes close to
capturing the notion of contributory value (Lewis’ view of contributory value):
LCV: the contributory value of x at world w = (the intrinsic value ofw - the
intrinsic value of x) - the intrinsic value of (w-x).
Intuitively put, we might say that according to LCV, the contributory value of
a part is the difference between the value of the whole and the sum of the values of
that part and the rest of the whole. Since LCV discounts the intrinsic value of x when
calculating x’s contributory value, it does not fall victim to the objection I gave to
FCV”. Thus LCV seems to capture the idea that if P has contributory value at w, then
“adding” P to w increases (decreases) the value ofw by more than P’s intrinsic
value.
11
In order to test LCV, let us see how it handles the cases described at the
beginning of this chapter. First let us see how LCV might handle the principle of
bonum variationis. Let A, B, and C be states of affairs with basic intrinsic value of
+10 each. Suppose A and B are states of affairs consisting in Mary’s deriving
pleasure from a beautiful piece of artwork; suppose C is a state of affairs consisting in
Mary’s deriving pleasure from a beautiful piece of music. According to the principle
of bonum variationis, the intrinsic value of {A,C} should be higher than the intrinsic
value of {A,B}. If we could get the intrinsic value of {A,B} just by adding the basic
intrinsic values ofA and B, the intrinsic value of {A,B} would be +20; so the intrinsic
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value of {A,C} must be higher - let’s say +30. Let’s suppose that A and C obtain at
w, but B does not; for simplicity’s sake, let’s also suppose that no other states of
affairs with basic intrinsic value obtain at w. What is the contributory value of C at
w? According to LCV, we must first find the intrinsic value of w. Provided there are
no other “organic unities” in w, it seems reasonable to suppose that the intrinsic value
ofw would be +30. We subtract from this the intrinsic value of C, which is +10. We
then subtract the intrinsic value of (w-C); assuming that A is the only state of affairs
with basic intrinsic value in (w-C), the intrinsic value of (w-C) will be +10. So the
contributory value of C is 30 - 10 - 10, or +10. This can be explained by the fact that
there is an organic unity, {A,C}, that is part ofw but not part of (w-C). On the other
hand, ifB had obtained but not C, then since the intrinsic value of {A,B} is only +20,
LCV would imply that B has no contributory value (20 -10-10 = 0). It would also
follow that {A,B} is not an organic unity, since its intrinsic value is equal to the sum
of the basic intrinsic values of its proper parts. These seem to be the results we want.
The next test ofLCV is the value of retribution. Let P be Mary’s evil act and
Q be the basically intrinsically evil consequence of P; let the basic intrinsic value ofQ
be -50, while P has no basic intrinsic value. Let R be Mary’s feelings of pain at
having committed P; let the basic intrinsic value ofR be -10. Suppose P, Q, and R
obtain at w but no other states of affairs with basic intrinsic value obtain at w. If
Mary’s feelings of sorrow make the world better than it would have been without
those feelings - that is, if the intrinsic value ofw is greater than the intrinsic value of
w-R - then it would seem the value ofw must be greater than -50; let’s say the value
ofw is -40. To find the contributory value of R, we subtract from -40 the intrinsic
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value of R, which is -10. We then subtract the intrinsic value of (w-R). Since Q and
R are the only states of affairs with basic intrinsic value that obtain at w, the intrinsic
value of (w-R) = the intrinsic value of Q. By hypothesis, the intrinsic value ofQ is -
50. Thus, according to LCV, the contributory value ofR is (-40)-(-10)-(-50), or +20.
Thus LCV entails that Mary’s feelings of remorse are contributorily good.
4.4 Contributory Value vs. Conditional Intrinsic Value
In “Two Kinds of Organic Unity,” Thomas Hurka discusses two ways to
account for the existence of organic unities. One way - the traditional “holistic” view
- is to be a Moorean, holding that something’s intrinsic value does not change
depending upon the circumstances. This way of accounting for organic unities
requires recognition of contributory value to account for the additional value
something has when it contributes to an organic unity (though Hurka does not
explicitly discuss contributory value). However, there is another way to account for
organic unities. This view - the “conditionality” view - would be to hold that
something’s intrinsic value can change depending on the circumstances; so, for
instance, the intrinsic value of a painting could change depending upon whether it is
unique or one of several similar paintings. Hurka argues that each view has its own
defects and merits. I will examine the examples Hurka uses to argue against the
traditional holistic view, and will argue that the traditional view really does not have a
problem accounting for them. I will then bolster the traditional view by presenting an
argument against the conditionality view.
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First, let me further illustrate the difference between the two views. “The first
difference concerns the location of the additional value in an organic unity, which the
holistic interpretation places in the whole as a whole but the conditionality
interpretation places in a part” (Hurka 8). Take the contemplation of beauty, for
instance. If we want to say that beauty is more valuable when it is part of a whole
consisting of its being contemplated than when it exists alone, we might say that there
is an organic unity - contemplation-plus-beauty-plus-causal relation - that has
intrinsic value. On the other hand, we might say that when the beauty is
contemplated, its intrinsic value increases. The first view is the holistic view; the
second is the conditionality view.
There is another, closely related difference between the views:
The holistic interpretation treats the parts of a whole symmetrically,
ascribing value to an entity, namely the whole as a whole, of which they
are both equally and in the same way parts. The conditionality
interpretation, by contrast, treats the parts asymmetrically. It assigns the
additional value in a whole to one of the whole’s parts, but only on
condition that the other part is present. (Hurka 11)
In the case of beauty, for instance, the holistic view assigns intrinsic value to the
whole consisting of beauty and contemplation, but not to the beauty or the
contemplation. On the other hand, the conditionality view might assign additional
intrinsic value to beauty when it is contemplated, but might not assign additional
intrinsic value to the contemplation.
Hurka thinks that placing the additional intrinsic value in the whole, rather than
in a part, yields unsatisfactory results in certain cases.
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Several philosophers hold that if a person pursues a good goal, the
successful achievement of that goal, even after his death, makes his pursuit
intrinsically better than if his efforts had ended in failure. For example, if
he works for the preservation of Venice, and if partly through his efforts
Venice is preserved after his death, his activities are better than if Venice
had been destroyed. . . .It is assumed that a person has reason to care if not
exclusively then at least more about goods in his own life. But this
assumption hoes better with a conditionality than with a holistic
interpretation. On the former, the extra value ...is located in the person’s
activities and therefore in his life. ...On the holistic interpretation, by
contrast, the additional value is located not in his life but in a whole
combining activities in his life and events after his death. And why should
that whole be a special concern of his? (Hurka 9-10)
Here is how I interpret Hurka’ s argument:
1 . Sometimes events that occur after one’s death can affect the intrinsic value of
one’s life.
2. If 1 . then the holistic view is not true.
3. Therefore, the holistic view is not true.
Before I can evaluate Hurka’ s argument, it is necessary to discuss the nature
of
a life. What is a life? What states of affairs constitute one’s life? We might take a
very broad view of lives, and say that S’s life consists of all the states of
affairs of
which S is a constituent - that is, it consists of all the states of affairs that
are (de re)
about S. If we take this very inclusive view about lives, then it is easy
to see that
Hurka’s argument is not sound. If S performs certain acts during
his life that turn out
to help preserve Venice after his death, then among the states
of affairs that will be a
part of S’s life will be the state of affairs that S helps to
preserve Venice. This is a
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state of affairs that is about S; S is a constituent of this state of affairs; and thus, if we
have the intuition that achieving one’s goals makes one’s life intrinsically better, this
state of affairs will increase the intrinsic value of S’s life. In fact, there is no need
even to mention organic unities here. Thus, on this understanding of what a life is,
premise 2 of Hurka’s argument is not true. So long as this view of the nature of a life
is plausible, the holistic view has a way to account for Hurka’s example.
However, it seems pretty clear that Hurka does not have this broad view of a
life in mind. Unfortunately, Hurka does not tell us his view about lives. Perhaps what
he has in mind is a view like this: S’s life consists of all the states of affairs that
attribute intrinsic properties to S. Thus, S’s being six feet tall, or raising his right
hand, would be part of S’s life, but S’s helping to preserve Venice would not be a part
of his life. I think this is a much too restrictive view of what counts as part of a life.
However, let us assume that it is true. I think it can now be plausibly maintained that
premise 1 of Hurka’s argument is false. Things that happen after one is dead cannot
increase the intrinsic value of one’s life. However, they can increase the overall
value
of one’s life. Hurka says that the “most natural statement of the view about
posthumous achievement . . .is that realization of a goal after one’s death makes
one’s
own activity better” (Hurka 10). Indeed, it does seem fairly plausible to suppose
that
achieving one’s goal makes one’s activity better - but in what way?
Intrinsically
better, or overall better? I do not think that there are any pre-theoretical
intuitions
about whether achieving one’s goals makes one’s activity intrinsically
better.
I think this illustrates a general problem with Hurka’s line
of argument.
According to Hurka, the holistic view does not “locate” any
additional value m the
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parts of an organic unity. But this is not the case. While the holistic view does not
locate any additional intrinsic value in the parts of an organic unity, it does locate
contributory value in the parts, and hence, it can hold that the parts of an organic unity
have more overall value when they are parts of the organic unity than when they exist
on their own.
I conclude that Hurka’s argument does not succeed. Furthermore, I think there
may be some positive reasons to reject conditional intrinsic value. One reason is that
the nature of conditional intrinsic value has not been explained. That is, we do not
have a criterion of conditional intrinsic value that distinguishes it from other sorts of
value. As with any new concept, we ought to be very careful about introducing
conditional intrinsic value into our value theory without being sure exactly what it is -
especially if, as I have argued, there is really no need to do so.
I think there may be good reason to think that a conditional value view cannot
succeed. Hurka points out a number of views that present difficulties for a conditional
value view, including Brentano’s principle of the bonum progressions. Let me
present another example that illustrates a serious problem for the view. Consider
some worlds, each very small, whose only inhabitants are a judge named Judge, Bill,
Rob, and Kim. What happens in each world is as follows:
W 1 : Nothing of interest happens here; in particular, no crimes are committed.
W2: (KMB) Kim murders Bill, and (JPK) Judge punishes Kim for the crime.
W3
:
(RMB) Rob murders Bill, and (JPK) Judge punishes Kim for the crime.
W4: (KMB) Kim murders Bill, and (JPR) Judge punishes Rob for the crime.
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My own intuitions about the values of these four worlds are pretty clear. It
seems clear to me that W1 is the best of the four worlds, and that W3 and W4 are the
worst. W2 is worse than Wl, because it contains a murder; but it is better than W3 or
W4, because in W2 justice is served, while in W3 and W4 there is a lot of injustice.
What about the values ofKMB and JPK at the four worlds? We can ignore Wl, since
neither of those states of affairs obtains at Wl. Now consider JPK. The value of JPK
seems to depend on whether KMB is true or not. At W2, where KMB is true, JPK
seems to be good; of the KMB worlds, W2 and W4, W2 is better in virtue of the fact
that JPK is true there. On the other hand, at W3, where KMB is not true, JPK seems
to be bad. What about KMB? At W2, is KMB good or bad? Our answer seems to
depend upon when the question is asked. Before any murder has been committed, we
would be inclined to say that ifKMB were to occur, it would be a bad thing; we hope
that Wl will turn out to be actual. However, suppose the murder has already been
committed, and Judge has already distributed the punishment to Kim. We might then
be inclined to hope that Kim had committed the murder - that is, we might be inclined
to think it would be good ifKMB were true, given that JPK is true. KMB’s goodness
is conditional on the truth of JPK. Since W2 is better than W3, and we know that
we
are in either W2 or W3 (since JPK is true), we hope that we are in W2.
How do the two views handle a case like this one? First, consider
the holistic
view. The holistic view can say that (KMB, JPK} is an organic unity with
positive
basic intrinsic value, while maintaining that each of
its parts is either intrinsically bad
or intrinsically neutral. To obtain the value of W2, we
would add the basic intrinsic
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values of KMB, JPK, and {KMB, JPK}; so long as the positive value of the justice
does not outweigh the negative value of the murder and pain, the intrinsic value ofW2
will be negative (hence worse than Wl). So the holistic view seems to have no trouble
with this case.
Now consider the conditionality view. On the conditionality view, the intrinsic
values ofKMB and JPK depend upon whether certain other states of affairs are true or
not. In particular, the intrinsic value of JPK depends on the truth of KMB, since if
KMB is not true, JPK will be intrinsically bad (as in W3). Furthermore, the intrinsic
value ofKMB depends on the truth of JPK, since KMB seems to be better when JPK
is true - given that Judge punishes Kim, it’s better that Kim is the one who has
committed the crime. So long as JPK is true, KMB is intrinsically good, and so long
as KMB is true, JPK is intrinsically good. In W2, both JPK and KMB are true; so on
the conditionality view, both JPK and KMB are intrinsically good at W2. Now the
question is this: how can W2 be worse than Wl, if the only difference between the
two worlds is that W2 contains two more intrinsically good states of affairs? It would
seem that the conditionality view entails that W2 is better than W 1 ; this is very
counterintuitive.
The reason the conditionality view faces problems that the holistic view does
not is that when something makes the world overall better in virtue of its relationships
to other things, the conditionality view ascribes additional intrinsic value to the thing,
whereas the holistic view ascribes merely extrinsic value. The holistic view can say
that both the crime and the punishment are overall good, and that each is good given
the other, without saying (as the conditional view must) that the world is better with
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both the crime and the punishment than with neither. This is because we do not add
extrinsic values when determining the value of a world. So if JPK and KMB have
intrinsic values of
-10, and {KMB, JPK} has an intrinsic value of +15, we can say that
JPK and KMB each has a contributory value of +15 in virtue of contributing to the
existence of {KMB, JPK}. Thus, JPK and KMB will each have an overall value of
+5. However, ifwe sum (basic) intrinsic values to get the intrinsic value of a world,
the net result of adding JPK, KMB, and {KMB, JPK} to a world will be ((-10) + (-
10)) +15, or -5; that is, the world is worse with both JPK and KMB than with neither.
The conditional view cannot say this without abandoning the idea that intrinsic value
increases the value of the world; for on the conditionality view, if we were to sum the
(basic) intrinsic values to get the intrinsic value of the world, a world with both JPK
and KMB would turn out to be intrinsically better than one with neither. This seems
wrong.
I conclude that the holistic view, with contributory value, is better than the
conditionality view at accounting for some organic unities. I now turn to some
technical difficulties with contributory value that will require some revisions to LCV
.
4.5 Problems with Addition and Subtraction
4.5.1 The Subtraction Problem
There are still some important and interesting difficulties with LCV . Fred
Feldman has noticed that there is something odd about what I call “residues.”
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Consider a state of affairs S that has no basic intrinsic value and that occurs at @.
Recall that the residue when S is removed from @, or @-S, is the set of all states of
affairs other than S that are members of @. If we want to know the contributory value
of S at @, we compare the intrinsic value of@ with the sum of the intrinsic values of
S and @-S. The question is, could the intrinsic value of@ be any different from the
intrinsic value of @-S? One might think it couldn’t. After all, you can’t really just
“subtract” one state of affairs from the world. S might not be part of @-S, but many
other states of affairs closely related to S will be. Suppose S is the state of affairs that
John is bald. Some of the states of affairs that will be part of @-S are the following:
someone named “John” is bald; John is not hairy; John is bald and 2+2=4; John is
bald or 2+2=5 and it’s not the case that 2+2=5; and so forth. Apparently removing S
from @ is not quite so easy. If this is so, then there might be a problem in saying that
the intrinsic value of@ is greater than the intrinsic value of @-S. If the intrinsic
values of@ and @-S are equal, then according to LCV, if the intrinsic value of S is n,
the contributory value of S will be -n. This result would be unacceptable. Call this the
“subtraction problem.”
In order to solve the subtraction problem, we must carefully formulate a
principle that will tell us how the value of a whole is derived from its parts. Since the
wholes whose values are in question are worlds and residues, we should first say
something about (i) what counts as a world or a residue and (ii) what counts as a part
of a world or residue. Let me put forth the following definitions.
D1 x is a world =# x is a maximal consistent set of states of affairs.
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D2 x is the life of person P at world w —# x is the set of all states of affairs that
are (de re) about P and are true at w.
D3 x is the residue of state of affairs S at world w =df x is the set of all states of
affairs other than S that are true at w.
13
D4 x is a part of set (j) =df x is a member of <|) or x is a subset of
<J).
D5 x is a proper part of set <)> =df x is a member of (() or x is a proper subset of
<t>-
For example, the parts of the set {P,Q,R} are P, Q, R, {P}, {Q}, {R}, {P,Q}, {P,R},
{Q,R}, and {P,Q,R}; its proper parts are all these except {P,Q,R}.
How do we determine the intrinsic value of a set of states of affairs, like a
world, life, or residue? We might wish to hold the following summative principle:
SP: The intrinsic value of a set is equal to the sum of the basic intrinsic values
of its proper parts.
However, there is a difficulty with SP. I have defined worlds, lives, and
residues as sets. It ought to be conceivable that some of these complexes - lives, in
particular - are organic unities. C.I. Lewis seems to have held that at least some lives
are organic unities:
To eat one’s peck of dirt in youth and so achieve a life ambition is quite
different from spending one’s youthful energies in exuberant enjoyment
and finding the peck of dirt left for middle age. Once again, life is like
heard music; not only the constituent passages but the order and
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progression of them make a difference to the quality of it on the whole.
(Lewis 1955, p. 68) 14
If lives are sets, and the intrinsic values of sets are determined simply by
adding the basic intrinsic values of their proper parts, then whenever the parts of two
lives are equal in value, the values of the lives must be equal as well. So here is an
argument against SP:
1 . If SP is true, then the intrinsic value of a set is always equal to the sum of the
basic intrinsic values of its proper parts.
2. If the intrinsic value of a set is always equal to the sum of the basic intrinsic
values of its proper parts, then the intrinsic value of a life is always equal to the
sum of the basic intrinsic values of its proper parts. (Because lives are sets, by
D2)
3. Sometimes the intrinsic value of a life is not equal to the sum of the basic
intrinsic values of its proper parts.
4. Therefore, SP is not true.
There are only two ways to attack this argument. One would be to deny that
lives are sets, thereby rejecting premise 2. This won’t get us very far. No matter what
a life is, we will need some sort of principle that will tell us how to determine its value
based on the values of its parts; the argument could be reformulated to attack whatever
reformulated summative principle would apply to the revised conception of lives. On
the other hand, we could deny Lewis’ (and Brentano’s) intuition that the value of a life
132
depends on how the goods it contains are ordered, thereby rejecting premise 3. I do
not wish to do so, because I am not attempting here to provide a substantive theory of
value. Furthermore, the very need for such a thing as contributory value derives from
intuitions, such as Lewis’ and the ones described in Section 4.1, that are incompatible
with SP.
So we need a summative principle that will be compatible with the existence of
contributory value and that will enable us to solve the subtraction problem. I think the
appropriate principle was suggested by Moore. When introducing the notion of an
organic unity, Moore denies SP: “I shall ... use the term ‘organic’ with a special sense.
I shall use it to denote the fact that a whole has an intrinsic value different in amount
from the sum of the values of its parts” (Moore 1903, pp. 35-36). I think the following
simple definition captures what Moore had in mind:
MOU: x is an organic unity =* the intrinsic value of x is not equal to the sum of
the basic intrinsic values of x’s proper parts.
15
Even though Moore believed in organic unities, he did endorse a summative principle:
“it must now be observed that the value which a thing possesses on the whole may be
said to be equivalent to the sum of the value which it possesses as a whole, together
with the intrinsic values which may belong to any of its parts” (Moore 1903, p. 214,
his emphasis). By the value a thing possesses “on the whole,” he simply meant its
intrinsic value; by the value a thing possesses “as a whole,” Moore meant
“the
difference between the value ofthe whole thing [i.e., its value “on
the whole ] and the
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sum ofthe value of its parts” (Moore 1903, p. 215; his emphasis; bracketed insertion is
my editorial addition). The intrinsic value of a whole, then, is equal to the sum ofthe
values of its parts and its value as a whole.
If we understand the value of a whole “as a whole” to be its basic intrinsic
value, then we may assert the following summative principle:
SP’ : the overall intrinsic value of a set is equal to the sum ofthe basic intrinsic
values of its parts (including itself).
SP’ seems to be something like the summative principle that Moore endorsed. It is
consistent with the existence of organic unities (as defined in MOU), and it enables us
to solve the subtraction problem.
Here is how we solve the subtraction problem. Suppose that a life at world w
consists of states of affairs P, Q, and R; then the life will be the set {P,Q,R}.
16
If, as
Lewis and others believe, lives are organic unities, then the set {P,Q,R} will have
some value “as a whole” - that is, it will have basic intrinsic value. When we remove
P from w, the set {P,Q,R} will no longer be part of what remains, since in order for
{P,Q,R} to be a subset of the set w-P, all of its elements must be elements of w-P.
Thus {P,Q,R} is not part of the residue of P at w; thus, the intrinsic value of the
residue of P at w will not be equal to the intrinsic value of w. The subtraction problem
is solved.
I have so far dealt only with lives; but we can use the same methods to deal
with organic unities that are not lives. Take feelings of remorse, for example.
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Suppose we hold the axiological intuition that given that an evil act occurs, feelings of
shame by the evildoer make the world better, even though those feelings are
intrinsically worthless or even intrinsically bad. Then we should say that the set
consisting of something like the following states of affairs:
R: John feels undeserved pain to degree -10 at time t
S: Mary causes R
T : Mary feels shame in the fact that S
has basic intrinsic value. The set {R,S,T} will presumably be overall intrinsically bad
(because of the negative intrinsic value of R) but intrinsically better than {R,S}, even
if (as seems plausible) T does not have positive intrinsic value. T seems like a clear
example of a state of affairs with contributory value. The contributory value of T
should be equal to the basic intrinsic value of {R,S,T}.
Returning to the subtraction problem: can LCV account for T's contributory
value? If {R,S,T} is a subset of @, and SP’ is true, then the intrinsic value of@ will
be greater than the intrinsic value of @-T, since (i) there is a set with positive basic
intrinsic value -- namely, {R,S,T} — that is part of@ but not of @-T; and (ii) it seems
reasonable to suppose that every other state of affairs with basic intrinsic value that is
in @ will be in @-T, and vice versa. If the intrinsic value of@ is greater than the
intrinsic value of @-T, and T has no basic intrinsic value, then LCV implies that T has
positive contributory value. Of course, there will be many states of affairs that are
logically equivalent to T that are in both @ and @-T, such as
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P: 2+2=4 and Mary feels shame in the fact that S.
But provided that we are careful in specifying our basics, I presume that P will not be
a part of any organic unities; so P will fail to boost the intrinsic value of @-T.
4.5.2 A Problem with Basic Intrinsic Value
However, there are still difficulties for LCV involving basic intrinsic values.
In order to illustrate the problem, I will assume the truth of a simple version of
hedonism according to which the only states of affairs with basic intrinsic value are
ones that consist of a particular person (de re) experiencing a determinate amount of
pleasure at a time -- e.g., John experiencing 10 hedons of pleasure at 12 noon. Call
this state of affairs J, and suppose it is true at world W. Suppose that since J involves
someone experiencing 10 units of pleasure, J has intrinsic value of +10. There will be
another state of affairs, S, that will be true at W and will have intrinsic value but not
basic intrinsic value: the state of affairs consisting of someone’s experiencing 10 units
of pleasure at noon. Suppose S has zero contributory value. Furthermore,
suppose
that at W there are no organic unities, and that nothing at W has any contributory
value, so that the intrinsic value of any subset ofW is equal to the sum of the basic
intrinsic values of its proper parts. Finally, suppose that the intrinsic
value ofW is
+ 1000.
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Given these suppositions, according to LCV it will turn out that, contrary to
our hypothesis, S has a contributory value of -10. Here is why. According to LCV we
take the intrinsic value ofW (+1000), subtract the intrinsic value of S (+10), and from
what remains subtract the intrinsic value of W-S, which is also +1000, leaving us with
-10. Given SP’, we know W-S must have an intrinsic value of +1000, because
discounting a state of affairs with no basic intrinsic value, such as S, will not affect the
intrinsic value of the whole if the intrinsic value of the whole is determined solely by
the basic intrinsic values of its parts.
We might try to solve the problem by making the following revision:
LCV’: the contributory value of x at world w = (the intrinsic value ofw - the basic
intrinsic value of x) - the intrinsic value of (w-x).
This revision accounts for the case that was problematic for LCV, since in that
example, state of affairs S had no basic intrinsic value. However, LCV’ still has a
problem with basics. Consider the following example. Let W be a possible world that
does not have basic intrinsic value, but has intrinsic value of +100. Suppose we want
to find the contributory value of W. We would think that W would have no
contributory value; after all, to what would it be contributing its value? W is not a part
of anything, and contributory value is supposed to be the value a part has in virtue of
contributing to some larger whole. Indeed, LCV implies that W has no contributory
value. But suppose we use LCV’ to find the contributory value of W. In order to do
this, first we take the intrinsic value of W, which is +100; we subtract the basic
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intrinsic value of W, which, by hypothesis, is zero; and we subtract the intrinsic value
of W-W. Since W-W is the empty set, its intrinsic value is zero. Thus W has a
contributory value of +100. I fmd this result unacceptable.
The problem is that when calculating contributory value, we want to count the
basic intrinsic values, not the intrinsic values, of some states of affairs or sets, while
we want to count the intrinsic values, not the basic intrinsic values, of others. How do
we do this? Here is one possibility. We introduce a function, B that takes either a set
or a state of affairs as an argument and yields a set as a value. If the argument is a
state of affairs S, this function yields {S} as a value. If the argument is a set T, the
function “eliminates” any part of that set with zero basic intrinsic value, yielding the
set whose members are all the parts of T that have basic intrinsic value. Take the set
{R,S,T}
;
suppose R and {R,S} have basic intrinsic value, but none of its other parts
does. Then B({R,S,T}) = {R,{R,S}}, B({R,S}) = {R,{R,S}}, B(R) = {R}, and B(S) =
{S}, while B({S}) = 0. The following definition should solve the problems facing
LCV and LCV’:
LCV”: the contributory value of x at world w = (the intrinsic value ofw - the
intrinsic value of B(x)) - the intrinsic value of B(w-x).
It may be instructive to show how LCV” avoids the problems faced by LCV
and LCV’. Recall that in the counterexample to LCV, BIV(J) = IV(J) = +10; BIV(S)
- zero; and IV(S) = +10. LCV went wrong because it assigned contributory value of
-
10 to S even though, by hypothesis, that state of affairs had no contributory value.
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LCV” avoids this problem by subtracting from the intrinsic value of the world the
intrinsic value of B(S), not the intrinsic value of S. B(S) = {S}; according to SP’,
since S has no parts with basic intrinsic value, the intrinsic value of {S} is zero. So
according to LCV”, the contributory value of S is zero, which is the result we wanted.
Now recall that in the counterexample to LCV’, IV(W) = +100; BIV(W) = zero;
BIV(W-W) = BIV(0) = zero; and the contributory value ofW was supposed to be
zero. LCV’ went wrong when determining the contributory value ofW because W
had no basic intrinsic value, so when we subtracted the basic intrinsic values ofW and
W-W from the intrinsic value of W, we were left with the intrinsic value of W. LCV”
avoids this problem as well. IV(B(W)) = IV(W) = +100, and since W-W is the empty
set, which has no basic or non-basic intrinsic value, B(W-W) = 0; so when we
subtract IV(B(W)) (+100) and IV(B(W-W)) (zero) from IV(W) (+100), we get zero.
Again, that is just the result we wanted. Thus I think that LCV” adequately captures
the notion of contributory value. I think it also captures the spirit of Lewis’ account of
contributory value, though of course it is expressed in a much different way.
1
This idea seems to have been anticipated by Descartes in the Fourth
Meditation. Here Descartes attempts to explain why God would create people with
imperfect faculties:
Furthermore, it occurs to me that we should not consider a single creation
separately when we investigate whether the works of God are perfect, but
generally all created objects together. For the same thing which might
perhaps, with some sort of justification, appear to be very imperfect if it
were alone in the world is seen to be very perfect when considered as
constituting a part of this whole universe. (Descartes 111)
2
Naturally, this does not explain why virtuous people suffer; to explain this,
Leibniz must say that their suffering is instrumentally, not contributorily, good. He
recognizes this in the following passage: “But as to the special question of the
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afflictions of good men, it is to be held as certain that these afflictions have as their
result the greater good of those who are afflicted” (Leibniz 1898a, p. 349).
3
Leibniz also seems to have held this view: “And by this means there is
obtamed as great variety as possible, along with the greatest possible order; that is to
say, it is the way to get as much perfection as possible” (Leibniz 1898b, p. 249).
4
There is a tradition according to which whether one state of affairs is part of
another depends upon entailment relations between them, or upon the ability to
conceive of one without conceiving of the other, or both (see Chisholm (1986), N.
Lemos (1994), and Gibbard (1973)). I find these conceptions of the part-whole
relation to be unintuitive. I think they would also present a problem if we wanted to
say that there were atomic states of affairs » ones that have no other states of affairs as
parts. For example, the state of affairs that A is red seems like a good candidate for
atomicity; yet according to traditional definitions it has parts, such as the states of
affairs that something is red and that A is colored. In any case, this conception of
parthood would not help Broad’s definition of contributory value.
5
See Lewis (1946), pp. 391-392, and (1955), p. 69.
6
See Section 5.3.2 for further discussion of inherent value.
It should be noted that Ross goes on to say: “But it may be doubted if it is a
sense in which the word ‘good’ is often actually used” (Ross 72).
o
I actually hold that what remains when x is removed from y is not
determined absolutely, but depends upon contextual factors; however, some will find
this contentious, so I will not define contributory value in this way here. In Chapter
Five I will discuss how to give a contextual analysis of contributory value.
9
In fairness to Gibbard, he makes no claim to be defining the traditional
notion of contributory value. Nevertheless, it is interesting that his definition so
closely resembles my interpretation of Frankena’s definition.
10
This might be thought to be begging the question against those who defend
SCV”; one might say that a state of affairs always contributes its intrinsic value to the
value of the world as a whole, and thus it would be a contradiction to make this
supposition. I discuss this view below.
1
1
However, see Section 4.5 below for some difficulties with LCV involving
addition and subtraction.
12
See Chisholm (1986, pp. 70-71).
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Note that a residue is not a possible world, since no residue is a maximal
consistent set. In Chapter 5 I will redefine ‘residue’ in such a way that residues are
worlds.
Also see Chisholm (1986, p. 71), where he introduces Brentano’s principle
of bonum progressions
.
15
Chisholm gives a different definition of ‘organic unity’ in Brentano and
Intrinsic Value. I find his definition to be unnecessarily cumbersome. I also think it is
false, for reasons like the ones given by N. Lemos in his (1994). Carlson (1997) notes
that MOU really does not capture the notion of organic unity; there are principles that
are consistent with MOU but which do not allow for organic unities. I will not attempt
to define the notion of organic unity here, though I think it can be done.
Note that I say that the intrinsic value of an organic unity is not equal to the
sum of the BIVs of its proper parts, not its parts. The reason for this will become
apparent.
16
Notice that a crucial part of the solution of the subtraction problem is the
claim that lives are sets. When P, Q, and R combine to form an organic unity, it is the
set {P,Q,R} that is the organic unity, and not, say, the conjunctive state of affairs
P&Q&R. If we say that P&Q&R is the life, then when we remove P from the world in
which that life obtains (call it w), P&Q&R will still be a part of w-P. The subtraction
problem will remain; the intrinsic values ofw and w-P will be equal.
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CHAPTER 5
EXTRINSIC VALUE
Instrumental and contributory value seem to be subspecies of a more inclusive
species of value: extrinsic value. But what makes instrumental and contributory value
subspecies of this species? Can we provide a definition of extrinsic value that will
allow both instrumental and contributory value to be subspecies of extrinsic value?
There is one easy way to define extrinsic value; it is stated by Gamer and Rosen:
“[Intrinsic goodness] is usually contrasted with something called extrinsic goodness.
We shall use the latter expression here to mean ‘good in some way that is not merely
intrinsically good”’ (Gamer and Rosen 1 15, their emphasis). But surely we can say
something more interesting than this. This tells us what extrinsic value is not; can we
say something positive about what it is, and how it is calculated? I think that we can.
In this chapter I will discuss several attempts to define extrinsic value; I will then
defend a definition of extrinsic value that accounts for instrumental and contributory
value, as well as another kind of value called “signatory value.”
5.1 Some Proposed Definitions of Extrinsic Value
One mistake that is often made in defining extrinsic value is identifying
extrinsic value with instrumental value. Often this is done subtly, by supposing that
intrinsic and instrumental value are the only kinds of value.
1 However, sometimes the
equation is more explicit. For example, consider the following passage:
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One may also say that something is good on the ground that it is a means
,
necessary, sufficient, or both, to a good end, as when one says, ‘It is a good
idea to go to the dentist twice a year.’ Then it is extrinsically or
instrumentally good, or good as a means. (Frankena 65, his emphasis)
Here Frankena seems to equate extrinsic value with value as a means. Thus,
Frankena’ s definition is incompatible with the existence of kinds of extrinsic value,
such as contributory value, that do not have anything to do with causal consequences.
Now, it may be that instrumental value is really the only kind of extrinsic value; there
might be no organic unities, for example, in which case nothing would have
contributory value. However, this is a substantive claim. We do not want to define
extrinsic value in such a way as to eliminate the possibility of non-instrumental
extrinsic value. Therefore I reject this conception of extrinsic value.
There is another defect of Frankena’s definition that it shares with other views.
Frankena’s view does not allow for the existence of preventive value (see Chapter 3).
Since few philosophers have taken note of this kind of value, it is not surprising that
other definitions of extrinsic value have this defect. Consider Korsgaard’s attempt to
state what different kinds of extrinsic value have in common:
Contributive value and inherent value, however, both share with
instrumental value the fact of deriving their goodness from the contribution
they make to the existence of a supposedly intrinsically good end.
(Korsgaard 172)
This suggests a principle about extrinsic value, which is stated by Ramon Lemos as
follows: “For the obtaining of any state of affairs, x, to have extrinsic value there
must be some other state of affairs, y, the obtaining of which has or would have
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intrinsic value” (Lemos 35). We can call this principle “No Extrinsic Value Without
Intrinsic Value,” or “NEVWIV .”2 NEVWIV is incompatible with the existence of
preventive value, since if there is preventive value, there could be a world in which
nothing intrinsically good occurs, but where some state of affairs S prevents an
intrinsically bad thing from happening. In such a case, S could be said to have
preventive, hence extrinsic, value. Since some things do seem to have preventive
value, I reject any account of extrinsic value that entails NEVWIV. 3 Therefore, I
reject the accounts of extrinsic value stated by Frankena, Korsgaard, and Lemos.4
Other accounts of extrinsic value fail because they are based on faulty
conceptions of intrinsic value. For example, consider the following passage, in which
Korsgaard seems to state her official view of extrinsic value: “If unconditional value
is intrinsic value, conditional value is extrinsic value. Now a thing is conditionally
valuable if it is good only when certain conditions are met; if it is good sometimes and
not others” (Korsgaard 179). This suggests the following pair of definitions:
KIV: x is intrinsically good =df x is necessarily (unconditionally, always) good.
KEV : x is extrinsically good =# x is merely contingently (conditionally,
sometimes) good.
I have already argued (in Section 2.1.1 above) that KTV is false. The problem with
KTV is that it is unclear how to interpret the word ‘good’ in the definiens in a way that
makes KIV plausible. Perhaps ‘good’ in the definiens of KTV means ‘intrinsically
good.’ However, if we interpret ‘good’ in KTV as ‘intrinsically good’, we ought to be
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able to interpret it in the same way in KEV. Obviously we cannot; there are some
things that are extrinsically good that are not intrinsically good under any conditions.
Furthermore, to interpret ‘good’ as ‘intrinsically good’ in KJV would result in a
circular definition.
Perhaps we should interpret ‘good’ in KIV as ‘overall good’; then it might
make sense to interpret ‘good’ in the same way in both KIV and KEV. However, as I
noted in Chapter 2, it is difficult to think of anything that is necessarily overall good.
Even a good will might not be overall good, if it had terrible consequences (though it
might still be intrinsically good). If there is nothing that is necessarily overall good,
then according to KIV, nothing would be intrinsically good; everything that is good
would be merely extrinsically good. 5 This is an unacceptable result. Therefore, I
reject KIV and KEV.
The final view of extrinsic value I would like to consider is one that is implied
by a passage from Ramon Lemos’ The Nature of Value:
There are two major species of value - intrinsic and extrinsic - and two
major species of extrinsic value - instrumental and contributory. These
species yield the concept of total value, which is the conjunction of the
intrinsic, instrumental, and contributory value of a thing, event, or state of
affairs. (Lemos 34)
From Lemos’ remarks on “total” (or overall) value, another conception of extrinsic
value can be extricated. In order to explain this conception, I must make some
clarificatory assumptions. First, assume that something’s overall value is the sum of
its intrinsic and extrinsic values. Second, assume that when Lemos says that
something’s total value is the “conjunction” of its intrinsic, instrumental, and
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contributory values, he means to say that it is their sum. Then if something’s overall
value is the sum of its intrinsic, instrumental, and contributory values, as Lemos
suggests, we would have the following conception of extrinsic value:
LEV: the extrinsic value of x = the sum of x’s instrumental and contributory
values.
I think it would be fair to interpret Lemos as endorsing LEV. In order to make LEV
more plausible, let s ignore Lemos’ NEVWIV leanings and suppose that instrumental
and contributory value are defined the way I describe in Chapters 3 and 4. Then LEV
gives us a fairly reasonable account of extrinsic value.
However, I do not wish to endorse LEV. The first reason I do not endorse
LEV is that there may be other kinds of extrinsic value besides instrumental value and
contributory value. For example, there may be such a thing as signatory value, which
seems to be a type of extrinsic value distinct from instrumental and contributory value
(see Section 5.3 below). If so, then LEV is not sufficiently inclusive. Nor would I be
satisfied simply to add signatory value to the list, and endorse the following modified
Lemosian principle:
LEV’: the extrinsic value of x = the sum of x’s instrumental, contributory, and
signatory values.
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The reason I would not endorse LEV’ is that there might be some other kind of
extrinsic value we have not noticed. I think a definition of extrinsic value ought to
leave open the possibility of the existence of kinds of extrinsic value that have not
been thought of. Furthermore (but perhaps less importantly), I suspect that there may
be contexts in which some types of extrinsic value, but not others, are relevant to
determining something’s extrinsic value; thus, even if instrumental, signatory, and
contributory value were the only kinds of value, LEV could yield incorrect results in
such contexts. That is, there is no guarantee that the nearest world to the actual world
in a context where we are determining instrumental value will be the same world as
the nearest world in a context where it is signatory value we are interested in - in fact,
the worlds will usually be different.
5.2 A Contextualist Analysis of Extrinsic Value
In explaining extrinsic value, I propose to expand on the contextualist analysis
of instrumental value presented in Chapter 3. Recall that the instrumental value of a
state of affairs is equal to the intrinsic value of its total causal consequence, minus the
intrinsic value of what it prevents. I think we can get at a more inclusive notion of
extrinsic value by introducing the broader notion of a total consequence. In order for a
state of affairs to be a part of S’s total causal consequence, it has to be caused by S.
Let us define the broader notion of a total consequence as follows. Remember that
W<~s,w,c> is the nearest world to w, given context c, at which state of affairs s does
not occur. Let the total consequence of <s,w,c> be the set of all states of affairs other
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than s that are true at w but not at W<~s,w,c>; let what <s,w,c> prevents be the set of
all states of affairs true at W<~s,w,c> but not true at w. Then we can define extrinsic
value as follows:
BEV: For any state of affairs s, world w, and context c, the extrinsic value of
<s,w,c> = the intrinsic value of the total consequence of <s,w,c> - the
intrinsic value of what <s,w,c> prevents. (Thus <s,w,c> is extrinsically
good (bad) iff the intrinsic value of the total consequence of <s,w,c> is
greater (less) than the intrinsic value of what <s,w,c> prevents.)6
It seems pretty clear that BEV accounts for instrumental value, including
preventive value. Consider a vaccine that prevents people from getting a terrible
illness. The extrinsic value of the vaccine equals the intrinsic value of its total
consequence (which for the sake of simplicity we may assume equals zero), minus the
intrinsic value of what the vaccine prevents. If the consequences prevented by the
vaccine are terrible, the extrinsic value of the vaccine will be very high, according to
BEV. This seems like the right result.
However, what is interesting about BEV is its ability to account for other kinds
of extrinsic value. Take contributory value, for example. In chapter 4, 1 gave an
account of contributory value that defined the contributory value of a state of affairs in
terms of Broad’s concept of a “residue.” The residue of a state of affairs s at world w
was defined as the set of all states of affairs other than s that are true at w. In order to
allow BEV to account for contributory value, we could simply reconstrue the notion of
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a residue. The residue of state of affairs s at w, given context c, would simply be
another possible world: namely, W<~s,w,c>. This results in a slightly different
concept of contributory value, but one that seems fairly interesting.
To illustrate how BEV can account for contributory value, it will help to
consider an example. A good example of contributory value involves retribution.
Consider a simple case of retribution involving the following two states of affairs that
obtain at world
J: John commits an evil act worthy of a 10-dolor punishment.
P: John receives a 10-dolor punishment for committing an evil act.
Suppose that J has no intrinsic value (J’s consequences might have negative intrinsic
value, but ignore them for now); suppose that P has an intrinsic value of -10. Suppose
that, because of the fit between the punishment and the crime, {J, P} is an organic
unity with a basic intrinsic value of +15; suppose, also, that because of the injustice
involved, { J, ~P} has a basic intrinsic value of -5. Asa further simplifying
assumption, suppose that P has no good or bad consequences at @, and suppose that J
and P are not parts of any other organic unity at @.
To determine the extrinsic value of P, we must first determine the total
consequence of P. One thing that obtains in @ but not in W<~P,@,C> is the organic
unity { J,P} ; suppose that nothing else with any basic intrinsic value obtains in @ but
not in W<~P,@,C>. Then the intrinsic value of the total consequence of <P,@,C> is
+15. Next we must determine what <P,@,C> prevents. If P had not obtained, {J, ~P}
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would have obtained; suppose that nothing else with any basic intrinsic value would
have obtained. Then the intrinsic value of what <P,@,C> prevents will be -5. To
determine the extrinsic value of <P,@,C> according to BEV, we subtract the intrinsic
value of what <P,@,C> prevents from the intrinsic value of the total consequence of
<P,@,C>; thus the extrinsic value of<P,@,C> is +15 - (-5), or +20. It seems
reasonable to call this its contributory value, since the value depends upon P’s part-
whole relationships (its being a part of the organic unity (J, P}), not its causal
relationships. Since P has an intrinsic value of
-10, the overall value of <P,@,C> is
20 - 10, or +10; thus the punishment that John receives is a good thing on the whole,
even though it is intrinsically bad.
Because it incorporates a kind of “preventive” value, this account of
contributory value does not give the same results as LCV, the account presented in
Chapter 4. For example, in the case described above, LCV would give P a
contributory value of +15, not +20; the fact that P’s obtaining prevents the organic
unity {J, ~P} from obtaining would not endow P with any additional contributory
value. This doesn’t seem to make much difference in this case. However, some may
find this to be an advantage of a view like LCV. For example, Ramon Lemos seems
to endorse the non-preventive notion of contributory value in the following passage:
Thus the specific shade of brown covering the surface of our table has
positive contributory value if it contributes to making the table beautiful
even though there be some other shade of brown that would make the table
even more beautiful. (Lemos 43)
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According to this view, all that is important in calculating contributory value is the
actual contribution made to the value of a whole (or the whole world), not what
contribution would have been made by something else.
It is less clear to me that there is preventive contributory value than that there
is preventive instrumental value. However, I think there may be some reasons to
prefer a preventive account of contributory value to an account like LCV. First of all,
the preventive account yields a nice symmetry between instrumental and contributory
value. Instrumental and contributory value would be calculated in essentially the same
way; the difference between the two types of value would simply be in what gets
counted as part of the total consequence and the total prevention.
Second, the preventive account may be more flexible than LCV. There is no
way that LCV could account for preventive contributory value. However, the
preventive account could mirror the results given by LCV. The idea is that, ifwe want
to say that the only thing that matters to something’s contributory value is its actual
contribution to the value of the world, we can simply suppose that the intrinsic value
of what it prevents is zero; that is, we can suppose that it would not have prevented
anything of any value from obtaining. To insist upon counting only the actual
contributions of state of affairs S would be simply to insist upon a context C in which
what <S,@,C> prevents is worthless.
Take Lemos’ table example, for instance. Suppose that the table is painted a
nice shade of brown, B1 ; ifwe simply look at the table, we might say that the brown
color of the table contributes to its beauty - without caring what other color it might
have been painted. On the other hand, suppose we are watching the table being made,
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when it comes time to paint the table, the table-maker can either paint the table B 1
,
which is a very nice shade, or B2, which is even nicer. Ifwe see the table-maker
choose B 1 , we would not be inclined to say that it was a good thing he chose B 1 ; we
would wish he had chosen B2 instead. In the first case, we would say that being
painted B 1 makes the table better than it would have been, maybe because we are
supposing that if the table had not been painted Bl, it would not have been painted at
all. In the second case, we would say that being painted Bl makes the table worse
than it would have been, because we know that the table would have been better had it
been painted B2. BEV can account for both judgments, by supposing that there is a
change of context involved. LCV cannot account for both judgments. I think this is a
point in favor of subsuming contributory value under BEV.
5 . 3 Other Kinds of Extrinsic Value
5.3.1 Signatory Value
Signatory value can be explained by the following fictional story: suppose
Shaquille is a basketball player who injures his knee on the court. He goes to the
doctor to find out if he has tom ligaments. If his knee has tom ligaments, the world
will be a worse place. He won’t be able to enjoy playing basketball for several weeks;
he will have to undergo a painful operation and difficult rehabilitation, he
will make
only fifteen million dollars the next season, not twenty million; and so on.
The doctor
x-rays his knee. As it happens, the x-ray comes back with no sign oftom
ligaments.
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We might say that it’s a good thing that the x-ray looks the way it does. But of course
it’s not intrinsically good that it looks that way; nor is it instrumentally or
contributorily good. Rather, its value comes from what it signifies - viz., that
Shaquille doesn’t have tom ligaments.
BEV accounts for signatory value quite nicely. Let X = the state of affairs
consisting in Shaquille’s x-ray coming out with no sign oftom ligaments. Suppose X
occurs in @. In a context in which we would say that X is good, we would be
assuming a number of things: most importantly, that ifX had not occurred, Shaquille
would have had tom ligaments. Call this context C. So W<~X,@,C> is a world
where Shaquille has tom ligaments. To determine whether X is extrinsically good, we
first determine the sum of the basic intrinsic values of all the states of affairs that are
true at @ but not at W<~X,@,C>. For the sake of simplicity, let’s consider only the
states of affairs involving Shaquille. Assuming (implausibly) that Shaquille lives a
totally mediocre life, the sum of the basic intrinsic values of the states of affairs true at
@ but not at W<~X,@,C> would be zero. Then we determine the sum of the basic
intrinsic values of all the states of affairs that are true at W<~X,@,C> but not at @.
Some of these will be states of affairs where Shaquille experiences great pain, so it
seems likely that the sum will be a negative number - say -100. Given BEV, the
extrinsic value of <X,@,C> is +100; thus it is a very good thing that the x-ray comes
out negative. It seems reasonable to call this value its signatory value. This further
illustrates the flexibility of BEV; the states of affairs involved in the total consequence
of state of affairs X need not be ones that are caused by X, or of which X is a part; in
this case, they are states of affairs of which X is a sign.
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One might be skeptical of the claim that BEV accounts for signatory value. It
might be objected that the claim that the x-ray’s coming out negative is a good thing
does not imply the claim that things would have been worse had the x-ray been
positive .
7 We might truly claim that it was a good thing the x-ray was negative, the
objection goes, but later fmd out (as a result of further tests) that Shaquille’s leg has
problems that the x-ray failed to detect. If it could be true that the x-ray has positive
signatory value, yet the world is no better than it would have been otherwise, then this
would indeed be a serious objection to my contention that BEV accounts for signatory
value.
I don’t fmd this objection very troubling. It seems to me that in order for a
sign to have positive signatory value, what it signifies must be true; and I think that
careful reflection should lead the reader to the same conclusion. If I were in
Shaquille’s position in the above story, I would fmd no inclination to call the initial x-
ray result good unless what it signified — that there was no serious injury to the leg —
were true. Upon hearing the grim results of the later tests, I would be inclined to
retract any earlier remarks I might have made about the positive value of the x-ray
results. Imagine the doctor coming into the room and saying to Shaquille, “I have
some good news and some bad news. The good news is, the x-ray shows no sign of
injury! The bad news is, the MRI shows that you’ll be on crutches for three months.”
Shaquille could only take the doctor’s remarks as a joke. There’s obviously no good
news here; the x-ray results are clearly worthless.
Here is one more example in support ofmy intuition. There’s an old adage
that goes something like “red sky at night, sailor’s delight; red sky in morning, sailors
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take warning.” Presumably a red sky in the morning usually indicates that there will
be bad weather that day; let’s just suppose that is true. Suppose two sailors wake up to
fmd the sky bright red. One says to the other: “Look at how red the sky is! That’s a
bad sign.” Suppose, however, that the weather turns out to be perfect for sailing. I
think that the sailors would agree that the red sky had not been a bad thing after all . 8
5.3.2 Inherent Value
There is another kind of value that seems more puzzling. C.I. Lewis calls this
kind of value inherent value. This type of value has been discussed more recently
by Paul Taylor and Robert Audi. 9 Here is what Lewis, Taylor, and Audi have to say
about inherent value:
Let us call those values which objects have by their capacity to contribute
directly to human life by their presence, inherent values. (Lewis 1955, p.
69)
Inherent value is the capacity of an object, event, situation, process, or any
kind of thing other than a quality of our own experience, to produce in us
when we respond to it (by perceiving it, imagining it, thinking about it, or
otherwise apprehending it) a quality of experience which has intrinsic
value. (Taylor 26)
If . . . contemplation of [beautiful objects] would have intrinsic value owing
to their qualities experienced therein, this would imply that they have
inherent value, as distinct from both intrinsic and instrumental value:
roughly, they are such that properly contemplating them for their own sake
(say a painting for its beauty) or experiencing them in some other
appropriate way (say in playing a good game) is intrinsically valuable.
(Audi 255, his emphasis)
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Now, it would seem that just about any object has the capacity, in some broad
sense, to contribute to human life by its presence. But surely not just any object has
inherent value. Some clarification can be gained from the following passage from
Frankena’s Ethics :
Works of art and things of natural beauty may also be said to be good on
the ground that one who contemplates them normally has a good or
rewarding experience. Then, we may say that they have inherent
goodness. (Frankena 65; his emphasis)
The concept of normalcy plays an important part in inherent value; in order to have
inherent value, something must normally produce a valuable experience in an
observer. Hence, the following definition seems to capture what is meant by ‘inherent
value’:
IHV : x has inherent value =df. contemplation of x by a human being, under
normal conditions, would cause that human to have an intrinsically
valuable experience.
The best examples of inherent value are pieces of artwork or music. A good piece of
art or music will, under normal conditions, cause a human observer to have a valuable
aesthetic experience; thus, good pieces of art or music have inherent value.
I think inherent value is a strange kind of value. First of all, it seems too
human-centered. If there were a piece of artwork that would cause a member of some
alien race to have a valuable aesthetic experience, but which seems ugly to human
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beings, IHV would assign it no inherent value. But it seems arbitrary to suppose that
there is something special about humans aesthetic experiences, something that
provides their objects with value but not the objects of experiences had by non-
humans. It would seem, then, that we would need a different concept of inherent
value for every species with a distinct aesthetic taste; there would be human inherent
value, Martian inherent value, etc. On the other hand, we could say that for something
to have inherent value it is sufficient that there be some sentient creature that normally
would have a valuable experience if it were to contemplate that thing. But this would
give the result that a single thing could be both inherently good and inherently bad, if
one creature would have a good experience when contemplating it but another would
have a bad experience.
Furthermore, there will be difficulties in attempting to state how much inherent
value something has. A good piece of artwork will be enjoyed to different degrees by
different people. The same person might experience much more intense pleasure
when contemplating a piece of artwork on one day than she would experience the next
day. Aesthetic experiences may also differ in length; contemplating a beautiful picture
for fifteen minutes might yield much more pleasure than contemplating it for thirty
seconds, while contemplating it for an hour might yield boredom. It would seem that
there are infinitely many possible experiences people could have of a single painting,
even under “normal conditions,” each with a different intrinsic value. This would
seem to make it impossible to determine how much inherent value something has. It
seems important to know how to calculate inherent value; otherwise, how will we
know which of two paintings has more of it?
10
157
It may be that some, or even all, of the alleged problems I have raised here can
be solved using the notion of context. For example, context may determine what
normal conditions are, and whether a painting has inherent value for a human or an
alien. In most ordinary contexts, when it is asserted that a painting has inherent value,
it will be assumed that a human being who contemplated it would have a good
experience. So we might restate our definition of inherent value as follows:
IHV2: x has inherent value relative to context C =# an appropriate experience of x
would be intrinsically good, where the appropriateness is determined by C.
Since I already maintain that extrinsic value is context-relative, I cannot object to
IHV2 on the grounds that it makes inherent value context-relative.
However, inherent value cannot be subsumed under BEV even if we allow
contexts to do some work for us. The reason is that BEV entails that in order for
something to be extrinsically good, the world must be intrinsically betterfor its
existence than it would have been otherwise - whether because it brings some intrinsic
value into the world, or prevents some intrinsic evil, or is a sign of intrinsic value or
the absence of evil. Things with inherent value do not necessarily make the world
better; they merely have the potential to do so. We might say that when a painting has
inherent value, the nearest world in which it is contemplated (by an appropriate
person, for an appropriate time, in the appropriate way, etc.) is intrinsically better than
the nearest world in which it is not contemplated (perhaps the actual world). This is
clearly a much different kind of value. Extrinsic value, according to BEV, makes the
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actual world better than it would have been; but inherent value does not necessarily do
so.
Inherent value really seems to be one member of a more inclusive kind of
value, which we might call “potential value.” This kind of value will be had not just
by aesthetic objects, but also things like fast cars and games, for example, which have
the potential to produce valuable experiences in people who drive or play them. Thus,
I do not wish to attempt to subsume inherent value under my concept of extrinsic
value. My conception of extrinsic value is a kind of “actual” value; in order for
something to have positive extrinsic value, the world must actually be better off for its
existence (ignoring its intrinsic value). Things with inherent value do not necessarily
affect the intrinsic value of the world; and having inherent value does not necessarily
affect something’s (actual) overall value. Since I am interested in the kinds of value
that actually affect something’s overall value, and that actually affect the value of the
world, I propose to leave inherent value aside; if there is a notion of inherent value
worth studying, it is a member of a wholly different species of value than the one in
which I am interested.
I conclude that BEV can account for several different subspecies of extrinsic
value, including instrumental value, contributory value, and signatory value. It cannot
account for inherent value, which seems to fall under a different species. There may
be other types of extrinsic value. For example, Judith Thomson suggests there might
be such a thing as “product value” (Thomson 1990, p. 132n). I cannot hope to discuss
every type of extrinsic value that someone might think of; but I am optimistic that
BEV is flexible enough to account for other kinds of value as well.
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5.4 The Extrinsic Values of Actions
Alastair Norcross presents an objection to theories that determine the values of
actions by appealing to counterfactuals. He thinks the problem arises for
consequentialists, where consequentialism is understood not simply as a view about
the rightness or wrongness of actions, but also their goodness or badness. Roughly,
the view is that whether an act is good or bad depends upon the value of its
consequences. His objection can easily be seen as an objection to BEV. In this
section I will explain Norcross’ objection, and defend BEV against the objection.
The first view involving counterfactuals discussed by Norcross is the
following:
GC: An act A is good iff the world would have been worse ifA hadn’t been
performed; A is bad iff the world would have been better ifA hadn’t been
performed. (Norcross 14)
Note first that Norcross does not provide an interpretation for ‘good’ in GC. I think it
is clear, however, that he is talking about extrinsic goodness.
11
Norcross is attempting
to find a definition of ‘good act’ that will be acceptable to consequentialists-,
consequentialists typically do not think that actions have any intrinsic value. GC
seems very similar to BEV, or a version ofBEV restricted to actions.
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Norcross then proceeds to give counterexamples to GC. The most important
example he gives is called “Button pusher
Agent stumbles onto an experiment conducted by a twisted scientist named
Scientist. He is seated at a desk with ten buttons, numbered ‘O’ through
9
,
in front of him. He tells Agent that the buttons control the fates of ten
people. If no button is pressed within the next thirty seconds, all ten will
die. If the button marked ‘9’ is pressed, only nine will die; if ‘8’ is pressed,
8 will die, and so on down to ‘O’. He was, he explains, about to sit and
watch as all ten died. However, to honor her arrival, he turns control of the
button over to Agent. She is free to press any button she wishes, or to
press none at all. Agent pushes ‘9’, killing nine people. If she had
remained immobile, all ten would have died. According to GC, then, her
action is good, since the world would have been worse, if she hadn’t
performed it. But her action is not good. (Norcross 15)
Here is how I interpret Norcross’ argument:
The Button Pusher Argument:
1 . If GC is true, then Agent’s pushing ‘9’ was a good act.
2. Agent’s pushing ‘9’ was not a good act.
3. Therefore, GC is not true.
Premise 2 is intended to be obviously true; pushing ‘9’ “led to the deaths of nine
people who needn’t have died. She could have pressed ‘0’ instead” (Norcross 15).
Premise 1 is supported by a particular understanding of what Agent would have done
had she not pressed ‘9’ - namely, that she would have remained immobile, thereby
allowing all ten to die. “The intuitive reading ofGC involves a comparison with the
world in which the agent is inactive” (Norcross 14).
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If we understand GC in this way, so that whether an act is good or bad always
depends upon a comparison between what the act brings about and what would have
happened had the agent of the act remained immobile, then the Button Pusher
Argument is sound. This reading ofGC results in an implausible principle. Norcross
goes on to consider some other ways to understand GC. Instead of comparing the
results of Agent s act to what would have happened had Agent remained immobile,
perhaps we should compare them to what would have happened had Agent simply
disappeared (miraculously or not). Of course, this reading fares no better. However,
none of these readings ofGC results in a view that is sufficiently similar to BEV, for
reasons that will emerge shortly; at this point, Norcross does not yet have a
counterexample to BEV.
Norcross then gives another reading that results in a view that is much closer to
BEV:
There are other ways to read the counterfactuals in GC that will give
different accounts of goodness and badness. The most obvious alternative
reading involves a judgment about which other possible world is closest to
the world in which the action occurs. ...Sometimes that will be the world
in which the agent is immobile, but often it will be a world in which the
agent does something else instead. (Norcross 16).
This interpretation ofGC results in a more flexible view. Depending on the other
details of the situation, it may be that in Button pusher
,
Agent would have pressed
some other button if she hadn’t pressed ‘9’; if that is so, then pressing ‘9’ would turn
out to be bad, according to GC, since it would have worse results than the action that
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Agent would have performed had she not pushed ‘9’. Endorsing this more flexible
account ofGC enables us to reject Premise 1 of the Button Pusher Argument.
However, GC could still entail that pushing ‘9’ would be good. Without more
details about Button pusher, there is no reason so far to think that there is some
particular thing that would have happened had Agent not pushed ‘9’. Agent could
have pushed another button, or she could have pressed no button at all. Norcross adds
some details to the story, in order to make it clear what would have happened had
Agent not pushed ‘9’:
Agent is highly misanthropic. She delights in the misfortunes of others,
especially their deaths. Her initial inclination is to refrain from pushing
any buttons, so that all ten will die. She is dissatisfied, though, that this
will involve, as she sees it, merely letting people die. She wants as many
as possible to die, but she also wants to kill them. At the last second she
changes her mind, and pushes ‘9’. If she hadn’t pushed ‘9’, she wouldn’t
have pushed any button. She didn’t even consider the possibility of
pushing a different button. ...Once again, GC judges Agent’s action to be
good. But we are no more inclined to believe that her action is good than
we were before we knew about her character defects. (Norcross 17).
By describing Agent’s character in this way, Norcross ensures that if Agent had not
pressed ‘9’, she would have pressed no button at all. Thus, since pushing ‘9’ makes
the world better than it would have been, GC (and BEV) judges that action to be good.
We can no longer reject Premise 1 of the Button Pusher Argument.
Instead, I now reject Premise 2. This may seem surprising. But imagine that
you are an omniscient observer of the scene described by Norcross. You know that
Agent is inclined to do nothing, allowing ten people to die; you know that she is not
even considering anything other than doing nothing or pushing ‘9’. When you see that
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she pushes ‘9’, you would probably be inclined to say that (given Agent’s
psychological state) it is a good thing that she pushes ‘9’.
Norcross admits that in some cases (though not all - and in particular, not in
Button pusher), we are inclined to allow the character of the agent to affect our
judgment of the goodness or badness of her action.
If we would have expected an outcome of an event or action to be worse,
. . .we may be pleased to discover that things aren’t as bad as they might
have been. Thus, we might claim that it’s a good thing ...that the
Republican Congress cut entitlements by only 80 percent. We don’t mean
by this that the budget cut was good, just that it wasn’t as bad as we were
expecting. (Norcross 18).
This is an excellent example. But I think Norcross is wrong, in one sense, to say that
we don’t think that the budget cut is good. If we know in advance that there will be a
budget cut of 80 or 90 percent, and the cut is only 80 percent, then we might well say
that it is good that the cut was 80 percent, meaning exactly what we say. We might
think that it is a bad thing that the budget was cut at all. But it is entirely consistent to
say both that it is bad that there was a budget cut, bad that there was a severe budget
cut, and - given that there was a severe budget cut - good that the cut was not more
severe. I will have more to say about this below.
Returning to Button pusher, what, exactly, is the difference between the case
of the budget cut and Button pusher? Norcross seems to think that there is a
difference; that we may take the character of the Congress into account when judging
whether the budget cut was good, but we can’t take Agent’s character into account
when judging the goodness of her pushing ‘9’. But the cases seem relevantly similar.
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Furthermore, there seem to be many other esses, not involving actions, where
something with disastrous consequences might rightly be called ‘good’. For instance,
when an earthquake occurs at night, causing much destruction, people often say that it
is a good thing it occurred at night, rather than at rush hour when many more would
have been killed. Of course, it would have been better had there been no earthquake;
but given that there was one, it was better that it occurred at night.
But this account is not satisfactory to Norcross. He seems to think there is
some underlying difficulty with an account like GC (or BEV) that allows contextual
factors to influence judgments of goodness or badness of actions.
The intuition on which they were based is that a good action makes the
world better. The difficulty lies in producing a general formula to identify
the particular possible world (or worlds) than which the actual world is
better as a result of a good action. Any unified theory requires a way of
fixing the contrast point, but the contrast point varies from situation to
situation. (Norcross 18)
As I have noted above (see Section 3.4), I agree that there is no general formula that
can tell you which is the closest world where an action does not occur. This follows
from the Lewisian analysis of counterfactuals that I endorse. But I do not see why this
is a difficulty. Norcross seems to think that theories like GC and BEV are not
sufficiently “unified”; but I do not understand what this means. If a unified theory is
one that specifies exactly which world would have occurred had an action not been
performed, no matter what the context, then unification is not a desirable characteristic
anyway; it would require us to reject analyses of counterfactuals that are otherwise
plausible. We should not look for more “unity” than is there to be had.
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Fortunately, Norcross provides more detail about the problems he sees with a
theory that does not provide a “general formula” to tell you what would have
happened had an action not been performed. He asks us to consider another view:
Why not simply say that different comparisons will be relevant forjudging
different actions? This gives the following account:
GAP An action is good iff it is better than whichever possible
alternative provides the appropriate comparison.
There is no general formula for identifying the appropriate comparison, but
in most cases the context will make it clear. (Norcross 27)
First, I should point out that GAP is really not a view that competes with GC. Rather,
holding GAP is simply one way (the most plausible, in my view) to hold GC.
Norcross admits that he has no “knock-down argument” against GAP. However, he
proceeds to give four reasons not to hold GAP. I will consider them each in turn.
Objection #7: “Part of the appeal of consequentialism is its simplicity and
generality. GAP violates the spirit of consequentialism by using the notion of
appropriateness without a general account of what makes a comparison appropriate”
(Norcross 27). This is a pretty weak objection. GAP merely incorporates a
contextualist view of counterfactuals. If this makes things more “complex” in some
ways, the so be it. If holding GAP is the best way to be a consequentialist, then the
consequentialist had better hold GAP. Unless Norcross has some preconceived notion
ofjust how complex a theory of the goodness of actions should be, this objection
carries no weight. At best, it could be seen as one strike against GAP ifGAP were
competing with another more simple view; but Norcross provides no such view.
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Objection #2: “GAP allows nonconsequentialist factors, such as self-sacrifice,
ownership, rights, and institutional duties to influence the question of whether an
action is good or bad” (Norcross 27). Take self-sacrifice, for example. In Button
pusher, the alternative to which it seems “appropriate” to compare Agent’s action is
the alternative where she pushes ‘O’; however, if more self-sacrifice were involved in
pushing a lower-numbered button, the appropriate alternative might be pushing some
other button (call this case “Button Pusher 2”). For example, the mad scientist might
stipulate that if Agent pushes a button, she will receive some sort of punishment
proportional to the number of lives she saves. If pushing any button at all would
involve serious self-sacrifice on the part of Agent, the appropriate alternative for
comparison might be the one in which Agent does nothing. So the element of self-
sacrifice affects which is the appropriate alternative for comparison, and thus affects
whether an act is good or bad according to GAP. But whether an act involves self-
sacrifice is not something that a consequentialist should care about. Thus GAP is not
an acceptable consequentialist account of good and bad actions.
This is a strange objection. First of all, GAP does not explicitly state that any
of the “non-consequentialisf ’ factors listed by Norcross must be relevant to
determining the appropriate comparison. So the consequentialist could simply deny
that those factors are ever appropriate in making such comparisons; whether an action
involves self-sacrifice, for example, would not be relevant to the sort of
consequentialist Norcross has in mind. Of course, GAP is consistent with views that
Norcross considers non-consequentialist. However, I consider this to be a virtue of
GAP, not a vice, at least from the point of view ofmy project. I would like my
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definition of extrinsic value to be of some use even to non-consequentialists (though it
is hard to imagine how one could be a “non-consequentialist” about instrumental
value). Finally, Norcross seems to have a very narrow view of what counts as a
consequentialist view. It seems to me that a perfectly legitimate form of
consequentialism could rate an action better if it involved a certain amount of self-
sacrifice. One consequence of Agent’s act in Button Pusher 2 that is not a
consequence of Agent’s act in Button Pusher is that there is more self-sacrifice in the
world; a certain sort of consequentialist might think this plays a role in determining
the values of Agent’s acts in the two cases.
Objection #3
:
“Sometimes there is no clearly appropriate comparison.
. . .Most ofmy examples in this paper have been designed to elicit strong intuitive
reactions, but in many cases we just don’t have strong intuitions about whether a
particular action is good” (Norcross 28). This is true enough. Sometimes the context
will not determine a particular outcome that would have obtained had the action not
been performed. The appropriate response is “So what?” Sometimes actions will not
be determinately good or bad. Sometimes they will be determinately good or bad, but
not to a determinate degree. I see no reason to think that a correct view of the
goodness and badness of actions must say, given an action and a context, whether the
action is good or bad relative to that context and to what degree.
Objection #4: “Perhaps the most serious problem with GAP is that it makes
the goodness of actions context-relative” (Norcross 28). Norcross asks us to consider
the following case: Ross Perot donates $1000 to help the Dallas homeless. This
seems like a good action. But suppose we add this detail to the case: he had been
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intending to give the money to a village in Somalia that needed the money to build a
dam, and as a result of his giving that money to the Dallas homeless, twenty Somalian
children die. Now his act does not seem so good. Our judgment of the value of the
action does not depend on whether we know all the details of the case; for even if we
did know about the Somalia alternative, it could still make sense to say that Perot’s
action was good, as Norcross explains:
We could interpret GAP as incorporating a notion of appropriateness that
assumes complete, or reasonably complete, knowledge. The problem is
that what comparisons are appropriate can change with a change in the
linguistic context, even if there is no epistemic change. For example,
different descriptions of the same action can make different comparisons
appropriate. If we ask whether Perot’s diversion of the $1000 from the
starving Somalians to the Dallas homeless was good, we will probably
compare the results of the actual donation with the alternative donation to
the Somalians. If, however, we ask whether Perot’s donation to the Dallas
homeless was good, we may simply compare the donation to the alternative
in which the money sits in the bank, even if we know that Perot had
previously intended to send the money to Somalia. (Norcross 28-29, his
emphasis)
Norcross is absolutely right to say that a change in linguistic context could
change the appropriate comparison, even without a change in epistemic context. It is
unclear to me why he thinks this is a problem. There are different ways it could come
about that Perot failed to donate $1000 to the Dallas homeless; some are better (he
sends the money to Somalia), and some are worse (he keeps the money). Norcross
seems to think that there must be a fact of the matter about whether his action is good
or bad; if it is good, it must be good no matter what the context. But why? Norcross
seems to think the reader will simply agree with him after hearing the example. “The
goodness of an action doesn’t change with a change in the context in which it is
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discussed” (Norcross 30). But this assertion is question-begging when used to argue
against my view. Norcross goes on to say: “It is much less implausible to suppose
that the appropriateness of describing an action as good or bad changes with a change
in linguistic context” (Norcross 30). But why is this less implausible? Perhaps the
reason it seems appropriate to say that in one context Perot’s action is good, but in
another it is bad, is that relative to one context it really is good, and relative to another
it really is bad.
I conclude that Norcross has given no good reason to reject a contextualist
account of the goodness of actions. I will now discuss a more technical objection to
BEV.
5.5 A Basic Problem for BEY
There’s a minor problem with BEV involving basic intrinsic values. The
following example should make the glitch apparent. Suppose that hedonism is true,
and that the only states of affairs with basic intrinsic value consist in a particular
person ’s (de re) experiencing a definite amount of pleasure or pain at a time. Suppose
that S is a state of affairs with positive basic intrinsic value that obtains at world @ -
Jones’ experiencing 12 units of pleasure at noon. Suppose that S’s truth at @ implies
the truth at @ of another state of affairs T that has intrinsic value, but not basic
intrinsic value: someone’s experiencing 12 units of pleasure at noon. We might say
that S “bestows” T with whatever intrinsic value it has - viz., +12. To determine the
extrinsic value of T according to BEV, we would have to include S as part of its total
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consequence, for T is distinct from S, and S is true at the world w where T occurs, but
not at W<~T,w,c> (for any c). Since S has basic intrinsic value, it would boost the
intrinsic value of the total consequence of T, and hence boost the extrinsic value of T.
This seems wrong; we don’t want S to be factored into the calculation of the extrinsic
value of T.
To make this a bit more clear, suppose we add the following details to the
above example: T causes R, a state of affairs which has a basic intrinsic value of +10;
T causes no other state of affairs with intrinsic value; and the context, C, implies that
had T not occurred, nothing with any intrinsic value would have occurred — i.e.,
IV(what <T,@,C> prevents) = zero. In such a situation, we’d like to say that T’s
extrinsic value is +10. But according to BEV, the total consequence of T includes
both R and S; so we add the basic intrinsic values ofR and S to get the intrinsic value
of the total consequence of <T,@,C>. Since the basic intrinsic values ofR and S add
to +22, and since what T prevents has zero intrinsic value, BEV entails that T’s
extrinsic value would be +22.
The problem is easy to fix. We revise the notion of the total consequence of
<s,w,c> to include s; so the total consequence of <s,w,c> will be the conjunction of all
states of affairs in w that are not in W<~s,w,c>. Then we revise the formula for
calculating extrinsic value as follows:
BEV2: For any state of affairs s, world w, and context c, the extrinsic value of
<s,w,c> = the intrinsic value of the total consequence of <s,w,c>, minus the
intrinsic value of s, minus the intrinsic value of what <s,w,c> prevents.
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I think this solves the problem. In the above example that posed a problem for BEV,
the intrinsic value of S will be factored into the intrinsic value of the total consequence
of T, but it will be factored out when we subtract the intrinsic value of T. The
extrinsic value ofT will be +10, just as we’d hoped.
An astute reader may have realized that BEV2 is in fact equivalent to the
following slightly more elegant formula:
BEV2’: For any state of affairs s, world w, and context c, the extrinsic value of
<s,w,c> = the intrinsic value of w, minus the intrinsic value of s, minus the
intrinsic value of W<~s,w,c>.
While BEV2’ is more elegant, it is perhaps more difficult to see why it yields the right
results. But indeed, it does, since all and only the states of affairs that are in w but not
in the total consequence of <s,w,c> are states of affairs that are in W<~s,w,c> but not
in what <s,w,c> prevents. Hence their (basic) intrinsic values are included in both
IV(w) and IV(W<~s,w,c>), and thus do not affect the calculation.
1
For example, see Pojman (1993, p. 85) and Hospers (1961, pp. 104-105).
2
This principle was named by Ned Markosian.
3
This does not seem to be Korsgaard’s official definition of extrinsic value;
nevertheless, as a statement of what these kinds of value have in common, it seems
incorrect. I discuss her official definition below.
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4
Also see Robert Olson’s account of nonintrinsic value: “a nonintrinsic good
is something valuable by virtue of its relationship to an intrinsic good” (Olson 367).
5
Consider the following passage: “To say that a thing is conditionally
valuable is to say that it is good when and only when the conditions of its goodness are
met” (Korsgaard 179). One wonders how something could be good even when the
conditions of its goodness are not met!
6 BEV is similar to a definition of extrinsic value given by Fred Feldman:
The extrinsic value for S of P = the difference between the intrinsic value for S of the
life S would lead if P is true and the intrinsic value for S of the life S would lead if P is
false” (Feldman 1992, p. 150). There are some differences, however. Feldman
defines extrinsic value for lives, and he does not mention contexts. Most importantly,
his definition is false. Suppose John experiences some pain that has no bad
consequences. His life is made worse by that pain, so Feldman’s definition entails that
the pain is extrinsically bad for John; but clearly the pain is intrinsically bad, not
extrinsically bad, for John.
7
This objection was raised by an anonymous referee for Philosophical
Studies.
8 One might still say that the red sky had been a bad sign (though not a bad
thing) even though the weather turned out fine. Perhaps this suggests that there are
two kinds of signatory value: one that can be subsumed under BEV, and one that
cannot.
9
This notion of inherent value should not be confused with a distinct notion
of inherent value discussed by Tom Regan (1983). Regan’s conception of inherent
value is a kind of value that more closely resembles intrinsic value; the main
difference is that inherent value, according to Regan, does not come in degrees.
Regan’s conception of inherent value thus seems to be similar to Dworkin’s notion of
“sacred” value (Dworkin 1993, p. 74). I find Regan’s notion of inherent value to be
very mysterious; in any case, it does not seem to be a type of extrinsic value, so I will
ignore it here.
10
See R. Lemos (1995, pp. 52-58) for further criticism of the notion of
inherent value.
1
1
He might also be talking about overall goodness; since actions have no
intrinsic value, their extrinsic values are identical to their overall values.
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CHAPTER 6
THE VALUE OF ENDANGERED SPECIES
Preservationism, Conservationism, and the Tellico Dam
The infamous snail darter vs. Tellico Dam controversy of the 1970’s raised an
interesting philosophical problem - one that continues to arise, as illustrated by the
more recent spotted owl controversy in the Pacific Northwest. The snail darter is not
itself a snail, but a fish that eats snails; it is small (3 1/2 inches long), a relative of the
perch, and ranges in color from brown to olive. At the time the dam was proposed, its
only habitat was a region of the Tennessee River. The controversy arose because the
proposed Tellico Dam would have eliminated the snail darter’s habitat by creating a
lake in that region of the Tennessee; thus, it was thought that the building of the dam
would have jeopardized the snail darter’s future. Does this fact provide any good
reason not to build the dam?
In general, there are many good reasons not to destroy a species. Species can
provide important medical resources for humans; humans enjoy watching wildlife, and
destroying a species prevents people from having aesthetically pleasing experiences;
and so on. But consider the snail darter. It is not a particularly beautiful fish, and it
has no known important medical benefit for humans. From the human perspective, the
snail darter may be completely useless. Let us suppose that it is. Furthermore, let us
suppose that building the dam would not decrease the total number of fish; the snail
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darters would simply be replaced by another, more plentiful sort of darter. Is there any
good reason not to build the dam? 1
Some find it incredible that anyone would even seriously ask this question.
For example, Judith Jarvis Thomson says that nobody would claim that it would be
bad if “just any species” were exterminated:
I gather that hundreds of species of ants (or is it termites?) become extinct
every day: Is anyone seriously inclined to call that just plain a bad thing?
Pandas are another matter, however. Dear living teddy bears! ...So far as I
can see, it is in being bad for us, and only in being bad for us, that their
becoming extinct would be bad. (Thomson 1997, p. 294n)
Thomson would appear to be what might be called a “conservationist.”
Conservationists hold that the only reason it is wrong to destroy a species is that the
species may be of some value to human beings — species have instrumental value for
humans. A species may have instrumental value in many different ways: by
providing medicinal benefits to humans, by providing people with aesthetic
enjoyment, by making possible the expansion ofhuman knowledge resulting from
studying the species, by providing a tasty meal, and so on. In the Tellico Dam
scenario as described above, the snail darter would have no such benefits for humans;
thus the factors listed above provide us with no reason not to destroy it.
Despite what Thomson says, however, there are actually many people who
think there is a reason not to build the dam. Such people may be called
“preservationists.” Preservationists hold that there may be good reason not to destroy
a species even if it has no use for humans. If there would be no difference to the
benefit of humans, then given a choice between killing the last blue whale or one of
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thousands of sperm whales, the preservationist would kill the sperm whale; the
conservationist would find no reason to choose one rather than the other.
The preservationist faces a difficulty, however, when he tries to justify his
view. In recent years there have been at least three prominent attempts to justify
preservationism. Robert Elliot (1992) has argued that it is worse to kill the last
member of a species than to kill a member of a flourishing species because the last
member of a species has greater intrinsic value than a member of a non-endangered
species. Holmes Rolston (1988), Alastair Gunn (1980) and Nicholas Rescher (1980)
have argued that species themselves have intrinsic value beyond the intrinsic values of
their members, and this intrinsic value is what explains why it is worse to destroy the
last members of a species. Finally, Robin Attfield (1987) has argued that killing the
last members of a species has additional negative instrumental value — not because it
prevents humans from gaining any benefits, but because it prevents future generations
of that species from coming into existence.
Unfortunately, each of these attempted justifications of preservationism seems
to be inadequate. As a preservationist, then, I must find another justification. In what
follows I will explain the defects of current preservationist views. I will then argue
that part of the reason that justifications of preservationism have failed is the fact that
philosophers have mistakenly held that intrinsic and instrumental value are the only
types of value; I will argue that if we recognize the existence of contributory value
(see Chapter 4), we may be able to explain the value of endangered species. 3 I will
use the notion of contributory value, along with Brentano’s principle of bonum
variations, to provide a defense of preservationism.
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First, however, I must clear up two possible misunderstandings about
preservationism. Alastair Gunn claims that “the preservationist values the existence of
species, perhaps of all natural kinds, for their own sake” (Gunn 1984, p. 330). While
some preservationists may indeed value species for their own sake, I propose to
understand preservationism to be the view that it is worse to destroy the last member
of a species than to destroy a member of a similar but plentiful one, even when doing
so results in no harm to humanity. This allows for a wider variety of views to be
characterized as preservationist (including my own). Gunn then makes a different
claim about preservationism; he characterizes preservationism as the view “that it is
always wrong to exterminate any species” (Gunn 1984, p. 330). However, a reflective
preservationist would reject this view. To hold a preservationist view, such as the
view that species have intrinsic value, is not to say that it is always wrong to eliminate
a species; it is merely to say that there is always some reason not to eliminate a species
— one that may be outweighed by other, more important considerations.
4
6.2 Three Failed Justifications of Preservationism
6.2.1 Rarity Bestows Intrinsic Value
Robert Elliot has suggested that members of endangered species have more
intrinsic value than other organisms. If we hold the traditional view of intrinsic value,
Elliot’s suggestion would appear to be incoherent. By the “traditional view, I have in
mind the conception I defend in Chapter 2, stated by G.E. Moore in ‘ The Conception
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of Intrinsic Value”: “To say that a kind of value is ‘intrinsic’ means merely that the
question whether a thing possesses it, and in what degree it possesses it, depends
solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing in question” (Moore 1951, p. 260; emphasis
his). On this view, members of endangered species cannot have more intrinsic value
than other organisms; after all, being rare is not an intrinsic property of anything.
But Elliot does not seem to be working with the traditional conception of
intrinsic value; instead, he seems to be introducing a new concept. 5 He makes this
clear in the following passage:
We should note that intrinsic value is contrasted with instrumental value,
where the latter is the value a thing has in virtue of contributing to the
production of some other thing which has intrinsic value. The contrast is
not between having value in virtue of certain intrinsic properties and
having value in virtue of certain extrinsic properties. (Elliot 1992, p. 139)
So just what is this new conception of intrinsic value? According to Elliot, the
intrinsic value of something is a function of its “value-adding” and “value-subtracting”
properties (1992, pp. 138-139). “Where the value-adding properties outweigh the
value-subtracting properties, a thing has intrinsic value; in the converse case a thing
has intrinsic disvalue; otherwise, the thing is value neutral” (1992, p. 139). Elliot
defines ‘value-adding properties’ as any properties that “increase the overall value of
the thing which has them” (1992, p. 138). Elliot claims that these value-adding
properties may be either intrinsic or extrinsic properties: “More surprisingly, perhaps,
value-adding properties need not be intrinsic properties of the object to which they add
value” (1992, p. 139). So Elliot’s definition of ‘intrinsically good’ (or ‘good in itself)
is as follows: “‘good in itself has to be read as ‘good in virtue of the (value-adding)
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properties it possesses’. Read thus, relational properties are not ruled out” (1992, p.
139). Elliot seems to think this is a virtue of his view: “This is an important point
since substantive theories of environmental value do in fact attribute value on the basis
of such relational properties as being rare” (1992, p. 139). Thus Elliot can account for
the special value of endangered species in the following way: other things being
equal, members of endangered species are intrinsically more valuable than other
organisms in virtue of certain extrinsic properties they possess, such as rarity.6
Elliot’s view generates some very strange results. In fact, on his view, it turns
out that anything that has any value at all has intrinsic value. In particular, things that
we would ordinarily take to be examples of instrumental value turn out to have
intrinsic value on his view. This is because on Elliot’s view, a value-adding property
is any property that increases the overall value of something that has it; and
something’s overall value will often depend on its causal properties. For example:
when I found my favorite shirt, which had been missing for several weeks, it made me
very happy; it was, overall, a good thing that I found the shirt, in virtue of the fact that
finding the shirt caused me to be happy. If causal properties are value-adding, then
things that we ordinarily think of as having merely instrumental value — such as
finding a shirt — would turn out to have intrinsic value. Clearly, however, finding my
shirt was not intrinsically good. Thus, Elliot has failed to provide a useful conception
of intrinsic value that contrasts with instrumental value. Henceforth, when I use the
term ‘intrinsic value,’ I have in mind the Moorean conception defended in Chapter 2.
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6.2.2 Species Have Intrinsic Value
Another much-discussed solution is suggested by Holmes Rolston, III.
Rolston seems to hold that species themselves - not just their members - have
intrinsic value.
We might say that the prohibition of extinction does not rest on rights that
species have but (so to speak) on rights that humans do not have. ...such a
prohibition seems to depend on some value in the species as such, for there
need be no prohibition against destroying a valueless thing. (Rolston 131)
Every extinction is a kind of superkilling. It kills forms (species), beyond
individuals. It kills “essences” beyond “existences,” the “soul” as well as
the “body.” It kills collectively, not just distributively. (Rolston 144)
(some say) no species - whatever “species” exactly is - can evaluate
anything, and therefore nothing called “species” can be the holder of
intrinsic value ... But we need to revise this logic. (Rolston 150)
Alastair Gunn, Nicholas Rescher, and Rick O’Neil also seem to advocate this sort of
solution: “An environmental ethic is nonspeciesist in that it values each living thing,
and each type of living thing, for its own sake” (Gunn 1980, p. 36); “species do not
just have an instrumental ‘value for’ man; they also have a value in their own right --
an intrinsic value” (Rescher 1980, p. 80); “it is sufficient to have established that on
either conception some species possess intrinsic value” (O’Neil 1997, p. 49). If a
species has intrinsic value, then it is easy to see why it would be worse to kill the last
member of a species than to kill a member of a flourishing species. Destruction of the
last member eliminates two things with intrinsic value: the individual organism killed,
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and the species. Killing a member of a flourishing species, on the other hand, destroys
only one thing with intrinsic value.
Before I criticize this view, I should note that there is something of a puzzle as
to just what species are. Are species properties? Gunn suggests this view when he
says that “types” of things are intrinsically valuable, and by Rolston when he says that
extinctions kill “forms.” But it is hard to see how one can destroy a property. Another
view is that a species is a collection of organisms; on this conception it is easier to see
how a species may be destroyed. Yet another view is one stated by Rolston; it is the
view that a species is some sort of “superorganism”: “a species is a living historical
form” (Rolston 135). Henceforth I will understand a species simply to be a collection
of organisms; however, the things I say would apply equally well to Rolston’s
“superorganism” view, since on either view a species is constituted by individual
organisms.
Whatever species are, attributing intrinsic value to species is problematic in
virtue of the fact that boundaries between species are somewhat arbitrary. Different
taxonomists will divide organisms into species in different ways. Of course, this is
not to say that boundaries between species are completely arbitrary, for taxonomists’
decisions are grounded in real similarities between organisms; but taxonomists will
differ as to which similarities are most important. Thus the number of species will
depend upon decisions made by biologists. For example, consider the following case:
The Baltimore oriole and the Bullock’s oriole were long recognized and
classified as two separate species of birds. As a result of extensive
interbreeding between the two species in areas where their ranges
overlapped, the American Ornithologists’ Union recently declared that
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there were no longer two separate species; [members of] both ex-species
are now called ‘northern orioles.’ (Russow 104)
If species have intrinsic value, then it would seem that the union’s decision to classify
the Baltimore oriole and Bullock’s oriole as one species rather than two was (at least
primafacie) morally wrong. Instead of two intrinsically valuable species, the union’s
decision leaves us with one; thus the intrinsic value of the world has decreased. Ifwe
assume a generic form of consequentialism, then Rolston’s proposal seems to imply
that biologists have a (prima facie) moral obligation to divide the world into as many
species as possible. This is plainly absurd.
The view that species have intrinsic value seems to suffer from the same
conceptual confusion as the view that members of endangered species have additional
intrinsic value. It implies that something may have intrinsic value in virtue of its
extrinsic properties. The intrinsic value of a group of organisms depends solely on the
intrinsic properties of that group -- whether or not that group constitutes a species.
Consider two possible worlds, W1 and W2, each of which contains snail darters Sr
S 100 ; suppose that S,-S 10o are intrinsically identical in the two worlds. In Wl, S,-S, 0o
are the only snail darters; but in W2, there are some extra snail darters S 10rS 2oo. Thus,
in Wl, SrSioo constitute the snail darter species, but in W2 they do not. Now suppose
that the members ofWl and W2 are deciding whether to build the Tellico Dam. In
either world, if the dam is built, SrS 10o will be exterminated; however, in W2, S 10rS 20o
would survive the building of the dam. The preservationist should be able to say that
it is much worse to build the dam in Wl than in W2. But since the two collections of
organisms, S,-S, 0o in Wl and SrS 10o in W2, are intrinsically identical, their intrinsic
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values must be identical. Thus we cannot explain why it is worse to destroy SrS,oo in
W1 than in W2 by claiming that the snail darter species has intrinsic value, for
whatever intrinsic value the snail darter species possesses in W1 is possessed by
something intrinsically identical in W2.
Note that this problem will arise even for one who holds the view that to say
that species are intrinsically valuable is just to say that we value species intrinsically.
J. Baird Callicott appears to hold such a view:
Thus I think we have found, at last, an axiology which faithfully
articulates and adequately grounds the moral intuition that nonhuman
species [qua species] have “intrinsic value.” They may not be valuable
in themselves, but they may certainly be valued for themselves.
(Callicott 1986, p. 160; emphasis his)
To value a species intrinsically is, one would presume, to value it in virtue of its
intrinsic properties. But in the example I have presented, it is impossible to value snail
darters S,-S 100 in W1 more than in W2 in virtue of their intrinsic properties, for there is
no intrinsic difference between those organisms in the two worlds.
6.2,3 Rare Animals Have More Instrumental Value
Robin Attfield rejects the view that species, qua species, have intrinsic value;
he proposes another alternative.
Another question concerns the widespread conviction that it is almost
certainly wrong to eliminate a species. ...(I)t is sometimes held that it can
only be answered if we allow that species have a standing as such, which
does not reduce to that of their members. But to adopt this supposition is
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to forget that when a species is eliminated, not only are the lives of its
present members cut off but also the lives of what would have been its
future members. ...The reason why it is worse to wipe out a species than to
kill some of its current membership while others survive in abundance may
then he in the value of a multitude of possible future lives, all of which are
simultaneously pre-empted when their species is eliminated (Attfield 19-
20 )
Attfield’s view is not that members of endangered species have more intrinsic value
than other organisms; rather, they have additional instrumental value (beyond
whatever instrumental value they have for human exploitation, etc.). Killing the last
member of a species is instrumentally bad, for it prevents the existence of that
member's offspring.
Unfortunately, this solution is no better. It fails to explain why it is worse to
kill the last member of a species than it would be to kill a member of a flourishing
species. After all, when a member of a flourishing species is killed, all the offspring
of that member are prevented from coming into existence as well. The existence or
non-existence of other members of the species is not relevant. 7
6.3 Contributory Value and the Value of Variety
When attempting to determine what is common to all of the failed solutions
considered so far, we notice that each involves attributions of one or the other of only
two sorts of value: intrinsic value and instrumental value. Many have thought that
these are the only types of value — that is, they have thought that instrumental value is
the only type of non-intrinsic value.
8
This is a mistake. Something's instrumental
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value is a result of its causal relationships with other things; however, there are other
extrinsic relations that can endow something with value. Among these, as I have
pointed out in Chapter 4 above, are part-whole relations. When something has value
in virtue of its part-whole relations, we say that it has “contributory value.” Recall the
definition of contributory value presented in Section 4.5:
LCV: the contributory value of x at world w = (the intrinsic value ofw - the
intrinsic value of x) - the intrinsic value of (w-x).
In Section 4.1, 1 discussed several ways in which things might be thought to
have contributory value. One way in which something might be thought to have
contributory value is by contributing to the variety of the world. In this century the
view that variety is good has been held by A.C. Ewing, 9 but the view goes back at
least to Leibniz. In the Monadology Leibniz writes: “And by this means there is
obtained as great variety as possible, along with the greatest possible order; that is to
say, it is the way to get as much perfection as possible” (1898b, p. 249); in Theodicy
he says “to multiply one and the same thing only would be superfluity, and poverty
too” (1952, p. 198). Brentano has also endorsed this view. In Brentano and Intrinsic
Value Roderick Chisholm explains Brentano’s principle of bonum variationis: “other
things being equal, it is better to combine two dissimilar goods than to combine two
similar goods” (1986, pp. 70-71). Recall the example Chisholm uses to illustrate this
principle:
185
Suppose, for example, that A is a beautiful painting, that B is a painting
exactly like A, and that C is a beautiful piece of music. The aesthetic
contemplation of A may have the same [intrinsic] value as that of B and
also the same [intrinsic] value as that of C. But the whole that is the
aesthetic contemplation of A followed by that of C is intrinsically better
than that whole that is the aesthetic contemplation ofA followed by that of
B. Hence one could say that the value of a bonum variations is greater
than the sum of the values of its constituent parts. (Chisholm 1986, p. 71)
Consider the value of the contemplation of C in the above example. Besides
its intrinsic value, it also seems to have another kind of value : the value it contributes
to the whole consisting of the contemplation ofA and C. This value is not
instrumental value; contemplating C may not cause anything good to occur. Rather,
its value depends on its part-whole relationships — it has contributory value.
If we hold, with Leibniz, Brentano, and Ewing, the principle of bonum
variations, we have a plausible justification of preservationism. Consider two worlds,
V and U, with the same number of organisms, and suppose that the intrinsic value of
each organism is the same. Suppose, however, that V contains a great variety of
organisms, including all the species we have on earth (snail darters, spotted owls,
alligators, and so on), while U contains nothing but snail darters (and possibly some
snails) -- billions and billions of snail darters. The principle of bonum variations
implies that V is a better world than U. If this is so, then we can see how killing the
last snail darter in V - call her “Veronica” - would be worse than killing an
intrinsically identical snail darter in U -- call her “Ursula”. Ursula does not make U a
more diverse planet; she is one of billions, so exterminating Ursula would reduce the
value ofU only by Ursula’s intrinsic value (ignoring instrumental value). Veronica,
on the other hand, contributes to the diversity of V; V is intrinsically better with
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Veronica than without, and by more than Veronica’s intrinsic value. Veronica has
contributory value, in virtue of her contribution to the variety of organisms in V.
Hence we have a way to justify preservationism: the last member of a species has a
type of value, contributory value, that it would not have if it were a member of a
flourishing species; this explains why killing the last member of a species is worse
than killing a member of a flourishing species . 10
Of course, this is only the beginning of a solution to this problem. We also
need to say what sort of variety is important to the value of the world. For instance,
destroying all the organisms bom on the second Tuesday in August should not be seen
as depleting the variety of organisms on earth in any important way (though it would
of course be very bad). On this question I simply yield to the experts. If biologists
fmd a certain sort of variety to be important in explaining biological facts, then, ceteris
paribus, diminishing that variety will be bad.
Note that this solution does not fall victim to the problem that plagued the view
that species have intrinsic value. It does not matter how we divide up organisms into
species; so long as these divisions are based on objective similarities, the last member
of a species will have some property that is important from the point of view of
biology and that no other organism has. Thus, if it is destroyed, nothing will have that
property; the world will be a more homogeneous, hence less valuable, place. Yet
another virtue of my solution is that it explains why it seems worse to kill the last
alligators, for example, if they were not only the last alligators but the last reptiles
—
for eliminating all the reptiles would reduce biological diversity much more than
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simply eliminating a single species. Other views may have difficulty explaining this
intuition.
6.4 Objections and Replies
Finally, I must deal with some important objections to my view. First, I claim
that when more biological properties are instantiated, the world is better. It might be
thought that instead of saying that diversity is good, we could say that instantiation of
biological properties is intrinsically good. For any biologically important property B,
the state of affairs consisting of B’s being instantiated would be intrinsically good.
This would result in a view somewhat similar to the view that species have intrinsic
value, without placing any emphasis on particular ways of dividing organisms into
species. Such a view could apparently account for the wrongness of exterminating a
species, since when the last member of a species S is destroyed, the state of affairs
consisting of S’s being instantiated will no longer be true. Furthermore, such a view
would have no need for the (possibly mysterious) concept of contributory value.
11
This view might indeed be able to mirror the results that my view gives, and it
seems to be a coherent view. However, I think it might have some problems. For one
thing, it involves an enormous number of attributions of intrinsic value. For every
biological property, there would be an intrinsically good state of affairs consisting of
that property being instantiated. This seems especially strange when we consider that
some biological properties are “parts” of others. For example, part of
what it is to be a
turtle is to be a reptile. If we have one biological property, Bl, that is
part of another
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property, B1&B2, we would have to say that the state of affairs that B1 is instantiated
is (basically) intrinsically good, and that the state of affairs that B1&B2 is instantiated
is (basically) intrinsically good. We would end up with an enormous number of
attributions of intrinsic value - perhaps too many.
Perhaps more importantly, however, this view does not allow us to attribute
any particular value to the rare organism itself. When an animal is the last of its kind,
it seems to be especially valuable in some way. The proposed view does not attribute
any value to the organism itself. It merely attributes value to an existential state of
affairs that the organism itself does not enter into at all. My view, on the other hand,
attributes contributory value to the rare animal; so it seems that my view can account
for the specialness of rare organisms better than the view just presented. 13 I do not
pretend that these are knockdown objections to the view; I merely think that my view
has some slight advantages. At worst, there is another view similar to mine that can
also solve the problem.
Another objection is raised by Lilly-Marlene Russow in the following
14
passage:
Some appeals to intrinsic value are grounded in the intuition that diversity
itself is a virtue. If so, it would seem incumbent upon us to create new
species wherever possible, even bizarre ones that would have no purpose
other than to be different. Something other than diversity must therefore be
valued. (Russow 109)
Russow’s objection seems quite powerful. Certainly few people would argue that we
are obliged to create new species. Yet if variety makes the world better, then (if we
assume an appropriate version of consequentialism) we ought to do just that.
189
Several points are in order here. First, I must note that while I do endorse the
view that appropriate sorts of variety make the world better, I do not hold that variety
is the only thing that makes the world better. This is an important point, since it seems
likely that attempting to create new species would be extremely risky; besides
contributing to the variety of organisms, it might also produce many unwanted and
disastrous side effects -- a point often raised in mediocre science-fiction movies. 15
The existence of a new species, while contributorily good, might well be
instrumentally very bad. Thus the commonly held view that we should not create new
species should not be taken at face value — at least not as a criticism of the view that
there is value in variety.
More important, however, is the fact that this criticism applies to just about any
preservationist view. In fact, it applies equally to conservationist views. If one holds
that species have intrinsic value, then one must hold that (provided the cost is not
prohibitive and there are no significant negative side effects) we should create new
species — for doing so would increase the amount of intrinsic value in the world. If
one is a conservationist who holds that species are valuable only because of potential
medical benefits they can provide, then one must hold that we should create new
species - in case they might hold some as-yet-unknown cure for a deadly disease.
The criticism even applies to Russow’s own conservationist view. Russow holds that
we ought not destroy species because it would deprive people of the aesthetic
pleasures of watching members of those species: “we value and protect animals
because of their aesthetic value, not because they are members of a given species"
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(Russow 1 12). Why, then, does Russow not hold that we should create new species
whose sole purpose is to be aesthetically pleasing?
If Russow’ s criticism sinks all plausible views about the value of members of
rare species, then we have two choices: we must either (i) reject conservationism and
preservationism altogether or (ii) revise our thinking about the rightness of creating
species. I prefer the latter course. If somehow we were able to eliminate all possible
negative consequences of creating new species, and if our resources were not better
spent elsewhere -- two unlikely suppositions - then indeed, there would be nothing
wrong with creating new species.
The second objection is raised by Callicott; it is an objection to a view that he
calls “Holistic Rationalism,” a view much like my own:
However, if one defends one’s intuition that biological impoverishment is
objectively wrong by positing organic richness as objectively good, one
might well be accused of temporal parochialism and a very subtle form of
human arrogance. ...A holistic rationalist could not regret the massive die-
off of the late Cretaceous because it made possible our yet richer mammal-
populated world. ...Nonhuman life would go on even after nuclear
holocaust. In time speciation would occur and species would radiate anew.
...The new Age (of Insects, perhaps) would eventually be just as diverse,
orderly, harmonious, and stable and thus no less good than our current
ecosystem with its present complement of species. (Callicott 1986, p. 151)
I presume that Callicott’ s point is that a holistic rationalist has no reason to think that
exterminating a species (or even thousands of species) is bad, so long as one day those
species will be replaced by other species.
Callicott is mistaken, for two reasons. First, one can hold that biological
diversity increases the value of the world without claiming that it is the only thing that
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can increase the value of the world. If humans were wiped out and replaced by a
species of insect (as Callicott suggests), the world might not be less biologically
diverse; but it would lack many other sorts of value that depend upon humanity. In
particular, humans’ pleasant experiences will be missing from the world; many of
these seem to be quite valuable, and it is questionable whether insects could have
equally valuable experiences.
Furthermore, I hold that when the number of species decreases, the value of the
world thereby decreases. Thus it is perfectly reasonable for me to regret the loss of the
snail darter, even if the snail darter will one day be replaced by a new species of
darter; for during the time between the extinction of the snail darter and the emergence
of the new species, the value of the world will have been diminished. Consider the
following analogy. Suppose that we are considering the view that human life is
valuable, and suppose one were to object to this view as follows: “Imagine that ninety
percent of humanity is wiped out in a disaster. Eventually, the remaining ten percent
will rebuild the human population to its previous point. One who holds that human
life is valuable cannot object to the disaster, since the new civilization will contain just
as much human life as the old one.” Nobody would accept this as a devastating
criticism; the obvious reply is that the intermediate years, with their decreased human
population, bring down the value of the world. My response to Callicott is exactly
similar. The years between extinction and speciation, with their biological
impoverishment, bring down the value of the world in Callicott’s example; thus, I can
perfectly well regret the extinction of species, even if others eventually replace them.
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1This question is much like what Elliott Sober (1986) has called the un+m
question.” However, Sober sees it as showing the difference between “individualism,”
which he defines as the view that the lives of individual organisms are important, and
“holism,” or the view that “the stability and diversity of populations of individuals are
what matter” (Sober 228). I do not see why these two views must conflict; in fact, I
believe I hold both views. The views have been defined in other ways according to
which I hold neither view; see note 3 below.
2
Sober (1986) and Lilly-Marlene Russow (1981) are among those who
advocate the view that members of endangered species should not be killed because of
the aesthetic pleasures they could provide to people: “The comparison that is often
made between species and natural wonders, spectacular landscapes, or even works of
art, suggest that species might have some aesthetic value. ...most of us believe that the
world would be a poorer place for the loss of bald eagles in the same way that it would
be poorer for the loss of the Grand Canyon or a great work of art. In all cases, the
experience of seeing these things is an inherently worthwhile experience” (Russow
109); “viewed as valuable aesthetic objects, rare organisms may be valuable because
they are rare” (Sober 245).
3
The tendency to ignore contributory value may perhaps be due in part to the
individualism vs. holism” debate. Rick O’Neil (1997) defines individualism as the
view that species have merely instrumental value, and holism as the view that species
have intrinsic value. On this conception, I reject both views.
This is noted by Rescher (1980, p. 87). It is possible that Gunn meant that it
is always prima facie wrong to exterminate a species; if that is what he meant, then I
do not disagree.
5
John O’Neill (1992) notes that the term ‘intrinsic value’ is used in a variety
of senses by environmental philosophers.
6
See Section 2.2.2.2 above for criticism of the view that rarity can increase
something’s intrinsic value.
7 __
. ... •
This criticism is due to Fred Feldman.
For example, Callicott claims that “There are, in general, two kinds of value:
(1) intrinsic value and (2) instrumental value” (Callicott 1986, p. 139). See Section
5.1 above for further discussion of this claim.
9
“The more different kinds of goods realized the better, but they need not all
be realized at once” (Ewing 1973, p. 221); also see Frankena (1963, p. 75), who
claims that the good life will be a “mixed life.”
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10 Some may fmd it implausible to say that biological diversity increases the
value of the world. The notion of contributory value may still be helpful to such
people. For example, if one holds that beauty is intrinsically valuable, one may hold
that members of endangered species contribute to the value of the world in virtue of
making it more “ecologically beautiful.” One need not say that the species itself is
beautiful, only that the world is more beautiful with that species in it - much like a
painting might be made more beautiful by the addition of a part that is intrinsically
ugly. (This suggestion is due to Fred Feldman.)
This view was proposed by Erik Wielenberg.
1
2
“ Of course, I claim in Section 2.3 that states ofaffairs, not individuals, are
the bearers of value. This would seem to preclude my saying that rare animals are
valuable. However, there are a couple of things I could say here. One would be that
while states of affairs are the bearers of intrinsic value, other things may bear other
sorts of value (e.g., contributory value). Another thing I could say would be that a
state of affairs that is (de re) about a particular rare or unique animal may have
contributory value; the alternative view just sketched cannot make this claim.
13
Here I am indebted to Fred Feldman.
14 nRussow actually seems to be criticizing an incoherent view - that species
have intrinsic value in virtue of their contribution to biological diversity. Her criticism
would seem to apply equally well to my view.
15
Recent examples of such movies include The Island ofDr. Moreau, Species,
and Species 2.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
The main task I set out to perform in this dissertation was to present and
defend analyses of several species of extrinsic value. In order to perform this task, I
first defended the notion of intrinsic value against an influential attack by John Mackie
(Chapter 1). I then defended a Moorean conception of intrinsic value against recent
attacks by Elizabeth Anderson and Shelly Kagan (Chapter 2). Using this conception
of intrinsic value, I proceeded to give definitions of instrumental and contributory
value.
The definition of instrumental value I defended in Chapter 3 was as follows:
BIV3: For any state of affairs s, world w, and context c, the instrumental value of
<s,w,c> = the intrinsic value of the total causal consequence of <s,w,c> -
the intrinsic value of what <s,w,c> prevents.
I argued that BIV3 could account for the instrumental value of preventions better than
alternative views such as Conee’s. I also argued that it was necessary to define
instrumental value in a context-relative way in virtue oftwo facts: that the truth of
counterfactual statements is sensitive to context, and that in order to calculate
instrumental value we must calculate the values of counterfactual situations.
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Next, in Chapter 4, 1 defended the following definition of contributory value,
inspired by C.I. Lewis (which later required slight revision due to technical
difficulties):
LCV. the contributory value of x at world w = (the intrinsic value ofw - the
intrinsic value of x) - the intrinsic value of (w-x).
I argued that LCV could account for some important cases of contributory value,
including the value of retribution and the value of variety. I also argued, contra
Thomas Hurka, that an account of organic unities that utilizes Moore’s conception of
intrinsic value and LCV is superior to an account that uses the notion of “conditional”
intrinsic value.
Then I attempted to provide a definition of extrinsic value that could account
for instrumental value, as defined in BIV3, and contributory value, as defined in LCV.
In Chapter 5 I defended the following definition:
BEV: For any state of affairs s, world w, and context c, the extrinsic value of
<s,w,c> = the intrinsic value of the total consequence of <s,w,c> - the
intrinsic value of what <s,w,c> prevents.
I argued that while BEV would require a slight reinterpretation of contributory value,
the resulting conception is more flexible than LCV; it accounts for all the cases of
contributory value LCV accounts for, as well as cases of “preventive” contributory
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value. I then argued that, m addition to instrumental and contributory value, a third
species of extrinsic value - signatory value - could be subsumed under BEV, by
allowing the total consequence of <s,w,c> to include those states of affairs of which
<s,w,c> is a sign. Alastair Norcross has argued that a view like BEV cannot be
acceptable to a consequentialist; but I argued, contrary to Norcross, that BEV is
perfectly compatible with consequentialism.
In Chapter 6, 1 used the notion of contributory value to solve a current problem
involving endangered species. I argued that if we were to accept the intuition of
Leibniz, Brentano, and others that, ceteris paribus
,
variety of goods is better than
homogeneity, we could account for the additional value of the last member of a
species. Since the last member of a species contributes to biological diversity in a way
that a member of a plentiful species does not, the last member of a species may be said
to have additional contributory value. This solution avoids troublesome problems that
arise when trying to attribute additional intrinsic or instrumental value to endangered
species. The fact that this solution has been overlooked demonstrates the importance
of recognizing the possibility of the existence of species of goodness other than
intrinsic and instrumental goodness.
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